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3Preface
Governance reform is widely recognised as being one of the mainstays of 
sustainable progress in developing countries. An efficient administration, 
backed by the rule of law and wide public participation in civic matters, 
can provide a cornerstone for stability and equitable economic growth. 
The Lao PDR has certainly made great strides in economic development 
over the first dozen years of this century. This report attempts to gauge 
the progress made in governance. The Lao Government has repeatedly 
committed itself to various aspects of reform and has received continued 
support in its efforts from a range of development partners, notably 
UNDP.
This report shows that significant advances have been made in certain 
areas, notably in the greater responsibility taken by the National            
Assembly, in the recent advent of civil society organisations, and in the 
steps towards decentralising delivery of public services. At the same 
time, significant challenges remain for Laos. Many reforms remain 
stymied by a lack of human capacity at various levels and while the law 
has become much stronger and clearer on paper, awareness and         
enforcement of law remain weak. 
This Working Paper explores these matters in some detail. It is at times 
frank and at times encouraging, providing food for thought for all 
policy makers, advisors and development practitioners.
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6Introduction 
Structure 
This study on Trends in the Governance Sector in the Lao PDR will 
examine the main institutions of government as well as key 
processes of governance including justice, decentralisation, 
equitable service delivery and participation. The review contains 
an executive summary, six substantive chapters, a conclusion and 
recommendations. 
Chapter 1 of the study will examine the past context, present 
character and the evolving nature of the main branches of 
government under the one-party democratic centralist state 
system of the Lao PDR comprising the Party, the National 
Assembly and the Executive, followed by a brief review of the 
policy making process and concluding with the main changes and 
future trends. 
This is followed by a series of chapters on the evolving context of 
key processes of governance, beginning with Justice (Chapter 2) 
and followed by Decentralisation (Chapter 3), Equitable Service 
Delivery (Chapter 4) and Participation (Chapter 5). The analysis in 
each of these chapters is based on an examination of the current 
situation, recent changes, drivers of change and future trends. 
Chapter 6 examines the main underlying structural factors that 
cut across the system of government and the processes of 
governance that determine the overall political economy of the 
state. 
Chapter 7 provides a concluding overview as well as a brief 
assessment of some factors that may serve to restrain the change 
process. Chapter 8 summarises the main recommendations arising 
from the analysis covering a canvas of potential actions by the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and/or other donor 
partners. These are broadly divided into strategic recommendations 
intended to address some of the underlying structural issues 
7associated with the change process, and operational  recommendations 
which relate more closely to the change processes that SDC is 
currently supporting. Recommendations on economic governance 
focus on issues concerned with foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
natural resource development which have a negative impact on 
equitable service delivery, and are not intended to relate to 
wider economic issues of monetary and  fiscal management.  
Method
The study was undertaken on an intermittent basis over a period 
of six weeks from December 2011 to February 2012. It is based 
on analysis of a considerable volume of secondary data, reports 
and publications as well as two-week period of intensive 
in-country fieldwork. 
Field investigations incorporated a variety of methods including 
information gathering based on a structured checklist, and 
semi-structured meetings with key informants and a wide range 
of stakeholders from government, donor agencies, international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and non-profit associations 
(NPAs), formal associations, the media, the private sector and 
other parts of society.     
8Executive Summary: 
Evolution and Context of the Governance Sector 
There has been a slow but steady evolution of the system of 
governance since the establishment of the Lao PDR in 1975. For 
the first 15 years, the country was governed by the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party (LPRP) in the absence of any formal constitution 
or judicial system. The respective agencies of government were 
fully subordinated to the one-party state model of democratic 
centralist government. Paradoxically, strong central Party control 
coexisted with weak governance, in that the Party was unable to 
extend direct control over all its agencies at provincial level. This 
resulted in a period through the 1980s that was characterised by 
a significant degree of decentralisation. Whilst this was consistent 
with an historical pattern of ruling regimes in Laos, it was also a 
function of the inability of the Party to exercise adequate direct 
control over fiscal and administrative matters at provincial and 
district levels. The combination of fiscal and administrative 
decentralisation, coupled to a weak central state with inadequate 
resources and capacities to manage central-local relations in an 
9effective manner, resulted in serious fiscal problems and poor 
overall governance. Certain provinces were able to take full 
advantage of their fiscal autonomy, whilst other provinces 
remained in deficit and the centre lacked sufficient fiscal 
buoyancy to engage in any systematic revenue sharing. 
The 4th Party Congress of 1986 saw a significant shift in policy 
towards greater economic liberalization with the introduction of 
the New  Economic Mechanism, which represented a shift from 
a command and centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
While economic transition was high on the reform agenda, the 
New Economic Mechanism was subsequently accompanied by 
certain political reforms, culminating in the adoption of the 
Constitution on August 14, 1991. This marked the transition from 
direct administration by the Party towards a modern state 
structure comprising a legislature, judiciary and executive as the 
main institutions of the government, functioning under the 
guidance of the Party. The National Assembly represented the 
main legislative organ with its rights and duties defined in the 
Constitution and by the Laws on the National Assembly. 
Regional assemblies ceased to exist by the time of third Legislature. 
This period also marked the reassertion of central control over 
provincial administration with the Central Bank being granted 
authority over monetary policy and management and the 
introduction of a national budget process to direct central and 
local expenditure, which had to be approved by the National 
Assembly. Recentralisation also served to increase central 
government control over the executive machinery, with all 
recruitment to the civil service having to be approved by the 
Department of Public Administration in the Prime Minister’s Office. 
The recentralisation drive also led to the abolition of tasseng as the 
lowest tier of administration. Districts became the main locus of 
local administration and service delivery, with responsibility for 
managing large geographic areas with limited staff while 
provincial administrations became the repository of most technical 
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expertise and resources at the sub-national level. PM Instruction 
01/2000 attempted to provide some clarity on the roles of local 
administration at provincial, district and village level but had 
limited operational impact.
Over the years the focus of day-to-day administration and 
management has shifted from the Party to the formal structures 
of the executive machinery, which is headed by the Prime 
Minister and by the Council of Ministers, comprising Deputy Prime 
Ministers, heads of line ministries and other significant agencies. 
The leadership structure in government presides over the civil 
service, which has slowly increased in size following an initial 
downsizing in the early 1990s. The civil service is classified into 
five grades ranging from support staff to professional grades. 
Each of these grades is divided into 15 steps through which staff 
progress based on educational qualifications and tenure. From 
2001 the responsibility for personnel management was transferred 
from the Central Committee of Organisation and Personnel, under 
the Party, to the Department of Public Administration and Civil 
Service in the Prime Minister’s Office. This subsequently evolved 
into the Public Administration and Civil Service Authority. 
The Constitution was extensively amended in 2003 to better 
reflect contemporary political and economic reality. It was passed 
by the National Assembly and promulgated by presidential decree 
after first being endorsed by the Politburo. Article 3 of the 
Constitution continues to assert the Party as the leading nucleus 
of government and Article 5 reaffirms democratic centralism as 
the basis of the system of governance. Thus the prevailing system 
of governance, in which all branches of government are 
subordinate to the Party and the Politburo is the highest authority 
of the Party, was formally reasserted in 2003 and provides the 
general context within which the contemporary system continues 
to function. It also provides the context within which all 
subsequent reforms have taken shape. 
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Whilst gradual changes in the composition, functions and 
character of the respective branches of government have 
continued to take place, these have not altered the fundamental 
hierarchy of the single-party state but have, nevertheless, served 
to provide a means of strengthening elements of representative 
government, basic rule of law, steadily improving administrative 
competencies and local service delivery. At the same time the 
distinctive functions of the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of government are emerging in a more obvious manner, 
and in a form where the rudiments of a system of checks and 
balances are now more visible than a few years ago. There has 
also been a reduction in the number of key decision-makers 
holding significant power in more than one branch of 
government, which not only reinforced Party supremacy but also 
confused lines of authority and functions.
 Recent Developments 
In spite a high degree of structural continuity in the Lao system 
of governance, there have been a number of recent changes and 
developments in the composition, character and functioning of 
the respective branches of government. These changes, although 
small in themselves, represent a notable shift towards a more 
open, professional and effective system, with the emergence of 
some degree of autonomy allowing for limited checks and 
balances across the system. At the same time these changes are 
leading to a greater degree of openness in the system and a 
widening of choice around policy options and alternatives. Whilst 
it is recognised that such changes are incremental in nature and 
do not represent any fundamental change in the power structure 
of government, they do, nevertheless, provide a path towards 
improved governance and the formation of a platform for future 
reform. 
The overall framework for governance reform is reflected in the 
National Socio-Economic Development Plan for the period 2006-2010 
12
and the accompanying Strategic Plan on Governance, which 
emphasises the government’s commitment to building “an effective, 
efficient, well-trained, honest and ethical public service”. This 
plan highlights the need for greater accountability, transparency 
and public participation in planning and decision making as well 
as more accessible and efficient legal enforcement institutions. 
The Government’s framework identifies four major governance 
themes; “Public Service Improvement, People’s Participation, Rule 
of Law and Sound Financial Management”. Each of these areas 
is seen as playing a critical role in ensuring the balanced and 
sustainable development of Lao society and administration. The 
following section will briefly consider the nature of these 
changes as they relate to the Party, Legislature, Executive,  judiciary, 
local governance, service delivery and participation.          
The Party, National Assembly and Executive
 Current Situation
Government in the Lao PDR is based on a single-party system in 
which the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) presides over 
a rapidly growing free-market economy and a vibrant Buddhist 
culture as a symbol of national identity. As defined in the 1991 
Constitution the Party has a “leading role” in all the main 
governance institutions of the country including the executive, 
legislature/ assembly, unions and other mass organisations, and 
the military. In this context the Party and Government are 
essentially one and the same and there is no distinction between 
the political and executive arms of government. The main function 
of the Party is to provide direction, formulate policy and provide 
guidance on all aspects and across all branches of government. 
Membership of the party is by invitation and dependent on 
evidence of strong commitment to Party work and future poten-
tial.                             
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Membership is crucial for advancement in government and pro-
vides privileged access to the wider machinery of government. 
Whilst the absence of a multi-party system inherently limits the 
extent of political contest, the Party is not a static entity and there 
is a certain amount of heterogeneity based around personal, group 
and regional loyalties. This provides a dynamic element in the 
power structure with a degree of competition that may coalesce 
around different policies and/or issues.
 Recent Changes 
There has been a gradual shift towards more coherent and 
strategic policy development. Previously, as reported by a SIDA 
study in 2003, the Party’s macro-policy targets tended not to 
match local conditions and the reality of diverse socio-economic 
situations, and were not always based on sound research. 
Another change has been the gradual elimination of duplicative 
institutions in the Party and Government in areas such as personnel 
management, audit and inspection and training and growing 
acceptance of the need for less overlap of people holding dual 
positions in Government and the Party. There is a greater recognition 
of the issue of corruption and a growing realization of the 
economic and social danger that this poses in terms of hindering 
economic development and poverty reduction. The Party is aware 
that this issue will need to be addressed in order to comply with 
standards and conditions associated with greater regional and 
global integration and membership of bodies such as the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World 
Trade organisation (WTO).   
The Party and Government are essentially one: there 
is no distinction between the State's political and 
executive arms. While Party membership is crucial for 
advancement in government, the Party is not a 
static entity –competition between people and ideas 
is reinforced through personal and regional loyalties. 
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With increasing education and knowledge levels 
among senior members, and greater interaction with 
donor partners, a gradual shift has occurred towards 
more coherent and strategic policy development: the 
Party now recognises the importance of governance 
reform and international integration.
The breakthrough strategy announced at the 9th Party Congress 
of 2011 recognises the importance of governance reform through 
a mutually reinforcing portfolio of political and administrative 
actions to strengthen the delivery of development priorities as 
defined in the National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) 
and other key strategies. 
 Drivers of Change
A key driver of change is the Party's more strategic approach to 
decision making, which has become based on more comprehensive 
and coherent policies and plans developed by the executive 
administration, often with donor support. Policies and plans are 
now founded on more systematic analysis of prevailing conditions 
and a more strategic focus on goals and priorities. This has been 
further reinforced through the activities and contributions of 
sector working groups and steering groups, bringing together 
representatives of different agencies to contribute to the policy 
process. Although sector policies may be selectively interpreted 
at senior Party level, they have nevertheless contributed to a more 
strategic debate and understanding amongst senior Party 
members, many of whom have been involved in the policy 
formulation process. 
Another reason for change in the character of Party functioning 
can be attributed to the altering composition of the Politburo and 
Central Committee. A new generation of younger and more 
educated personnel who have risen through the ranks of 
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government are now beginning to enter the upper echelons of 
Party leadership. These members bring with them a more 
professional grounding in administration, greater familiarity with 
economic and social development trends and issues, plus more 
understanding and interest in the imperatives of regional and 
global integration. Although this emerging group remains rooted 
in the one-party state system, and hence continues to exercise 
loyalties to the State, members are beginning to infuse the system 
with new ideas on strategy and greater tolerance for some degrees 
of flexibility in governance. 
The Party is today much more aware of issues around growing 
inequality and disparity between different regions, ethnicities and 
socio-economic groups. Explicit reference was made to this in a 
statement at the 9th Party Congress to “avoid too much 
development disparity between different regions and rich and 
poor” and in calls to stabilize the socio-political situation to 
maintain unity. In a direct reference to the issue of patronage, 
the Party referred to the need to “curtail the trend of selecting 
and promoting personnel from the same family lines, clans, groups 
or regions”. The Party has also made statements on the need to 
maintain healthy self-criticism and mutual criticism and to ensure 
adequate disciplinary measures are taken against members who 
commit offences. 
Other factors contributing to a greater acceptance of reform 
include the imperatives of regional and global integration, 
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particularly those associated with the ASEAN Economic 
Community, the ASEAN People’s Forum, access to the WTO, and 
achievement of the United Nations' Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), as well as the requirement to maintain external 
support from donors and investors. 
National Assembly
 Current Situation
The National Assembly (NA) is a uni-cameral institution with 132 
members (25% female) elected from a pre-selected list of 190 
nominated candidates. Most members come from central or local 
administrations and are elected on five-year terms from 
multi-member constituencies across all 17 provinces. The NA 
undertakes a legislative and oversight function and has six 
permanent committees covering law and justice; economics, 
planning and finance; social and cultural affairs; ethnic affairs; 
defence and security; and foreign affairs. There is also a Standing 
Committee (SC) of ten full-time members. The Assembly convenes 
in two ordinary sessions per year, each normally lasting two to 
three weeks. The Assembly agenda for the next five years includes 
the approval of 91 laws, comprising 48 new laws and 43 amended 
laws. 
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Overall the NA faces many constraints in terms of being able to 
function as an effective representative Assembly. These include 
the limited degree of choice over candidates that are pre-selected 
from an approved list; an electoral process that lacks consideration 
of policies and options; sessions of limited duration, compromising 
the extent and quality of policy and legislative debate and the 
scrutiny of budgets and accounts; plus a lack of the capacity, 
experience and resources that would enable members to be 
effective representatives. 
Whilst these constraints represent a substantial bundle of 
problems, the NA is beginning to assume a much more assertive 
role in the consideration of laws and the scrutiny of government 
and budgets. There has been a gradual change in the functioning 
of the Assembly over the years with more critical debates on 
issues of national concern such as logging, corruption, lack of 
budget transparency, land concessions etc. Members have 
established offices at provincial level to strengthen links with 
citizens and Assembly sessions have been televised. 
 Recent Changes 
The NA's evolving role has been further strengthened by a number of 
more recent changes over the last two legislatures. Although almost 
all NA members are party members, the electorate has exercised more 
discretion as to whether or not to support favoured party candidates 
over other approved candidates. Analysis shows the current Assembly 
membership is younger and more educated than in the past and 
two-thirds of all members now have university and post-graduate 
degrees. There fewer NA members holding dual administrative and 
legislative positions. 
At the same time the Assembly has benefited from donor funding and 
technical support, which has helped to improve internal management 
and constituency linkages, provided access to comparative experience 
on assembly functioning, and organised inter-session activities.
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While the National Assembly is beginning to assume 
a more assertive and critical role in scrutinising          
government budgets and representing constituency 
interests, public awareness of the Assembly's           
functions as a representative body remains low.
Most significantly the Assembly has been granted more authority 
to undertake oversight, with the State Audit Organisation 
reporting directly to the Assembly. This has enabled members to 
assume a more effective scrutiny role in terms of public expenditure 
and the issuing of directions to address budget anomalies and 
audit queries. 
 Drivers of Change
One main driver of change in the legislature comes through its 
evolving composition: a raft of newly elected members, many 
with higher educational qualifications, are eager to take on a 
more meaningful oversight role through active participation in 
Assembly Committees and by participating more purposefully in 
the scrutiny of public expenditure. 
New members are also more aware of their role in representing 
regional and constituency interests. This may lead to sub-power 
bases within the broader framework. Members, especially the 
heads and members of standing committees, have a better 
understanding of their role and function than in the past and 
many have received several rounds of training under donor 
assistance. 
Another reason for the changing role and character of the 
Assembly can be attributed to the direct interventions of a 
donor-support initiative, SELNA, which has helped to fund a series 
of capacity development activities, improve Assembly management, 
operate more productive inter-session activities and provide 
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exposure to comparative models of Assembly functioning. All this 
has contributed to a qualitative change in the scrutiny of 
government. 
Whilst the general public remains somewhat confused by the role 
and function of elected members, with some people not 
comprehending that members are elected to the Assembly, there 
is a growing awareness on the part of citizens that they may raise 
issues either directly with Assembly or through a new hot line 
system. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Party itself has 
recognised the need for a more active Assembly capable of 
performing an oversight and scrutiny role as a core part of the 
wider structure of government, and one which will in the long 
run help to uphold the legitimacy of the political system.  
The Executive
 Current Situation
The Prime Minister is head of Government and presides over a 
29-member Council of Ministers, comprising four deputy prime 
ministers (each with sectoral responsibility), 18 ministers, heads 
of agencies and the Governor of the Bank of the Lao PDR (Central 
Bank). Ministers are appointed by the National Assembly on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Party. Each 
minister nominates vice ministers and departmental heads 
(director-generals), who must then be approved by the Party 
leadership and the Prime Minister.
The executive arm of government is responsible for implementing 
and enforcing government policies, programmes and projects 
and has the authority to issue binding decrees to implement and 
enforce policies and laws. Most ministries have de-concentrated 
structures that interact with provincial administrations and 
districts. Party cells operate within every ministry and provincial 
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administration, and there is active recruitment of promising young 
professionals into the Party. 
There are 130,000 staff, including teachers and health staff, 
working as civil servants in the public administration system. 
Around 82,500 staff (44% female) work at district level with a 
further 28,666 (35% female) at provincial level and 21,297 (44% 
female) at central level. More than 52% of all civil servants work 
in the education sector. Only 10% work in the health sector, 6% 
in agriculture and just 2% in public works. Nearly two-thirds of 
all civil servants are below the age of 40. 
A number of problems continue to affect the operation of the 
civil service, including low levels of capacity and skills, pay bands 
that do not reflect the jobs or responsibilities being performed, 
plus outmoded and non-transparent systems and procedures that 
lead to poor quality and slow delivery of services. Accountability 
systems are weak and levels of discretion remain high. The total 
wage bill of the Civil Service accounts for just under 5% of GDP. 
 Recent Changes 
There have been a number of changes in the executive machinery 
of government in recent years, contributing to the gradual 
development of a more competent and professional civil service. 
The number of line ministries has grown to 18 to provide 
greater policy direction and management over a more 
comprehensive range of sectors and services than in the past. The 
size of the civil service has grown to over 130,000, including 
teachers and health workers, the vast majority of whom are at 
district and local level. The agency responsible for the 
management of the civil service has recently been upgraded from 
a sub ministry to full ministry status as the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MOHA). 
The policy framework for strengthening the civil service is 
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contained within Decree 82/PM of 2003, which defines the 
framework for selection, recruitment, deployment, grade and 
step determination, training, and disciplinary action. Another 
important initiative is the Decree on incentives for civil servants 
working in remote areas, entailing government approval of a 
budget allocation of 62 billion kip (about US$7.7 million) for the 
fiscal year October 2011-September 2012. This represents an 
important step in recognising the effort of civil servants working 
in rural and remote areas and in encouraging them to work in 
such areas, which is especially relevant for teachers and health 
workers. It is estimated that around 22,300 civil servants will be 
eligible for an additional allowance equivalent to 50% of a 
monthly salary. 
A number of pilot initiatives over the last five years have been 
designed to contribute to improved performance. These include 
the development of a web-enabled personnel information 
management system, the preparation of specimen job descriptions 
across all departments, the development of methodologies for 
organisational restructuring, the formulation of a Civil Service 
Strategy and Code of Conduct, a substantial amount of capacity 
building and training (funded largely through multi donor support 
to the Governance and Public Administration Reform Programme), 
as well as bilateral initiatives on training and capacity development. 
Most recently, MOHA has designed a new comprehensive 
programme for strengthening governance and public 
administration. This is intended to bring together its internal work 
priorities with additional donor funding to assist in strengthening 
a range of areas, including the institutional and legal frameworks 
for public administration; organisation and management systems; 
local administration and service delivery; civil service management, 
research and training. Altogether this represents an ambitious 
agenda designed to improve performance of the public 
administration system and will complement new Party policy 
directions on service delivery and decentralisation. Here a critical 
future area of concern is the need for an improved pay and 
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grading system that will relate more closely to responsibility and 
performance rather than educational qualification and tenure. 
 Drivers of Change 
The main driver of the recent changes in the executive arm of 
government can be attributed to a growing interest on the part 
of the Party and senior government functionaries in the need to 
develop an efficient and effective public administration capable 
of formulating strategic policies and plans in line with national 
priorities. There is wide recognition in all branches of government 
that an effective and accountable civil service is key to implementing 
and managing public infrastructure and services which are crucial 
foundations for future economic growth, and the basis for 
realising improved human development outcomes.  
The Party and senior functionaries in government have been 
eager to support initiatives designed to improve performance of 
public administration and to increase the effectiveness of service 
delivery. There is a strong interest in meeting MDG goals in the 
medium term and in graduating from LDC status by 2020. It is 
widely understood at all levels of government that this requires 
a better resourced, more competent and motivated civil service. 
Evidence of this increased understanding can be seen in the recent 
decree to provide an additional salary allowance up to 50% to 
civil servants willing to deliver services in remote areas.  
Evolving ministry structures and emphasis on            
governance reform are helping to develop a more 
effective public administration. Although the civil 
service remains hampered by low capacity, poor 
salaries and non-transparent systems, steps are being 
taken to improve staff conditions, accountability and 
efficiency. If governance reform is to be effective, it 
should ideally be locally owned and driven,             
incremental in nature and practical in ambition.
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Another important factor has been the prominence given to 
governance reform in the NSEDP as expressed in the Strategic 
Plan on Governance and the Governance Round Table which 
brings together government and donors to work towards a shared 
objective. This has set out the four key pillars of reform and 
includes a strong emphasis on strengthening public 
administration. The high-level policy endorsement of such reform 
has enabled proponents in government as well as donor partners 
and project staff to push the reform agenda and support 
specific reform initiatives.    
A number of initiatives can also be directly attributed to the 
long-standing partnership between donors and the government to 
support governance and public administration reform through the GPAR 
programme, which has been functioning for more than a decade. This 
programme represents a long-term commitment to the process of reform 
and has been implemented in a manner which has built strong 
ownership within the government, especially the MOHA. This 
combination of funding,  technical support and partnership has 
facilitated the piloting of a number of reforms that are likely to be 
mainstreamed over the course of time. 
 Future Trends 
It is clear from the above that whilst the overall structure of the 
one-party state system in Laos remains firmly entrenched, a number of 
significant changes have taken place that clearly indicate a trend towards 
a more open, accountable and effective government, even within the 
constraints mentioned above. This trend is unlikely to reverse as the 
Party leadership has become far more aware in recent years of the 
principles of good governance as a necessary underpinning for political 
stability and greater integration into the regional and global economy. 
This means that there is a degree of certainty in terms of the 
government's commitment to reforms, although these will be 
selectively pursued and adopted in a manner that does not undermine 
the  structure of the State. 
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This presents an interesting challenge to those engaged in helping to 
formulate and support the process of governance reform. Progress in 
this will require a high degree of political awareness as to what is feasi-
ble and practical, as well as a sound understanding as to which reforms 
can have important beneficial impacts for citizens without necessitating 
a fundamental restructuring of the system as a whole. Here the main risks 
are associated with the promotion of an externally driven reform agen-
da without adequate ownership on the part of government and the risks 
associated with unrealistic reform time frames which are driven by 
programme and project imperatives rather than the objectives of reform 
itself.    
Legal Sector and Justice System 
 Current Situation
Establishment of the rule of law has been a gradual and evolving 
process over the last two decades. A body of law is slowly being 
developed and applied in the courts. The Government is committed 
to strengthening the rule of law and has approved a sizeable 
number of new laws and statutes. A growing number of educated 
and informed citizens are aware of the emerging body of law and 
its implications. Although the vast majority of citizens remain 
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largely unaware of laws, they are familiar with traditional forms 
of dispute settlement and operate comfortably within the context 
of village mediation. 
A legal structure has been established, along with professional 
personnel, and a Legal Sector Master Plan has been formulated 
to strengthen human resource development. However, the large 
number of new laws that has been approved or drafted has made 
it difficult for officials to master and apply them. Even in the 
Ministry of Justice, and among the few professional lawyers, 
knowledge of the new laws and their application is sketchy. The 
interpretation of some laws is unclear and requires testing in a 
constitutional court. 
An encouraging sign in moving towards further reforms and 
improvements in the legal sector is that at its 9th Congress the 
Party clearly accepted the objective of making Laos a “Rule of 
Law State” and is consequently considering different options for 
how to bring about the requisite changes. Although there have 
been no formal legal cases against public bodies, the government 
is now taking a strong interest in exchanging views and ideas 
with countries such as Vietnam and China, where the legal system 
operates with sufficient independence to be in a position to bring 
a case against a public body. Vietnam has established a separate 
administrative court to address this issue and there have been 
many cases in Vietnam and China where senior members of the 
Party and government, including Politburo and Standing Committee 
members, have faced legal charges and severe penalties. 
The main challenges in strengthening the system to move towards 
a more fully developed rule of law state include the need to build 
and strengthen the body of independent professional lawyers 
and to develop mechanisms that enable the justice system to 
function in a more independent and professional manner. This 
will require a clearer separation of powers between the agencies 
of the justice system, plus substantial improvements in the nature 
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and operation of legal processes and procedures and in the 
capacity of those within the agencies to implement such 
processes. 
There is also a need for a substantial increase among people at 
all    levels of society in awareness of the law, the rights of citizens 
under the law and the application of the law. Many stakeholders 
point out that with a strong, more independent and effective 
legal system, many of the underlying problems or weaknesses 
associated with the underlying economic, political and social 
structures could be addressed, thus elevating support for 
strengthening the rule of law as a key strategic platform that is 
at the same time consistent with current Party and government 
policy. 
 Recent Changes 
There has been a recent move to rationalise the former 103 District 
Courts into 39 Area Courts, ensuring at least two courts per 
province. This is part of judicial restructuring, bringing local justice 
under the Supreme Court rather than the Ministry of Justice, and 
is significant in that it attempts to align the courts to the resources 
available to run these effectively.
There has been a steady increase in the size and competency of 
the judiciary over the last few years, with plans to expand the 
number of judges to over 1,500 by 2020. Within the court system, 
specific chambers have been established for family and juvenile 
cases and the justice ministry is setting up a Notary office. There 
are now ten legal centres offering a wide variety of legal advice 
and 12 private law firms, including four international firms licensed 
to provide legal advice. 
There has been substantial progress in the drafting and approval 
of a total of 88 laws to date. These include several important laws 
on the legal sector itself, such as the Law on the People’s Court, 
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the Law on the Public Prosecutor, the Penal Law and the Law on 
Criminal Procedure. At the same time more than 400 
international laws and treaties have been ratified - including six of 
the nine core UN human rights treaties - and the Ministry of Justice 
has participated in the first drafting of the ASEAN Declaration on 
Human Rights. 
Another important development has been the strengthening of the 
village mediation system, which for most citizens provides a more 
accessible, familiar and meaningful means of addressing legal issues and 
disputes, than does entering into the alien environment of courts and 
judicial processes. Indeed, many legal systems worldwide are struggling 
to introduce such systems as a low-cost, swift and effective means of 
delivering justice. 
Under a new law, defence lawyers will now be able to meet clients 
suspected of a criminal offence before police investigations are 
completed. Both the Ministry of Justice and the National Assembly 
Standing Committee on Law support this welcome initiative. 
A comprehensive Legal Sector Master Plan (LSMP) 2009 has been 
formulated to help establish the rule of law as a solid foundation of the 
justice system by 2020. The Plan places considerable emphasis on the 
development of human resources within the legal sector, in particular 
training of all personnel including Judges, Prosecutors and the Police, 
and upgrading the educational qualifications of these personnel.
 Drivers of Change  
A number of important recent changes are directly attributable to 
increased recognition by the Party leadership of the significance of the 
rule of law in underpinning the structure and systems of governance 
and in mediating social and economic relations in society as whole. 
There is an understanding that established rule of law principles are a 
prerequisite for engaging with the external world in a structured and 
productive manner, for example in terms of attracting investment, in 
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negotiating avenues for export, or in engaging with donor partners 
and other international agencies. 
Despite increased allocation of resources to establish 
new legal structures and staffing, the justice system 
displays fundamental shortcomings from investigation 
through to prosecution, sentencing and enforcement. 
There are signs that the Party and Government are 
committed to incremental reforms and rule of law, a 
fundamental prerequisite of good governance, is 
gradually being developed and applied. The process 
is likely to take many years and will require more 
focused support from donors and a sector-wide          
approach along the whole chain of actors and              
institutions. 
Statements at the 9th Party Congress clearly demonstrate the 
Party’s commitment to moving towards a Rule of Law State and 
the Government has been showing a keen interest in exchanging 
views and ideas with countries such as Vietnam and China on 
how the legal system can operate with sufficient independence 
to be in a position to bring a case against a public body.
Another important influence on the change process can be 
attributed to the plethora of international treaties and conventions 
that have been ratified in recent years. The Legal Sector Master 
Plan also represents a driver of change in the justice sector. It sets 
out an ambitious reform agenda that the justice ministry has 
committed to, and has already had some impact in terms 
bringing about change in the sector. Most significantly the plan 
addresses the issues of weak investigation and poor enforcement, 
which represent major challenges in the sector. Finally but not 
insignificantly, donor partner assistance is helping to improve 
access to justice and international law as well as supporting the 
drafting of new laws and amendments. Taken together, these 
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activities have led to a degree of engagement and influence that 
has contributed to the change process. 
 
 Future Trends 
The slow but discernible trend towards legal sector reform is 
a fundamental prerequisite of good governance. In spite of an 
increase in resources in terms of structures and staffing, there 
are fundamental shortcomings and weaknesses in the 
operation of justice from the level of investigation through to 
prosecution, court procedure, judgements, sentencing and 
enforcement. In spite of these weaknesses, there are signs that 
the Party and Government are committed to putting into place 
incremental reforms that will result in a more effective legal 
system capable of delivering justice across all segments of 
society, including within the government system itself. Given 
the political sensitivity of such changes, it is likely that the 
process will take many years although it is evident that certain 
subjects, such as commercial law, may gain more traction in 
terms of the development and codification of legal frameworks 
and the potential operation of fast-track legal processes. 
At the same time, although there has been substantial 
assistance in the drafting of new laws in a wide variety of 
sectors, focused support from donors has been limited in nature 
and largely confined to a few selected areas of the legal system 
that may have more instant appeal, such as access to justice 
and international law. It is clear that the lack of a well 
functioning legal sector is a major obstacle to addressing a 
number of underlying structural problems in the contemporary 
political economy of Laos and hence this sector represents a 
critically important aspect of governance reform. Without an 
effective system of enforcement and inadequate legal 
processes it will be difficult to realise the goal of good 
governance.        
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The reforms required to address all the problems of the sector 
represent a substantial task, and one that it is unlikely a single 
donor alone can address, since support requires a sector-wide 
approach to address the various complementary and reinforcing 
interventions along the chain of actors and institutions. 
In the meantime, a more feasible approach may be to focus 
on the enforcement of a much smaller number of laws and 
decrees of strategic significance in terms of wider development. 
These may include the responsible management of natural 
resources, FDI investments and the utilisation of public money 
(allocation and spending) in the context of the 2006 Budget 
Law.
Decentralisation 
 Current Situation
 
Laos has a unitary system of governance based on multiple 
subordinate levels of the same government, where sub-national 
units of administration have no constitutional powers over 
functions and finances. Local governance remains an elusive goal 
in the context of recent Lao political structuring, which has seen 
early decentralisation built around provinces, districts and tasseng 
alongside local councils with a high degree of administrative and 
fiscal autonomy at provincial level, revert to a more centralised 
system based on de-concentrated local administration functioning 
in the absence of any formal representative structures at local 
level. 
Since 2000, the Government and Party have followed a policy of 
de-concentration. The current system is based exclusively on 
administrative units functioning at provincial and local levels in the 
absence of any system of elected representation. Decentralisation 
only finds expression as a form of de-concentration of State 
authority, where sub-national units have the responsibility for 
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implementing centrally determined policies. Prime Minister’s Decree 
01/ 2000, which highlighted the need for more clarity on central-local 
relations, has in practice done little to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of sub-national units, nor has it yet helped to 
strengthen managerial autonomy at different levels of 
administration. 
The State Budget Law of 2006 has provided a framework for 
strengthening central fiscal control through initiatives such as the 
National Accounting System, although the process is not yet 
complete. Whilst central control has increased national revenues 
and provides an improved basis for more equitable fiscal transfers 
to provinces, it has clearly reduced fiscal autonomy at district level. 
Policies, laws and reforms underpinning the changes in relationships 
(between policymakers as the service providers and citizens as 
clients) are fragmented and lack clarity. This blurring of the roles 
and responsibilities of different tiers of administration compromises 
the ability of citizens to hold government to account and the 
ability of policymakers to hold service providers to account. 
Although there are mechanisms in place for community participation 
in the social sectors, the effectiveness of this participation is 
constrained by the inability of the system to be able to respond 
to citizens' views on policies, resource allocation and investment 
priorities.
The District Development Fund (DDF) component of the 
Governance and Public Administration Reform (GPAR) programme 
represents one of the most significant initiatives in promoting 
decentralisation to date. The DDF has piloted decentralised 
planning and financing of local infrastructure and services through 
discretionary block grant funding to 35 districts, and is in the 
process of being up-scaled to 66 districts through a proposed 
new phase. The DDF has shown that local administration can be 
used more effectively to manage and deliver small investments 
which target locally identified and prioritized needs and services 
in a manner that is cost effective, and with greater added value 
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than when the same services are delivered directly from the 
centre or province.  
 Recent Changes 
There has been little significant change to the structure and/or 
form of de-concentrated administration in the last few years in 
spite of the opportunity provided by Decree 01/PM to redefine 
more clearly the mandates, responsibilities and functions of 
different tiers of administration and/or to provide more 
operational autonomy to districts. 
One of the more important developments in this arena in recent 
years has been the piloting of discretionary block grants to district 
administration accompanied by capacity and systems development 
for improved budgeting, planning and expenditure management 
of local administration under the DDF. This initiative has provided 
strong evidence of the efficacy of greater fiscal and managerial 
autonomy at local level, resulting in significant value addition in 
terms of service delivery (see GPAR Outcome Evaluation 2005) 
when combined with participatory planning and implementation. 
Party policy calls for strengthened local administration 
to improved service delivery and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs is formulating proposals for greater autonomy 
in district budget management and staffing plus        
establishment of locally elected councils in the           
provinces. Previous attempts at decentralisation 
prior to 1991 resulted in a fiscal crisis and recentralisation. 
However, the Government is now considering granting 
more power to districts and has the positive example 
of the recent DDF pilot activities, which provided 
discretionary block grant funding. 
The most significant recent development, however, is contained 
in a policy statement of the 2011 Party Congress which 
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highlighted the need to strengthen local administration as a means 
of ensuring improved service delivery to local citizens. 
At the same time, MOHA is now in the process of formulating 
proposals for greater district autonomy in planning, budgeting 
expenditure management and staffing, and will in due course be 
working on proposals for the establishment of elected councils 
at provincial level. It is anticipated by MOHA that DDF pilot 
experience will provide the basis for the proposed way forward, 
which may include the provision of discretionary block grant funds 
in some form. 
 Drivers of Change
A previous attempt at decentralisation prior to 1991 resulted in 
weak administrative control at provincial level plus a fiscal crisis 
at the centre. The Government ran short of cash and was unable 
to meet recurrent expenditure outlays in some months and also 
unable transfer money to help equalize disparities across 
provinces. 
This experience led to recentralisation of government, and since 
the 1991 Constitution, despite an attempt to clarify the mandates 
and functions of local administration in Decree PM 01/ 2000, 
there has been little will to consider any form of administrative 
restructuring or assigning of new powers over revenues and 
functions to local administrations. At the same time, 
donor-supported initiatives to strengthen fiscal management have 
resulted in the centralisation of revenue management and the 
introduction of a new uniform National Accounting System.     
A growing interest in the need for improving local service delivery 
has led the Government to reconsider granting more authority 
to district administration. This has been complemented by the 
positive experience of discretionary block grant funding under 
the multi-donor funded DDF component of GPAR. This initiative 
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has provided strategic funding for fiscal devolution and 
decentralised planning and expenditure management at district 
level. The experience has provided a template for future reforms 
and is likely to influence a new decree that will replace PM 01/2000 
and help shape subsequent policies aimed at strengthening local 
administration.  
 Future Trends 
The Government is seeking ways of increasing the effectiveness 
of local administrations, as a prerequisite for more effective service 
delivery, and as reflected in the new strategy announced at the 
9th Party Congress in 2011. This new trend towards decentralisation 
is likely to be influenced by initiatives such as DDF in areas such 
as planning and expenditure management as well as greater 
autonomy over administrative and staffing functions at district 
level. It is also likely that local administrations will have greater 
power and authority over expenditure, including planning and 
implementation of schemes at local level. 
There is also a strong possibility that a greater representative 
element may be introduced to provincial governance through the 
establishment of local councils at provincial level. These councils 
are likely to be granted authority to oversee the functions of 
provincial administration and to scrutinise provincial budgets and 
expenditures. Such an initiative would provide an important 
additional element of political representation and, being closer 
to the electorate, would provide a new avenue for strengthening 
voice and accountability. 
There is a risk that a push towards decentralisation in the absence 
of capacity at local level could undermine local development 
activities and service delivery. This is unlikely, however, given the 
reasonably limited mandates that will be granted. The DDF has 
shown that districts are able to assume more responsibility and 
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to deliver higher quality services with limited supervision and 
support. There is also a risk that the process could proceed too 
fast and lead to failure, ultimately resulting in a second swing 
back to centralisation. At the same time there is a slight risk that 
donors will not be able to adjust existing programmes or funding 
commitments in an adequate manner and will thus not be in a 
position to support the process.  
Equitable Service Delivery
 Current Situation 
Laos is enjoying a period of sustained economic growth, with 
GDP growth reaching 7.5% in 2010. This has been primarily 
driven by expansion in the primary and tertiary sectors, 
especially mining (gold and copper) hydropower, and 
infrastructure, along with growth in the services sector (9% in 
2008). Although agriculture remains the single largest employer, 
providing work for about three-quarters of the workforce, the 
share of agriculture as a proportion of GDP has declined. 
There has been a steady decline in the number of people below 
the poverty line, from 34% in 2002/03 to 28% by 2007/08 (MPI, 
DoS 2010). Although the population grew by more than one 
million between 1992/93 and 2007/08, the absolute number of 
poor declined to just over 1.5 million. There has been a steady 
improvement in a number of critical human development 
indicators, with for example net primary school enrolment 
increasing.
In spite of these improvements the country remains one of the 
poorest in the region. A sizeable proportion of the total 
population live on the margins of poverty and are vulnerable to 
economic and environmental changes and shocks. Disparities, 
such as gender inequalities, are growing at all levels of society 
and in all regions, although they are more pronounced among 
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ethnic communities. Rural-urban disparities are most pronounced 
for children and the 2007 Public Expenditure Review identified a 
lack of a pro-poor focus in many areas of the budget. 
In response to the above, the Government and donor partners 
have developed various initiatives on equitable service delivery, 
including the Village Development Fund (VDF), which has 
provided a devolved fund for livelihoods and small infrastructure 
in 54 districts. The Leading Committee for Rural Development 
and Poverty Reduction oversees the Poverty Reduction Fund (PRF), 
which is designed to bring about a measurable reduction in 30 
priority districts in Phase 1, and in the 274 poorest kumban 
(village clusters) in Phase 2. The PRF also has 350 billion kip to 
spend on infrastructure in the 26 poorest districts. The DDF 
represents another initiative to promote equitable service delivery. 
Equity approaches have also been emphasised in sector projects 
such as the Lao Extension for Agriculture Project (LEAP) which 
has targeted poorest households with a strong emphasis on 
women and ethnic groups. All initiatives promote greater 
inclusion in terms of gender and ethnicity. 
 Recent Changes 
In order to address NSEDP targets and MDG priorities, the 
Government has actively promoted a strategy of targeting service 
delivery, initially at the 47 poorest districts and now the 64 
poorest areas. This strategy has served to guide the Government’s 
VDF initiative and has been incorporated into the PRF which is 
implemented with donor partner support. 
The Leading Committee on Rural Development and Poverty 
Eradication provides direction to the various initiatives designed 
to increase equitable service delivery through a targeted approach 
focusing on the poorest areas. As a consequence there has been 
an increase in the delivery of basic education, health, agriculture 
and small-scale infrastructure services in many remote areas.
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The PRF has refined its targeting mechanism for reaching the 
poorest and most service deficient communities in its current 
phase by focusing on kumban rather than districts and the 
programme now covers over 270 of the poorest kumban as 
opposed to 21 of the 47 poorest districts.
 Laos remains one of the poorest countries in the         
region, with many people living on the margins of 
poverty. Disparities and inequalities are growing, 
with rural people, women, children and ethnic           
communities more vulnerable to economic and          
environmental shocks. In the last five years steps have 
been taken to increase the pro-poor policy focus, with 
local administrations being strengthened to improve 
service delivery equity. Sustained technical assistance 
and different forms of funding are needed to further 
develop the targeting of services.
This has been complemented by other governance and service 
delivery initiatives such as that of DDF, which has also developed 
a methodology and process for strengthening equitable service 
delivery as well as the direct provision of discretionary block grant 
funding to districts for small-scale infrastructure and services. 
Various evaluations have shown that this initiative has been 
successful in building the capacity of district administrations for 
more equitable service delivery, as well as increasing access to 
services for many remote communities and households across 30 
districts. 
 Drivers of Change
Much of the recently declared rationale for strengthening local 
administration has been associated with the need to improve 
service delivery as a core governance objective. This emphasis on 
strengthening service delivery largely emanates from an improved 
socio-economic and sector planning process, which has shown 
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that aggregate growth and poverty reduction has been 
accompanied by widening inequalities and disparities that have 
distinct social, ethnic and geographical characteristics. Inequalities 
and disparities manifest themselves in human development 
outcomes which can be measured against MDG goals. 
Another driver of change has come from the elevation of service 
related goals and targets in the national planning and policy 
formulation process, which has placed equitable service delivery 
at the centre of the 6th and 7th National Socio-Economic 
Development Plans (NSEDP) over the last five years. This has led 
to a much greater focus on delivery-targeted services focusing on 
the poorest areas and communities as part of the wider 
development strategy, and has given shape to a number of 
specific programme and project interventions.   
At the same time the Party and Government recognise the 
potential dangers of ignoring inequalities and disparities across 
regions, ethnic groups and social strata. The Party has explicitly 
referenced the need to address this problem to ensure unity and 
avoid social unrest. 
 Future Trends
The reality of growth and inequality, which are simultaneously 
prevalent in many developing and transitional countries, means 
that there will continue to be a strong government emphasis on 
increasing equitable service delivery in a variety of ways. This is 
reinforced by the fact that the Government is committed to 
meeting MDG targets and graduating from LDC status by 2020. 
The 7th National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011-2015) 
recognises both the incidence of poverty and growing disparities, 
and the importance of delivering more services in a more 
equitable manner. The NSEDP also recognises the need to improve 
service delivery at local level through participatory approaches and 
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processes. This is further reinforced by the National Programme for 
Rural Development and Poverty Eradication, a key input to the NSEDP 
that has identified a series of national priority goals further reinforcing 
the principles and approaches of equitable services. 
This trend is likely to be reinforced by the donor community, which 
is firmly committed to focusing development assistance on the 
poorest and most service deficient communities. The trend may 
be further accentuated in the context of current austerity 
measures in a number of donor partner countries, where 
governments will come under pressure to focus aid on direct, 
measurable and tangible outputs that have direct benefit for 
poorest. Whilst this is a noble objective in itself, it could undermine 
the need to support systemic reforms that may, in the long run, 
make a greater contribution to poverty reduction and social well 
being. 
The implication of sustained emphasis on equitable service 
delivery is that not only will there be a continuing need for 
funding in the short run, but there will be an equally important 
need for technical assistance to help develop and refine new 
methods for targeting services and to ensure that funding is 
aligned to service deficiencies and disparities, since these are few 
well developed tools and procedures to guide this at present. At 
the same time there will be a need to experiment with different 
forms of funding, including support for recurrent services as well 
as capital. This is an area that requires greater attention in order 
to address the need for improved service outreach.   
Participation
 Current Situation
There are a variety of forms of participation ranging from indirect 
participation through representative institutions such as the 
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National Assembly, to the approved Party mass organisations and 
formal business associations, other interest groups and civil 
society organisations (CSOs), Non Profit Associations (NPAs), the 
media and other forms of communication. It appears that the 
overall environment, in both formal structures of decision making 
as well as in the planning and implementation of local-level 
development, is much more conducive to participation than it 
was a few years ago. Decree 115 of 2009 on Association marks 
an important step in the formal recognition of Non Profit 
Agencies as partners in development. The 7th NSEDP explicitly 
mentions the role of civil society in development and functionaries 
in government are more accepting of NPAs and CSOs as potential 
partners in the delivery of services. 
The main institution of representative government, through which 
citizens participate indirectly in the process of legislative 
approval and oversight of public expenditure, is the National 
Assembly and its 132 members elected from multi-constituency 
provinces. A number of features constrain the National Assembly 
in its functioning. These include the nature and composition of 
members, all of whom are elected from a pre-approved list of 
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candidates primarily from within government, the short duration 
of sittings in relation to the increasing volume of work, plus the 
capacity and resources of members and lack of constituency 
management. However, Assembly members are becoming young-
er and better educated, have assumed a more pro-active role in 
the approval of legislation and scrutiny of government budgets and 
expenditure, and are making Assembly observations public through 
TV and other media. Many mass organisations and professional 
associations have also begun to change their way of working. The 
Lao Federation of Trade Unions has begun to play a more substantial 
role in promoting workers' rights and interests while the Lao 
National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LNCCI) reports good 
progress in pushing the policy envelope in a number of sectors 
including tourism, business, mining and leasing.
The civil society sector is small and nascent with only 80 NPAs 
active in development. These organisations are primarily engaged 
in community development activities rather than advocacy, and are 
still struggling to establish their credibility with government and 
donors. Decree 115 marks an important step in the formal 
recognition of NPAs and CSOs as partners in development. 
Civil society remains largely nascent under Laos's democratic 
centralist regime, with the main forms of political participation 
mediated through formal mass organisations closely associated 
with the ruling Party. Over the years there has been a gradual 
emergence of a variety of formal associations backed by 
government as well as a more recent mushrooming of private 
schools, colleges and training centres. Such organisations are 
rarely engaged in development and remain largely conservative in 
nature, although some, such as the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry are beginning to function more effectively as lobby groups. 
There has been a burgeoning of cable and satellite TV with 
coverage extending into remote areas. There are five national 
daily newspapers with a circulation of 12,000, reaching 
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provinces and remote districts, and some papers offer more critical 
insights into policy than in the past. There are 29 national TV 
stations offering a wide mix of channels via cable and satellite 
connections. Official government-run media remains less popular and 
all media remains subject to censorship. Most media organisations 
practice a reasonable degree of self censorship although in recent 
years there has been greater acceptance of discussion of issues of 
concern. There has been significant growth in web-enabled media 
which provides a more educated segment of the population with 
access to news debates and exposure to topical issues, although 
almost none of these directly relate to the Lao context.   
 Recent Changes 
Recent changes in the character and functioning of the National 
Assembly have already been discussed in the section above on 
government. Hence this section will be confined to an assessment 
of the main changes affecting civil society and the media.  
There has been a positive shift in official views and attitudes 
towards civil society organisations as those in government recognise 
the need to open up the space in service delivery for a wider range 
of actors and resources. In spite of a slow and intrusive registration 
process, NPA stakeholders feel that the overall environment for 
civil society is improving and that there are new opportunities for 
engagement based on strategic alliances with those in government 
who express an interest in aligned areas. This provides a useful 
platform for CSOs/NPAs and individuals in government to coalesce 
around a set of related interests.
A recent and significant development relates to a change in the 
legal environment governing non-profit associations, which may now 
seek registration and formal recognition. Whilst the registration 
process is onerous and slow, this nevertheless represents an 
important step in opening up the space for alternative actors to 
work alongside government. It should be recognised that these 
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organisations will be largely confined to service delivery rather than 
advocacy or rights based activities. 
Opportunities for participation in decision making 
and local-level development are growing. The NA 
and other state organisations have become more 
involved in government policy and oversight while 
the environment for civil society is improving. NPAs 
and CSOs now have legal recognition, but their status 
remains nascent and most avoid a rights-based          
advocacy approach. Some formal associations are 
beginning to function more effectively as lobby 
groups. The number of media outlets and access to 
foreign media has risen but while discussion of    
policy is now tolerated, censorship remains tight. 
Expanding mobile phone and internet networks  provide 
potential avenues for web-enabled participation,           
although the State has begun to increase controls.  
While there has been a major expansion in print, radio and TV 
media in recent years in terms of access, choice and coverage, 
the content remains largely confined to the dissemination of of-
ficial news and information or entertainment. A new media law 
has enhanced the role of mass media. Although popular interest 
in the media is almost wholly restricted to foreign (Thai) entertain-
ment, increased access to foreign news is exposing people to new 
ideas and events. Mobile phone networks are quickly expanding 
and have reached over one million subscribers generating greater 
access to communication for over 60% of the rural population. 
New forms of communication, based on various forms of social 
media accessed through portable web-enabled technology, offer 
significant opportunity for information sharing and dissemination 
as well as potential avenues for participation which could be 
actively explored and developed in the future.  
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 Drivers of Change
The essential driving force behind the recent changes in approach 
to participation would appear to be based on a series of 
complementary factors. At the formal level, it is increasingly 
understood in government that the National Assembly can and 
should play a more pro-active oversight role over legislation and 
expenditure, since it can provide a level of checks and balances 
without threatening the foundations and fabric of the system 
within which it operates and derives its authority. 
At the civil society level, there is a growing acceptance that NPAs 
can operate as potential partners in community development and 
this has been reinforced by donors and NPA internal positioning 
on this issue. At the same time the domestic CSO sector is seen 
as more easily managed than international NGOs, which often 
assume an advocacy role that is less comfortable for the Government. 
Whilst domestic media remains largely censored, it is increasingly 
difficult for the State to control access to the rapidly expanding 
flow of information both regionally and virtually. There is thus a 
widening window of opportunity for new forms of participatory 
engagement in governance by a growing body of citizens.       
 Future Trends
As already shown in the Governance section, the representative 
role of the National Assembly is gradually taking shape with a 
new composition and character, enabling it to assume a more 
pro-active policy oversight role. With focused funding and support 
on building more effective constituency representation and 
grater oversight capacity, the role could be substantially enhanced 
in future. 
There is a positive trend in the overall direction of increased 
participation of citizens in governance through various formal, 
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semi-formal, and informal institutions. Around 80 NPAs are active 
in the development sector and there is also increasing acceptance 
in government towards civil society organisations as potentially 
useful partners in community development. Although NPAs and 
CSOs have adopted an essentially embedded role in support of 
existing development processes, rather than adopting a more 
rights-based advocacy approach, this is probably a more 
pragmatic and instrumental strategy in the present context. 
Web-enabled communication remains an untapped mechanism 
for voice and active citizenship. Whist it is accepted that the 
current cultural context of Laos is such that the vast majority of 
the population are largely apathetic to government and simply 
opt out of any form of structured participation, there is a 
substantial opportunity to shape ideas and channel energies in a 
more meaningful way through social media, which offers 
growing outreach in a highly accessible and evolving form. It is 
likely that the Government will begin to exercise more control 
over the use of social media: just recently users of mobile phones 
have been required to register with the authorities for security 
purposes.   
Recommendations 
 Strategic Recommendations
Political Governance and Social Processes  
1. Improved rule of law is a fundamental prerequisite for 
more effective governance and requires a much more 
holistic approach to the building of structures and systems 
that can provide a “good enough” and “sufficiently 
sound” legal system as an improved basis for due process, 
greater transparency and political and economic 
certainty. Here, support initiatives will need to address a 
wider range of concerns than at present. Notwithstanding 
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donor contributions to support law drafting, the bar 
association and international law, there remain many 
problems with the legal process in general and with weak 
investigation and enforcement in particular. While 
addressing these problems would ideally require a 
sector-wide programme approach, a pragmatic way 
forward could be to focus support on strengthening 
enforcement of one or two specific laws that would help 
to address the underlying problems associated with weak 
natural resource and land management, and with the 
2006 Budget Law, especially in respect of service delivery 
funding. 
2. The National Assembly is emerging as a governance  institution 
with the potential to strengthen the accountability of the 
respective agencies of government. Analysis of the current 
system and associated structures of democratic centralism 
shows that there are limited checks and balances 
horizontally across the different branches of government 
and limited formal participation in decision making 
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vertically at different tiers and levels of government. The 
National Assembly provides a narrow window of 
opportunity to address both these dimensions of 
governance through greater capacity to assume more 
effective scrutiny and oversight of all the governance 
institutions, and a mechanism for people at all levels of 
society to raise key concerns and issues on a national 
platform through their constituency members. Analysis 
has shown that the NA is beginning to assume a new 
scrutiny and participatory role in government with 
greater legitimacy. However, the constraining lack of 
resources, support and expertise which compromise its 
scrutiny role and limit the depth of constituency 
representation, both of which could become powerful 
drivers of change if addressed effectively.      
3. There is a need to strengthen existing mechanisms for 
policy and operational dialogue based on Sector Working 
Groups. Whilst these mechanisms provide structured 
engagement with senior decision makers and offer an 
opportunity to discuss and address issues of key concern 
in the respective sectors, the role and composition of the 
Groups need to be examined to determine how their role 
could be optimised at the technical, operational and 
policy levels of dialogue. It may be opportune to 
consider how to broaden the composition to include a 
wider constituency of interests in key sectors, potentially 
covering NA members, provincial governments, new local 
development partners and the private sector. Another 
issue is the absence of cross-sector working groups to 
address some of the more fundamental issues across all 
sectors, and which could be addressed far more 
effectively through a single coherent approach. 
4. As education and socio-political awareness improve, 
people become increasingly capable of formulating ideas 
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and voicing concerns. The challenge lies in whether there 
are effective means for stimulating ideas and articulating 
voice. Social media through web-enabled technology is 
fast becoming a dominant form of communication that 
has the power to reach out to many different social 
segments, and hence constituencies of interest, in a 
highly effective manner. The challenge is to convert these 
energies into structured interest groups able to articulate 
and communicate a coherent voice to the Government 
and public. A key component of such a strategy would 
be to develop specific modalities to reach out to a new 
younger generation of future civil society actors who 
already have a modern world view and a distinct 
pan-Asian outlook. This will require exploring new modes 
of engagement with higher learning institutions and 
through social media forums, youth conventions, events, 
exposure visits etc.  
5. Another important facilitator of change will be the 
gradual transition from more effective de-concentration of 
government to a more decentralised system of governance. 
A more enabling policy environment is emerging for such 
a transition as the Government is currently working on 
new policy agenda for strengthening local administration 
through greater delegation of powers and responsibilities 
over fiscal, human and physical resources. This may be 
complemented by a strengthening of local political 
accountability and a deepening of local representation 
through newly-established provincial councils. Here, the 
main challenge in the medium term will be to help the 
government introduce a more decentralised approach, 
within the existing state framework, in order to increase 
local autonomy for more effective local development. This 
in turn will help to bring about more equitable service 
delivery and open up spaces for greater local participation 
in addressing local needs, reducing disparities and 
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promoting diversity, all of which constitute the 
fundamental rights of citizens. The NGPAR in general and 
the DDF in particular provide good entry points for 
contributing to this strategic issue and can play a useful 
role in facilitating and shaping the change process.
Economic Governance and Natural Resources  
6. Improved governance of natural resources in relation 
to natural resource management is a critical requirement 
in addressing the underlying structural weaknesses of the 
current economic model of development noted in 
Chapter 6. Here, there is good potential to work in 
different ways with the larger donor community to help 
develop more effective tools and models for assessing the 
short- and long-run economic, social and environmental 
impacts of FDI investments, as well as developing options 
for optimal use and management of natural resources to 
shape emerging policies.
7. There is a need to assist government work towards 
meeting the standards, protocols and future membership 
of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. This is 
designed to improve governance and revenue transparency 
in extractive industries and is involved in reporting, 
auditing and publishing revenues and payments received 
by governments from such industries. 
8. There is also a critical requirement for the government to 
develop a much more coherent and effective approach 
to the formulation and negotiation of public private 
partnerships around FDI investments, including all aspects 
of the transaction management process in general and 
the structuring of concession arrangements in particular. 
Another area of concern is the need to develop more 
effective strategies and approaches for economic 
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diversification in areas such as small and medium 
enterprise development. 
9. There is an opportunity to assist the Government in 
reviewing the existing status and potential of different 
models of corporate social responsibility associated with 
FDI investments in natural resources and land concessions. 
This would include assessing impacts on local communities 
and the wider environment, and helping to formulate 
new policy options and strategies for incorporating good 
CSR practices in terms of escrow (dedicated) funding and 
implementation into FDI policy.  
Operational Recommendations 
10. The primary focus of the PRF is to address important and 
growing symptoms of the underlying structural processes 
that contribute to the persistence of poverty and inequality. 
The PRF provides a useful mechanism to address poverty 
reduction in a targeted manner with a reasonable scale 
of funding, and to focus on building the capacity of 
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communities to participate in the planning and delivery 
of project-related services. The current PRF phase targets 
kumban as the primary unit for planning and funding of 
services as a means to strengthen the focus on poor 
communities. Whilst the PRF will improve immediate 
access to services for poor communities and help bring 
immediate and measurable change for beneficiary 
communities, its contribution to wider structural change 
will depend mainly on its ability to influence policy. Its 
long-term success will be therefore determined by the 
degree to which it becomes institutionalised across 
government. 
11. There is a requirement to develop a mechanism for 
measuring and assessing service delivery gaps and 
variations across different communities within districts 
and across different districts. This would provide a basis 
for more systematic, rational and transparent planning of 
equitable service delivery, based on addressing relative 
differences in the variation of services by population and 
geographical area. This would help to strengthen the 
equitable as opposed to equal dimension of service 
delivery. 
12. There is a need to establish a robust evidence base on 
impacts of variable levels of service as well as on the 
impacts of relocation and land concessions. In the absence 
of such an evidence base it is difficult for implementing 
agencies and development partners to influence the 
wider policy agenda in a meaningful way. In order to 
develop the evidence base it will be necessary to 
commission research on the causes of problems as well 
as the extent and impact of problems affecting equitable 
services delivery. 
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13. At the same time it will be necessary to develop a sound 
information management system that can better monitor 
progress and track achievements in projects and 
programmes, especially pilot initiatives, as a means of 
demonstrating what can work and how effectively 
different approaches work. Such information could be 
used internally by ministries as well as externally at Sector 
Working Group and Round Table levels to influence 
policy formulation. 
14. There needs to be much stronger focus on funding 
operational expenditure for service outreach rather than 
funding capital development, and there is a need to 
complement this with experimentation on the use and 
efficacy of different forms of safety nets as targeted 
interventions for the poor. 
15. There is an urgent need for better understanding of the 
characteristics, strengths and potential risks associated 
with ethnic diversity, in terms of indigenous economic 
and social systems and the development of strategies and 
policies to capitalise on the strength of ethnic diversity. 
Service delivery should be more relevant to diverse 
communities as a means to off-set the strong existing bias 
towards uniformity of systems and services. 
16. In order to strengthen equitable service delivery, it may 
be necessary for government and donors to consider new 
delivery arrangements based on partnerships with select 
Not for Profit Associations that could help extend service 
outreach. However, stakeholders from the NPA/civil 
society sector claim there is a lack of trust on the part of 
donors and government.
17. There is an opportunity to engage with NPAs to broaden 
partnerships in service delivery at local level and to 
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understand the way of approaching advocacy in the 
political economy context. Here, there would appear to 
be two main opportunities to enhance engagement with 
NPAs. The first would be to develop a responsive 
small-grant facility which would enable NPAs to apply for 
different levels of funding in relation to capacity and the 
defined objectives and outputs of the grant facility itself. 
Management of the grant facility could be contracted to 
a professional agency to reduce transaction costs and 
such an agency could also assist in capacity building in 
defined areas. Another useful intervention could be to 
provide resources to enable potential NPA partners to 
engage in systematic research in areas related to their work. 
This would provide them with an evidence base to engage 
in dialogue with government, whilst simultaneously 
developing their internal capacity in structured fieldwork 
and project management. 
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Conclusion 
This review of the governance sector in Laos has examined the 
main government institutions and key processes of governance 
including justice, decentralisation, equitable service delivery and 
participation. The review has considered the past context, present 
character and the evolving nature of the main branches of 
government under the one-party democratic centralist state 
system of the Lao PDR. It has also examined the evolving context 
of key processes of governance, and the underlying political 
economy structures and constraints. Overall, the review has shown 
that in spite of a number of fundamental constraints, the system 
of governance is gradually changing to accommodate a greater 
plurality of views and stronger checks and balances within the 
essential unitary and hierarchical nature of state formation. 
The Party remains at the apex of government and plays a leading 
role in all aspects of government and across all the main institutions 
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of the State. Whilst the single-party system generates a high 
degree of uniformity and exclusivity in decision making, there are 
signs that the character of Party leadership is changing with an 
infusion of younger, more educated and regionally inclined 
leadership group in the upper echelons of the Party as well as in 
the National Assembly, Council of Ministers and Executive 
machinery. The main impact of this change can be seen in a more 
flexible interpretation of ideology to accommodate an open 
market economy, greater economic differentiation, and the legal 
and institutional requisites for regional integration.
The changing context of Party leadership and ideology has had a 
slow but increasing impact on both the structure and functioning 
of government, as well as on the processes of governance in relation 
to justice, decentralisation, service delivery and participation. The 
analysis contained in this review clearly demonstrates that there 
have been small but significant changes in a number of institutions 
of government. Apart from changes in the composition and 
character of the Party itself, the National Assembly has begun to 
assume a more pro-active oversight role in the legislative and 
budgetary process. The executive machinery of government has 
expanded, with an increased number of ministries and a larger 
number of personnel working in the civil service. 
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In line with changes and improvements in the structure and 
systems of government, there have also been a number of 
changes to governance processes. The foundations of a modern 
legal sector have been established, with a number of new laws 
governing legal processes as well as a judicial structure based on 
a Supreme Court, higher regional courts and area courts alongside 
a judiciary, public prosecution service and an emerging legal 
profession. However, the review has also highlighted many 
shortcomings in the legal system in relation to limited access to 
justice, inadequate independence, weak investigation, poor 
judicial procedure and lack of robust enforcement. 
Despite fundamental constraints, the system of          
governance is gradually changing to accommodate 
a greater plurality of views and stronger checks and 
balances. While the single-party system generates a 
high degree of uniformity, there are signs that the 
character of leadership is changing. The main impact 
of this can be seen in more flexible interpretation of 
ideology to accommodate an open market economy, 
greater economic differentiation, and the legal and 
institutional requisites for regional integration.
The review has also shown that government has experimented 
with different forms of decentralisation at different times, resulting 
in the current system of de-concentrated administration based 
on limited autonomy at district level combined with a higher 
degree of operational autonomy at provincial level. To counter 
the negative consequences of decentralisation as experienced in 
the period prior to 1991, there has been a minimalist interpretation 
of policy statements such as PM/01 2000. This has been 
accompanied by a policy thrust on fiscal centralisation, reflected 
in the 2006 Budget Law to counter national cash shortages and 
revenue imbalances across provinces. However, an initiative to 
manage decentralisation and fund more local development 
through discretionary block-grant funding of infrastructure and 
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services, alongside a general desire to increase the levels and 
coverage of service delivery, is changing the situation: the 
Government is now open to the possible introduction of 
moderate reforms to increase local control over staffing, planning, 
budgeting and expenditure management, in order to increase 
the performance of local administration. Provincial councils may 
also be introduced to strengthen the representative element in 
local government.   
Whilst growth and poverty reduction have contributed to the 
overall socio-economic well being of citizens, the process of 
development is also leading to an increase in disparities and 
inequalities, which manifest themselves in geographic, ethnic, 
gender and age dimensions of society. The Government is 
increasingly aware of the socio-political danger of growing 
disparities in society. It has consequently been active in 
supporting initiatives focused on more equitable service delivery 
targeted at higher risk areas and populations in partnership with 
donor-funded programmes. 
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Finally, the review has shown that there is a positive trend in the 
overall direction of increased participation of citizens in governance 
through various formal, semi-formal, and informal institutions. 
As highlighted above, the representative role of the National 
Assembly is gradually taking shape with a new composition and 
character enabling it to assume a more pro-active policy oversight 
role. With focused funding and support on building more 
effective constituency representation and greater oversight 
capacity, the role could be substantially enhanced in future. The 
review has shown that there are around 80 Non Profit 
Associations active in the development sector. There is also 
increasing acceptance in government towards civil society 
organisations as potentially useful partners in community 
development. This has been accompanied by a new Law of 
Association, which provides an avenue for formal legal 
recognition. Although NPAs and CSOs have adopted an 
essentially embedded role in support of existing development 
processes, rather than adopting a more rights based advocacy 
approach, this is probably a more pragmatic and instrumental 
strategy in the present context. Whilst there has been a major 
expansion in print, radio and TV media in recent years in terms 
of access, choice and coverage, the content remains largely 
confined to the dissemination of official news and information 
or entertainment. New media provide a substantial opportunity 
to shape ideas and channel energies in a more meaningful way, 
especially through social media, which offers potential for 
extensive and growing outreach in a highly accessible and 
evolving form.      
Juxtaposed alongside these changes are a number of potential 
restrainers of change relating to the underlying character of the 
economy, political structure and socio-cultural practices. Here, 
the main obstacles to change derive from the economic model 
of FDI-driven natural resource development, from the inherent 
nature of the political system, and from the persistence of 
traditional socio-cultural patterns of behaviour which reinforce 
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hierarchical relations emphasising loyalty and subservience over 
achievement. 
At the political level there are a number of “retained” characteristics 
of the one-party system which continue to manifest themselves 
in a high degree of concentration of power, rigid hierarchy, high 
degree of overlap of authority and responsibility across all branches 
of government, and weak civil society. These characteristics serve 
to inhibit the extent and pace of change. Whilst there has been 
a slow evolution in the structure and form of government over 
the last few decades, as well as a number of changes in the nature 
of the system and its style of functioning since 2003, there would 
appear to be no immediate prospect for greater political pluralism 
in any formal sense. While the party-state will continue to exercise 
full political and administrative power, it is likely that a greater 
element of internal heterogeneity and the infusion of a more 
technocratic approach to government will change the overall 
context of governance in the country. 
A number of issues concerned with the emerging economic 
model of natural resource extraction also present barriers to 
change. The requirement for land as the basis of the model 
necessarily affects a sizeable proportion of citizens who remain 
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as smallholder cultivators: much of the land required for natural 
resource development is used by the rural population as a central 
means of livelihood. The ensuing process of land alienation among 
affected rural communities is exacerbated in cases where inward 
investments require arable land for plantation purposes. 
This is further aggravated by a context in which promotion of 
certain forms of FDI, involving deals struck in a somewhat flexible 
manner, is given greater emphasis than the interest in ensuring 
safeguards and mitigations are in place and capable of providing 
adequate protection for smallholders, especially ethnic groups in 
remote locations. The lack of sound economic governance in 
terms of land and investment management poses a considerable 
risk to achieving the wider goals of equitable and sustainable 
development.
Overall, however, it can be seen that the evolution of governance 
in the Lao PDR has reached a point while the essential structure 
of the one-party system remains firmly in place, the character and 
functioning of the system has changed quite substantially to 
accommodate the shift towards a modern, open market-based 
economy, high rates of growth, greater regional economic and 
cultural integration, and the emergence of a new educated 
middle class superimposed on a largely subsistence-based rural 
population with growing inequalities across different regions and 
ethnic groups. The combination of these factors has led to a 
change in the nature of government to accommodate the need 
for stronger and more effective governance institutions, a wider 
plurality of socio-economic interests, and pressures to ensure all 
citizens have access to basic minimum services.
Finally, it may be interesting to speculate on the future development 
of the political regime. As noted above. there are some signs of 
the beginnings of an evolution towards a more modern 
one-party state. In China, for example, the State has successfully 
turned a system that once resembled a closed family business into 
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one that can be likened to a modern communist corporation. The 
old ideology of cadre and popular struggle has been replaced 
with that of meritocracy, stability and wealth accumulation. This 
system has successfully resisted any move towards political 
democracy, continuing a strong commitment to one-party rule 
in which the governing group has transformed itself into a 
modern mandarin bureaucracy presiding over an expanding 
free-market economy. Whilst the contemporary Lao political 
system remains firmly rooted in the one-party state, there are 
signs that the character of the regime is in transition from an 
ideologically-driven to a more technocratic governing class. 
Whether the regime will transform into a modern mandarin 
bureaucracy capable of delivering sufficient welfare to offset any 
overt pressure for change will only become clear over the course 
of the coming years, as the impact of greater regional and 
global economic integration becomes more apparent.    
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Chapter 1: The Party, National Assembly and Government 
Introduction  
Government in the Lao PDR is based on a single-party system in which 
the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) has a “leading role” as 
enshrined in the Constitution of 1991. Under a single-party system 
there is no distinction between the political and executive arms of 
government: rather government is the administrative arm of the Party, 
which determines policy through an all-powerful 11-member Politburo 
and a 61-member Central Committee alongside a Cabinet of Ministers 
presided over by the Prime Minister, functioning under the State 
President and Vice President. The Party, the military and the Government 
form the basis of the democratic centralist power structure of Laos and 
there are no strong interest groups outside the established machinery. 
Within this context it is important to recognise that the prevailing 
system of government is a product of particular historical processes and 
forces that are themselves deeply rooted in traditional political culture 
and practices. This includes a long tradition of personal and family 
loyalties and clan allegiances, a small and powerful elite, and a high 
degree of regional autonomy, all of which meant that the traditional 
political economy was not based on the strong bureaucratic state found 
in many Asian countries. Despite a change of political form in 1975, 
with the coming to power of the LPRP, many aspects of traditional 
political culture remain, although they are is now found within a 
different political form. In Laos the very concepts of governance, 
administration and law are still evolving and there remains a need to 
continue to build and strengthen unity and national identity. At the 
same time there are growing and inevitable pressures for change 
arising from the country’s internal development as well as its integration 
into the wider regional and global economy and society.        
Much of the current socio-economic and administrative reform agenda 
is contained within the 7th National Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(2011-2015). This plan emphasises the importance of growth with 
equity and stresses the need for government, including the public 
administration machinery and the legal system, to be accountable, 
effective, transparent and responsive. The Strategic Plans on 
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Governance (2006-10 and 2011-15) both emphasise the Government’s 
commitment to building “an effective, efficient, well-trained, honest 
and ethical public service that is able to meet the needs of the 
multi-ethnic Lao people”, across four major themes of governance 
relating to: “Public Service Improvement, People’s Participation, the 
Rule of Law and Sound Financial Management”. Both the 7th NSEDP 
and the Strategic Plan on Governance thus provide the basic enabling 
framework for strengthening the operation of the respective arms of 
government and enhancing participation and the rule of law. The plan 
stresses the need to improve organisational structures without 
compromising security, to simplify administrative rules and procedures, 
to improve human resource management and to upgrade the skills of 
civil servants to improve their effectiveness, efficiency, and ethical 
behaviour. 
The Party 
The LPRP, which was founded in March 1955 as the Lao People’s Party, 
is broadly structured along democratic socialist lines. Irrespective of its 
ideological base, the contemporary reality is one in which a single 
ruling party presides over a rapidly growing free market economy and 
a vibrant Buddhist culture as a symbol of national identity. Under the 
1991 Constitution, the LPRP and its mass organisations comprising the 
Lao Front for National Reconstruction, the Lao Women’s Union, the Lao 
Federation of Trade Unions and the Lao People’s Revolutionary Youth 
Union, are the only legal political entities and thus function in the 
absence of any formal political opposition. 
As also enshrined in the Constitution, the Party plays a “leading role” 
in all main governance institutions of the country including the 
executive, legislature/ assembly, unions and other mass organisations 
and the military, in a context where the Party and Government are 
essentially one and the same. The main function of the Party is to 
provide direction, formulate policy and provide guidance on all aspects 
and across all branches of government. A Party Inspection Authority 
monitors the whole apparatus of the Party and reports to State 
President.
The Politburo is the highest body of the Party with 11 members. These 
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are currently the President, Prime Minister, Party Secretariat Standing 
Committee Member, National Assembly President, four Deputy Prime 
Ministers, Head of Government Office, President of the Party and 
Government Inspection Committees, and the Minister of Education. 
Three former Politburo members continue to act as Party Advisers with 
an influence on the Politburo and Government. All Politburo members 
are elected from and by the Party Central Committee (CC) of 61 members 
(five females), who are in turn elected at the Party Congress. Interestingly, 
the 11 Politburo members are not necessarily those who have received 
the most votes in the Central Committee election of the Party Congress. 
The current State President is the most senior Politburo member 
followed the Prime Minister, although the previous Prime Minister was 
the one of the more junior members of the Politburo. Six of the Politburo 
members are from ethnic groups representing Lanten, Phou Noy, 
Katang, Akha, Hmong and Chinese/Sino-Tibetan ethnic groups. 
Day-to-day Party matters are the responsibility of the nine-member 
Secretariat of the Party Central Committee. Four of the members are also 
Politburo members (two being among the youngest from the Politburo) 
and the remaining five are all Central Committee Members. Women and 
ethnic groups are not well represented in the upper strata of the Party 
and there is only one female member, who is also from the Hmong 
ethnic group. This member has moved up several places in the Politburo 
hierarchy. There are no women in the Secretariat of the Party Central 
Committee nor in the Party and Government Inspection Committees.    
The Party has 191,780 members, representing around 3% of the 
population, a similar ratio to that found in Vietnam. Membership is by 
invitation and dependent on evidence of strong commitment to Party 
work and future potential. Prospective members have to be approved at 
various levels of the Party hierarchy. This results in the exercise of power 
by right of Party membership. All senior officials will necessarily be Party 
members and Party cells within each ministry/institution will invite those 
with potential to become members. Members of the government are 
appointed by the Party and not necessarily drawn from the National 
Assembly. Membership is crucial for advancement in government and 
provides privileged access to the wider machinery of government. 
The Party is based on a unitary and hierarchical structure with a hybrid 
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culture that is both patrimonial and technocratic, combining 
traditional ways of mediating relations with more functionalist modes of 
bureaucratic management. Whilst behaviour is not entirely governed by 
personal relations, but also by more technical functions and duties, 
traditional patterns of behaviour based around loyalties, reciprocity and 
obligations remain a dominant factor in Party culture. 
Under the Constitution, the LPRP and its mass organisations are 
the only legitimate political entities and thus function in the 
absence of any formal opposition. Major challenges for the 
Party leadership include improving access to rural services, 
keeping food prices stable, increasing agricultural production 
and handling the impacts of land concessions granted to foreign 
companies.
Whilst the absence of a multi-party system inherently limits the extent of 
political contest, the Party is not a static entity and there is a certain amount 
of heterogeneity within the Party based around personal, group and 
regional loyalties. This provides a dynamic element in the power structure 
with a degree of competition that may coalesce around different policies 
and or issues. The substance of such competition will rarely if ever enter 
the public domain but may manifest itself through a reshuffling of positions 
in top echelons of the Party. 
The level of internal dynamic is well illustrated by the changes in the 
Politburo and Central Committee following the resignation of Prime 
Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh in December 2010 and the 9th Party 
Congress of March 2011, which consolidated the position of the current 
Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong. Many commentators have argued 
that the previous PM did not have the requisite experience or support base 
to be in a position to maintain the post. There are now a number of 
intelligent and dynamic members of the Politburo who are likely to act as 
a progressive force on emerging policy within the constraints of a broadly 
conservative political structure. However, proposals for change and reform 
are likely to focus initially and somewhat cautiously on ways of improving 
the performance of government and increasing internal efficiency and 
effectiveness -  necessary but not particularly controversial issues. 
Whilst strong economic growth and insulation from the 2008-09 global 
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financial crisis has helped to maintain the political status quo, major 
challenges remains in improving access to services for the rural population, 
keeping food prices stable and increasing agricultural production. 
Another challenging issue for the Party leadership is the impacts of land 
concessions granted to foreign companies for plantations, mining, logging, 
hydropower and recreation projects. 
The Party still has control of around 200 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
operating in a number of sectors such as cement, pharmaceuticals, 
banking (four state owned hold 80% of deposits).and these 
enterprises have benefited from protection and subsidies which have 
undermined competitiveness and long term profitability. Mindful of this 
issue, the Government has been considering various measures to 
enhance efficiency and productivity, and while reluctant to sell the 
businesses outright, has been trying to get them listed on the stock 
market. All substantial Lao-owned businesses have close ties with the 
ruling Party. 
National Assembly
The 1991 Constitution assigns legislative and oversight functions to the 
National Assembly, which has evolved from an initial People’s Supreme 
Assembly in 1975 with just 45 members to the current National 
Assembly 7th legislature with 132 members. The NA is a single 
chamber institution with members (deputies) elected on a five-year term 
from multi-member constituencies in all 17 provinces. Representation is 
based on one member for every 50,000 people or 1:30,000 voters. 
Members are elected from a pre-selected list of 190 nominated 
candidates, including 47 from central government, 143 from local 
administration, 45 incumbents of the previous assembly, 4 from SOEs 
and 5 from the private sector. This demonstrates the limited degree of 
the separation of powers and interests between the executive and the 
legislature, as the latter is predominantly made up of members of the 
executive, who mostly obtain leave of office for the duration of the 
legislature to work either at central or provincial constituency level. 
Since the total number of candidates is only marginally more than the 
total seats, the election process involves deleting a small number of 
candidates from the list rather than actively selecting candidates, non 
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of whom will have been involved in an individual election campaign. 
The final composition of the 7th legislature includes 42 members from 
central government (against 47 candidates) and 90 from local 
administration (against 143 candidates). The fact that some candidates 
from central government, albeit a small number, were not elected by 
provincial constituencies does indicate the emergence of a more 
dynamic process since voters in Vientiane Capital, Vientiane Province 
and Khammouane Province did not necessarily return all candidates 
from central government. Another feature is that two provinces did 
not return any candidate with a military or security background.   
Although there is no quota system for women or ethnic groups in the 
Assembly, women are well represented. The 6th legislature comprised 
29 women deputies out of a total of 115 members, whilst representation 
of the Hmong ethnic group stood at around 6%, in proportion to their 
population. In the current 7th legislature there are 33 women members 
although some provinces retuned no women candidates to the 
legislature. 
The NA has six permanent committees, each responsible for a specific 
functional area: Law and Justice; Economics, Planning and Finance; 
Social and Cultural Affairs; Ethnic Affairs; Defence and Security; and 
Foreign Affairs. There is also a Standing Committee (SC), which consists 
of ten full-time members: the President and two Vice-Presidents of the 
National Assembly, the Chief of the Cabinet and the Presidents of all 
six functional committees, and is chaired by the NA President. When 
the Assembly is not sitting, the SC substitutes for the full assembly in 
its role of reviewing public petitions and considering complaints from 
citizens. If required, the SC can request the Office of the Supreme 
People’s Prosecutor and the People’s Supreme Court to review and 
re-consider a court decision, or instruct the government to address the 
petitioner’s grievance.
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Features constraining the National Assembly’s ability to function            
effectively include: the limited degree of choice over candidates 
during elections; an increasing volume of legislative work; the 
lack of time in assembly sessions for adequate policy debate; 
lack of discussion on policy alternatives. At the same time, a 
number of recent developments provide potential entry points 
for significant change.
The Assembly convenes in two ordinary sessions per year, each normally 
lasting two to three weeks. The main functions of the NA include: 
receiving statements from line ministries, reviewing petitions related to 
administrative, court or individual decisions, state official decisions or 
conduct, reviewing the state budget, plus voting on new legislation 
and on amendments to existing legislation. NA sessions have been 
reduced from four-five weeks to two weeks, with the increased 
workload leaving just one day for consideration of a law. 
During its inaugural session the latest Assembly approved a new State 
President, Vice President, President of People’s Supreme Court, President 
of the Public Prosecutor Office, Prime Minister and National Assembly 
President as well as amendments to the law on taxation. The Assembly 
agenda for the next five years includes the approval of 48 new laws 
and 43 amended laws. In the light of its short sittings there is concern 
that it does not have adequate time to debate these new laws and 
amendments 
There are many features of the Assembly which constrain its ability to 
function as an effective agent of participatory governance, acting on 
behalf of citizens and with responsibility to voters. These constraints 
include the limited degree of choice over candidates, whose pre-selection 
from an approved list constitutes a process of “managed” representation. 
Another constraint is the electoral process itself, in which the lack of 
any discussion or presentation of policy alternatives severely limits voters’ 
choice. This is further reinforced by the process of de-selecting 
candidates. The limited number and shorter duration of sessions have 
also severely compromised the scope for serious debate on key 
legislative proposals and for the effective scrutiny of policies, budgets 
and expenditure, a problem exacerbated by an increasing volume of 
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work. This has become more serious with the introduction of a new 
law on lawmaking, which requires the observance of a new process in 
the formulation and promulgation of a law. Finally, the role of the 
Assembly is compromised by the limited experience of its elected 
members and the lack of resources to enable them to better represent 
their constituencies. Whilst these constraints represent a substantial 
bundle of problems, a number of important developments have taken 
place recently that provide potential entry points for significant change 
(see analysis of Assembly in section on Participation).     
Executive Machinery 
The Prime Minister, currently Thongsing Thammavong, is head of 
government and a senior member of the Politburo. All senior officials 
in government are Party members and the Party decides all ministerial 
appointments. Ministers are appointed by the National Assembly on 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Party. Each minister 
nominates vice ministers and departmental heads within his ministry, 
who must then be approved by the Party leadership and then by the 
PM. The minister (usually the Secretary of the Party cell), deputy 
ministers and a number of Party cell members will generally constitute 
the leadership group within the ministry.
The Council of Ministers comprises the PM, four Deputy Prime Ministers 
and Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry, Foreign Affairs, Industry and 
Commerce, Information, Culture and Tourism, Justice, Labour and 
Social Welfare, Defence, Health, Security, Science and Technology, 
Public Works and Transport, Natural Resources and Environment, Home 
Affairs, Post, Telecom and Communications, Finance, Energy and Mines, 
Education, Planning and Investment, plus the Head of the Office of the 
Government, the President of the Government Inspection Authority, 
the Head of the Anti-Corruption organisation, and the Governor of the 
Central Bank.  
The executive arm of government is responsible for implementing and 
enforcing government policies, programmes and projects through 18 
Ministries and three institutions with ministry status, including the 
Central Bank and the Government Inspection Authority. The executive 
administration has the authority to issue binding decrees to assist with 
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the process of implementation and enforcement of policies and laws. 
Most ministries have de-concentrated structures that interact with 17 
provincial administrations and 143 districts covering 8,654 villages and 
1.057 kumban. Party cells operate within every ministry and within 
provincial administrations, and there is active recruitment of promising 
young professionals into the Party. Active involvement in the Party 
assists promotion within the executive. Hence almost all senior civil 
servants will, necessarily, be Party members.
Around 130,000 civil servants, including teachers and health staff, work 
in the public administration system. Around 82,500 staff (44% female) 
work at district level with a further 28,666 (35% female) at provincial 
level and 21,297 (44% female) at central level. More than 52% of all 
civil servants work in the education sector, only 10% in the health 
sector, 6% in agriculture and just 2% in public works. Nearly two-thirds 
of all civil servants are below the age of 40. The civil service staffing 
structure is based on five grades, ranging from clerical and support staff 
(Grades 1 and 2) to professional staff (Grades 3-5). Each grade is further 
divided into 15 steps matching respective points on the salary scale. 
Progression within each grade is based on seniority (i.e. a step increment 
every two years of service) or educational qualification. Salaries are 
extremely low and highly compressed across a range from $50 to $150 
per month. 
In 2009/10 a total of 10,180 additional staff were recruited, although 
ministries had requested an additional 30,000 staff. The MOHA issues 
an annual circular on staffing needs known as the “Staff Quota 
Instruction,” requesting bids from ministries and provinces for 
additional staff, based on net increase after retirements and other 
sources of attrition. Once it receives the envelope for staff numbers 
provided by the MOF Budget Department, it distributes the increases to 
ministries who in turn allocate the new staffing. The criteria used by 
MOHA for allocating staff increases are broadly based on workloads as 
assessed by ministries, as well as policy priorities. A degree of 
misalignment of staff and budget allocations may be detected at the 
provincial and district levels. Whilst the funds for district education and 
health services are included in the budgets of the provincial education 
and health departments, staffing decisions are made by the provincial 
governors, who may decide to allocate new staff to other activities. The 
mini CD 10
MOHA maintains a central database of all civil servants and is 
currently piloting a new integrated personnel management information 
system known as the PIMS. The total wage bill of the Civil Service 
accounts for just under 5% of GDP. 
The Civil Service staffing structure is based on five grades ranging from 
clerical and support staff (Grades 1 and 2) to professional staff (Grades 
3-5). Each grade is further divided into 15 steps matching respective 
points on the salary scale. Progression within each grade is based on 
seniority (i.e. a step increment every two years of service) or 
educational qualification allowing progression through multiple steps 
depending on the type of qualification obtained. Salaries across the Civil 
Service and for all levels are extremely low, ranging from around $50 to 
$150 per month at the highest end. The salary range is highly compressed 
from entry level at Grade 1 (405,000 kip) to final level at Grade 5 (1,263,000 
kip) with a mere threefold increase in salary from the lowest administrative 
support staff post to the highest professional post. Interestingly, the 
minimum wage for manual workers in the private sector has recently been 
raised from the equivalent to Grade 1 of the civil service to the equivalent 
of Grade 3. 
The State Audit Organisation (SAO) is the entity responsible for auditing 
all government revenues and expenditures. Dr Bouasy Lovanxay, 
appointed by the National Assembly, leads the SAO, which reports to the 
National Assembly twice per year. The SAO has its own staff from central 
to district level. The SAO has increased its capacity quite substantially with 
support from the ADB and has begun to assume a much more effective 
role in audit. It has recently raised objections relating to the provincial 
budgets and accounts which have been reported to first National Assembly 
session of the 7th Legislature. Some of the recent changes to the SAO are 
captured in the section on changes and trends below.  
The number of registered corruption related offences in State  institutions 
is extremely low. Given the limited number of checks and balances across 
and between the various arms of government, addressing the twin issues 
of immunity and impunity is a real challenge, and one compounded by 
ineffective and insufficient internal and external government control 
mechanisms and weak investigative capacity in the anti-corruption and 
legal enforcement bodies (see section on Justice). 
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Salaries across all five grades of the Civil Service are extremely 
low: manual workers in the private sector earn as much as Grade 
3 civil servants and staff numbers are low in many key services, 
particularly at local level.  While the State Audit Organisation has 
begun to assume a more effective role, the number of registered 
corruption related offences in state institutions is extremely low 
and tackling impunity remains a challenge. Many services display 
poor quality and slow speed and both the Government and the 
Party have recognised the need to improve public administration.
Despite robust growth and progress on human development, gender 
inequality remains a barrier to progress. A number of institutions have 
been established to help strengthen gender equality such as the Lao 
National Commission for the Advancement of Women, a government 
body mandated to work with line agencies to ensure that gender is 
mainstreamed, and the Lao Women’s Union. Gender issues are 
mainstreamed in most donor funded programmes to ensure that 
gender-related targets and indicators are included. The MAF (2010) 
includes provisions for a significantly greater investment in women and 
girls as a proven MDG multiplier. The new five-year plan for the 
advancement of women (2011-2015) is designed to advance linkages 
with the national programmes. However, it should be noted that 
women are far more influential in Lao society than their official 
representation in government would indicate. The wives of a number 
of senior Party officials are active in the Lao Women’s Union, and wives 
in particular have always served as a conduit for those seeking political 
favours.
Civil Service Management 
A number of problems continue to affect civil service management and 
performance. These relate firstly to the low number of staff in many 
key service delivery functions such as education, health and agriculture, 
particularly at local level. Secondly, the overall standard of technical 
qualification, competency and skill of staff is low, and thirdly pay bands 
are based on qualifications and length of service rather than jobs and 
responsibilities. This combination of problems explains the continued 
presence of donor partner involvement in a number of human resource 
mini CD 12
development projects and initiatives. 
Other problems affecting the public administration system include the 
persistence of outdated and ineffective systems and procedures, resulting 
in the poor quality and slow speed of many services, coupled to low 
levels of transparency and poor systems of accountability. Both the 
Government and the Party have recognised the need to improve 
public administration and there is strong support amongst decision 
makers at ministerial level and in the Politburo for initiating reforms 
that will help to improve performance in public administration through 
human resource development, improved systems and procedures, and 
revised operational guidelines and regulations.   
The Governance and Public Administration Reform Programme (GPAR) 
represents the main initiative to strengthen the functioning of public 
administration at national, provincial and district levels. It focuses on 
the development of institutional and legal frameworks, organisation 
and development, civil service management and training. Recent 
phases have addressed institutional reform as well as decentralised 
service delivery through separate projects at the national and sub-national 
level. These projects have piloted initiatives to improve service delivery 
and developed a series of policies, laws, regulations and guidelines to 
support implementation. GPAR activities have focused on four broad 
areas: the development of policy initiatives to strengthen public administration 
through civil service, people’s participation, rule of law and sound 
financial management; formulation of strategies and plans to assist in 
policy implementation; training and capacity building; and implementation 
support, including equipment and infrastructure. 
To complement these developments the Governance Sector Working 
Group has evolved into a high-level body led by two senior ministers. 
It offers a strong platform for coordinating joint activities between 
several ministries, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, development 
partners and civil society, working towards implementation of the National 
Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) and the Strategic Plan on 
Governance 2011-20.  
Experience to date demonstrates important lessons around building 
effective ownership for organisational and management reforms in the 
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executive machinery through a series of carefully structured steps in 
implementation. These begin with an understanding of the Government’s 
main priorities and build on these to achieve improvements through 
piloting new systems and procedures which can be gradually scaled-up 
and replicated. An important lesson from this experience is that whilst 
changes have been slow to implement and modest in nature, they are 
nevertheless in line with the Government’s own thinking on reform 
rather than representing an externally imposed agenda. Thus the initiatives 
are more sustainable in the medium and long terms. 
The Policy Formulation Process in Government
The system of decision making within the single-party structure of 
government is characterised by a strong degree of conformity and 
consensus which requires issues and proposals to be discussed and 
agreed upon at senior level before any action is taken. If the decisions 
imply a change to the accepted status quo, the processes of obtaining 
consensus and agreement will take longer as consultations will need 
to include a wider constituency of senior Party officials.  In such a system, 
it is rare for any senior official to take an important decision without 
having discussed the matter at several levels within the Government 
and Party, including the Party cell within the sponsoring agency or 
ministry, with vice ministers and ministers of other concerned ministries, 
and/or with key members of the Politburo or Central Committee 
depending on the significance of the issue under consideration. Such 
discussions will usually take place on a more informal basis in the 
early stages of the process, but will later be undertaken on a more 
formal basis at inter-ministerial and cabinet level, where the discussion 
will be accompanied by a policy paper or technical reports. This means 
that any important matter will be need to go through several rounds 
of consultation in order to clarify the likely response of government and 
Party. Such a process helps the process of reaching a consensus and 
gaining approval. All of this may require several rounds of discussion 
with key individuals and groups as well as behind the scenes lobbying 
and discussion to build a constituency of support for a proposal. 
Depending on the nature of the matter under consideration, it may 
take several months or even years before it is clear if there is a consensus 
and if this will lead to agreement. 
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Decisions implying a change to the status quo require several 
rounds of discussion with key individuals and groups plus              
substantial political lobbying and discussion. Depending on the 
proposal, this may take months or years. Building support revolves 
around strategic use of personal relationships and other gestures. 
This process of competition and debate could be seen as ‘Lao style’ 
democracy. Recent policies and pronouncements imply recognition 
among Party elements of the significance of encouraging direct 
participation in the process of development to reduce the potential 
for diverging interest between the Party and citizens.  
This process is not only designed to help reach a consensus but also to 
avoid any obvious criticism and censure of the proponent of the matter 
under discussion. Senior officials would far rather engage in a lengthy 
process of deliberation than to be seen taking a decision that will not 
meet with the approval of other senior government members. Whilst 
a consensual approach avoids such confrontation it reduces the level 
of risk that any senior individual would otherwise have to face in taking 
a particular policy position. However, just as with any policy-making 
process there is still a need to adopt various tactics to help build a 
constituency of support which, in the context of the Lao political 
economy, will tend to revolve around making strategic use of any 
influential family or personal relationships as well as other compensatory 
gestures. 
Whilst the need for consensus at the upper levels of the Party hierarchy 
helps to increase the level of internal transparency it does not substitute 
for a broader degree of transparency. Nevertheless, the fact that neither 
government nor the Party represent a completely homogenous group 
means that there is a degree of internal debate and competition which 
could be seen as a form of internal ‘Lao style’ democracy. Whilst 
organisational freedom and a free press are core ingredients of any 
definition of multi-party democracy, much depends on the people’s 
perception of what is democratic under a one-party system. In other 
words there may be a sense of democratic legitimacy behind the wall 
of one-party rule. The gradual introduction of elements of competitive 
democracy which, in turn, generate legitimacy will help to achieve a 
balance between the interests of the Party and citizens, rather than 
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allowing such interests to become divergent. Recent policies and 
policy pronouncements at the 9th Party Congress of 2011 would imply 
a gradual recognition amongst the progressive elements of the Party 
leadership of the significance of promoting greater socio-economic 
development in line with MDG goals and targets as well as encouraging 
direct participation in the process of development as key elements of 
reducing the potential for any diverging interest between the Party and 
citizens. 
Conclusion: Recent Changes, Drivers of Change and Future Trends 
The Party 
Recent Changes 
The basic elements of the Party structure comprising the Politburo, 
Central Committee, Party Congress and Party cells remain substantially 
in place and continue to exercise a leadership role in policy making, 
oversight and monitoring of government. This is facilitated by close 
party-state inter linkages, whereby all senior staff in all branches of 
government are necessarily Party members and where decision making 
in government entails close interaction with Party functionaries. However, 
there have been a number of recent developments that have altered 
the character of Party leadership. 
There has been a gradual shift towards more coherent and strategic 
policy development. The SIDA study 2003 reported that the Party’s 
macro policy targets tended not to match local conditions and the 
reality of diverse social-economic situations, and were not always based 
on sound research. Another change has been the gradual elimination 
of duplicative institutions in the Party and government in areas such as 
personnel management, audit and inspection and training. 
There has also been growing acceptance of the need for less overlap 
of people holding dual positions in government and the Party. There is 
a greater recognition in the Party of the issue of corruption in 
government and a growing realization of the economic and societal 
danger that this poses in terms of hindering economic development 
and poverty reduction. There is also an understanding that this can 
have extreme socio-political consequences, as witnessed in recent years 
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and months across the Arab world. At the same time the Party is fully 
aware that this issue will need to be addressed in order to comply with 
standards and conditions required for greater regional and global 
integration (with ASEAN, the WTO etc.).   
The breakthrough strategy announced at the 9th Party Congress of 
2011 recognises the importance of governance reform through a 
mutually reinforcing portfolio of political and administrative actions to 
strengthen the delivery of development priorities as defined in the 
NSEDP and other key strategies. 
Drivers of Change
A key driver of change relates to a more strategic approach to decision 
making adopted by the Party based on more comprehensive and 
coherent policies and plans developed by the executive administration, 
often with donor support. Such policies and plans are based on more 
systematic analysis of prevailing conditions and a more strategic focus 
on goals and priorities. This has been further reinforced through the 
activities and contributions of sector working groups and steering 
groups, bringing together representatives of different agencies to 
contribute to the policy process. Although sector policies may be 
selectively interpreted at senior Party level, they have nevertheless 
contributed to a more strategic debate and understanding amongst 
senior Party members, many of whom have been involved in the policy 
formulation process. 
Another reason for change in the character of Party functioning can be 
attributed to the change of composition in the Politburo and Central 
Committee. A new generation of younger and more educated personnel 
who have risen through the ranks of government are now beginning 
to enter the upper echelons of Party leadership. These members bring 
with them a more professional grounding in administration, greater 
familiarity with economic and social development trends and issues and 
more understanding and interest in the imperatives of regional and 
global integration. Although this emerging group remains rooted in 
the one-party state system, and hence continues to exercise loyalties 
to the state, members are beginning to infuse the system with new 
ideas on strategy and greater tolerance for some degrees of flexibility 
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in governance. The absence of political pluralism should not be confused 
with internal homogeneity, as all senior functionaries need to be able 
to cultivate a support base within the Party linked to family, kinship and 
regional loyalties. Such internal power bases may over time begin to 
be associated with specific reforms, ideas and strategies that may 
compete with others.               
There has been a gradual shift towards more coherent and            
strategic policy development, a growing acceptance of the need 
for less overlap between government and the Party and greater 
acceptance of the economic and societal danger that corruption 
poses. A new generation of younger, more educated individuals 
are entering the Party leadership, bringing a more professional 
grounding, greater familiarity with economic and social trends, 
and more understanding of regional and global integration.
The Party is much more aware today of issues of growing inequality 
and disparity between different regions, ethnicities and socio-economic 
groups and  at the 9th Party Congress made a call to “avoid too much 
development disparity between different regions and rich and poor” 
along with references to the need to stabilize the socio-political situation 
to maintain unity. In a direct reference to the issue of patronage the 
Party also referred to the need to “curtail the trend of selecting and 
promoting personnel coming from the same family lines, clans, groups 
or regions. To avert possible civil unrest or protest, as found in 
neighbouring countries, the Party has also made statements on the 
need to maintain healthy self-criticism and mutual criticism and to 
ensure adequate disciplinary measures are taken against persons who 
commit offences. 
Other drivers of change include the imperatives of regional and global 
integration, particularly those associated with the ASEAN Economic 
Community, the ASEAN People’s Forum, conditionality of access to the 
WTO and achieving the MDGs, The desire to maintain external support 
from donors and investors is also contributing to a greater acceptance 
of reform. 
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National Assembly
Recent Changes 
The NA’s evolving role has been further strengthened by a number of 
more recent changes over the last two legislatures. These include a 
membership composition in which the electorate has exercised more 
discretion as to whether or not to support favoured Party candidates 
over other approved candidates, although almost all NA members are 
party members. The current Assembly membership is more educated 
and younger than in the past and two-thirds of all members now have 
university and post-graduate degrees. There are fewer NA members 
holding dual administrative and legislative positions. 
At the same time the Assembly has benefited from donor funding and 
technical support, which has helped improve internal management, 
give access to comparative experience on assembly functioning, provide 
inter-session activities and improve constituency linkages. 
Most significantly, the Assembly has been granted more authority to 
undertake oversight, with the State Audit Organisation reporting 
directly to the Assembly. This has enabled members to assume more 
effective scrutiny role in terms of public expenditure and the issuing of 
directions to address budget anomalies and audit queries. 
Drivers of Change
One of the main drivers of change in the legislature relates to the recent 
composition with a raft of newly elected members, many with higher 
educational qualifications who are eager to take on a more meaningful 
oversight role through active participation in Assembly Committees and 
in participating more purposefully in the scrutiny of public expenditure. 
Although new members remain a part of the same Party and broad 
national power base, they are also more aware of their role in 
representing regional and constituency interests, which may constitute 
a sub-power base within the broader framework. Members, especially 
the heads and members of standing committees, have a better 
understanding of their role and function than in the past and many 
have received several rounds of training under donor assistance. 
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Another reason for the changing role and character of the Assembly can 
be the direct interventions of a donor support initiative, SELNA, which has 
helped to fund a series of capacity development activities, improve 
Assembly management, operate more productive inter-session activities 
and provide exposure to comparative models of Assembly functioning. All 
this has contributed to a qualitative change in the scrutiny of government. 
Whilst the general public remains somewhat confused by the role and 
function of elected members, there is a growing awareness on the part 
of citizens that they may raise issues either directly with Assembly or 
through a new hot line system. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, 
the Party itself has recognised the need for a more active Assembly 
capable of performing an oversight and scrutiny role as a core part of 
the wider structure of government, and one which will in the long run 
help to uphold the legitimacy of the political system.  
The Executive
Recent Changes 
A number of changes in the executive machinery of government in 
recent years have contributed to the gradual development of a more 
competent and professional civil service. The number of line ministries 
has grown to 18 to provide greater policy direction and management 
over a more comprehensive range of sectors and services than in the 
past. The size of the civil service has grown to over 130,000, including 
teachers and health workers, the vast majority of whom are at district 
and local level. The agency responsible for the management of the 
civil service has recently been upgraded from a sub ministry to full 
ministry status as the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). 
The policy framework for strengthening the Civil Service is contained 
within Decree 82/PM of 2003, which defines the framework for 
selection, recruitment, deployment, grade and step determination, 
training, and disciplinary action. Another important initiative is the 
decree on incentives for civil servants working in remote areas. This has 
entailed government approval of a budget allocation of 62 billion kip 
(about US$7.7 million) for the fiscal year October 2011-September 
2012. This represents an important step in recognising the effort of 
civil servants working in rural and remote areas and in encouraging 
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them to work in such areas. This is especially relevant for teachers and 
health workers. It is estimated that around 22,300 civil servants will be 
eligible for an additional allowance equivalent to 50% of a monthly 
salary. 
A number of pilot initiatives over the last five years have been designed 
to contribute to improved performance. These include the development 
of a web-enabled personnel information management system, the 
preparation of specimen job descriptions across all departments, the 
development of methodologies for organisational restructuring, the 
formulation of a Civil Service Strategy and Code of Conduct, as well as 
a substantial amount of capacity building and training, funded largely 
through multi-donor support to GPAR as well as bilateral initiatives on 
training and capacity development. 
There has also been a significant change in the role and function of the 
State Audit Organisation in terms of the inspection of government 
income and expenditure. The State Audit Law of 2007 has enhanced 
the SAO’s independence by having it report to the National Assembly 
rather than the Prime Minister as previously. Following a peer review 
carried out by the New Zealand State Audit Office (OAG) significant 
technical assistance has been provided by NZ OAG and the ADB. There 
has been a doubling of staff numbers and regional offices have been 
opened. An Action Plan for 2009-20 has been developed, focusing on 
capacity building and defining resourcing requirements. At the same 
time, the SAO has begun to assume a more assertive role in the 
scrutiny of government budgets and expenditure and has reported a 
number of anomalies to the National Assembly. Specifically, it has raised 
objections in relation to a total of 485.9 billion kip of provincial revenues 
from logging and other activities having been put aside in special 
accounts rather than being surrendered to the Treasury. This amount 
was thus not reflected in the 2009-2010 annual budget execution report 
sent to the Ministry of Finance. The SAO has observed this to be a severe 
and repetitive case of financial misconduct that contravenes Article 6 
of the Budget Law. 
Most recently, the MOHA has designed a new comprehensive 
programme for strengthening governance and public administration. 
This is intended to bring together its internal work priorities with 
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additional donor funding to assist in strengthening a range of areas 
including: the institutional and legal frameworks for public administration; 
organisation and management systems; local administration and service 
delivery; civil service management, research and training. Together this 
represents an ambitious agenda designed to improve performance of 
the public administration system and will complement new Party 
policy directions on service delivery and decentralisation. Here a critical 
future area of concern is the need for an improved pay and grading 
system that will relate more closely to responsibility and performance 
rather than educational qualification and tenure.
Drivers of Change 
The main driver of the recent changes in the executive arm of government 
can be attributed to a growing interest on the part of the Party and 
senior government functionaries of the need to develop an efficient 
and effective public administration capable of formulating strategic 
policies and plans in line with national priorities. There is wide 
recognition in all branches of government that an effective and 
accountable civil service is key to implementing and managing public 
infrastructure and services which are crucial foundations for future 
economic growth and the basis for realising improved human development 
outcomes.  
The Party and senior government functionaries have been eager to 
support initiatives designed to improve performance of public 
administration and increase the effectiveness of service delivery. There 
is a strong interest in meeting MDG goals in the medium term and 
graduating from LDC status by 2020. It is widely understood at all 
levels of government that this requires a better resourced, more 
competent and motivated civil service. Evidence of this increased 
understanding can be seen in the recent decree to provide up to 50% 
additional salary allowance to civil servants willing to deliver services in 
remote areas.  
Another important factor has been the prominence given to governance 
reform in the NSEDP, as expressed in the Strategic Plan on Governance 
and at the Governance Round Table, which brings together government 
and donors to work towards a shared objective. This has set out four 
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key pillars of reform and includes a strong emphasis on strengthening 
public administration. The high level policy endorsement of such reform 
has enabled proponents in government as well as donor partners and 
project staff to push the reform agenda and support specific reform 
initiatives.    
A number of initiatives over the last five years have been designed 
to improve government performance and the MOHA has designed 
an ambitious agenda for strengthening governance and public 
administration. There is strong interest in meeting MDG goals and 
graduating from LDC status and it is widely understood that this 
requires a better resourced and more competent civil service.               
High-level endorsement of such reform has enabled proponents 
to push the reform agenda.
A number of initiatives can also be directly attributed to the 
long-standing partnership between donors and government to support 
governance and public administration reform through the GPAR 
programme, which has been functioning for more than a decade. This 
programme represents a long-term commitment to the process of 
reform and has been implemented in a manner which has built strong 
ownership within the government, especially the MOHA. This combination 
of funding, technical support and partnership has facilitated the 
piloting of a number of reforms that are likely to be mainstreamed over 
the course of time. 
Future Trends 
It is clear from the above, that whilst the overall structure of the one 
party state system in Laos remains firmly entrenched, there are a 
number of significant changes that have taken place which clearly 
indicate a trend towards a more open, accountable and effective 
government, even within the constraints mentioned above. This trend 
is unlikely to reverse as the Party leadership has become far more aware 
in recent years of the principles of good governance as a necessary 
underpinning for political stability and greater integration into the 
regional and global economy. This means that there is a degree of 
certainty in terms of government commitment to reforms, although 
these will be selectively pursued and adopted in a manner that does 
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not undermine the very structure of the State. 
This presents an interesting challenge to those engaged in helping to 
formulate and support the process of governance reform. This requires 
a high degree of political awareness as to what is feasible and practical, 
as well as a sound understanding as to which reforms can have important 
beneficial impacts for citizens without necessitating a fundamental 
restructuring of the system as a whole. Here the main risks are associated 
with the promotion of an externally driven reform agenda without 
adequate ownership on the part of government and the risks associated 
with unrealistic reform time frames which are driven by programme 
and project imperatives rather than the objectives of reform itself.       
Chapter 2: Legal Sector and Justice System  
Introduction 
The Lao PDR has experienced a gradual move towards establishing a 
modern justice system. This is slowly evolving from an initial set of 
socialist law principles and Party directives, primarily aimed at maintaining 
law and order, to a more recognisable legal system based on rule of 
law principles. The rule of law is a fundamental principle in state-society 
relations that applies whenever individuals or organisations interact 
with the legal system and the State. The rule of law embodies principles 
such as the legality and transparency of decisions, the right to be heard, 
right of appeal and the right to information. Transparent decisions are 
a fundamental part of the rule of law. 
In the early post 1975 years, the justice sector was structured around 
a system of People’s Courts, administered by the Party and dealing with 
cases on the basis of interpreting Party directives, without reference to 
any former body of law. A Supreme Court was subsequently established 
in 1983 to act as a court of appeal but it was not until the early 1990s 
that courts could function with reference to a body of law in the form 
of new civil and criminal codes, operating within the framework of the 
new Constitution. Since then the basic structure of a modern legal 
system has gradually been put into place. 
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The present Constitution, adopted in 1991 and revised in 2003, provides 
for certain basic elements of the rule of law such as subordination of 
the Party and Government to the Constitution and laws, and recognition 
of a number of civil, political, social and economic rights. The 7th NSEDP 
refers to the need for the state authority to operate under the rule of 
law and to fight corruption in a determined manner. The country has 
promulgated several important laws on the legal sector itself including 
the Law on the People’s Court, Law on the Public Prosecutor, the Penal 
Law and the Law on Criminal Procedure.
The country has ratified more than 400 international treaties and agreements 
with other countries but fewer than 100 domestic laws have been 
promulgated, which means there is a major gap between domestic and 
international law, making it difficult to enforce international treaties in 
the absence of a wider domestic framework. In response to this, the 
President has passed Ordinance No 1/2009 to elevate international 
treaties to guiding principles occupying a position similar to that of the 
Constitution. 
However, there is little or no expertise in the system at present to hear 
cases on international treaties and hence enforcement and 
implementation will be a slow and lengthy process. To date, these 
treaties have mostly been used to bring about change in economic and 
business practice. Moreover it is anticipated that these treaties will have 
the effect of helping the legal process to move towards compliance 
with international obligations and over time it is expected they will have 
an impact on the application of domestic law. The country has become 
a party to six of the nine United Nations core human rights treaties and 
recently hosted the first drafting of the ASEAN Declaration on Human 
Rights. Laos has also formulated a national action plan to take forward 
a number of recommendations to strengthen training of prosecutors, 
law enforcement agencies and judiciary.   
Organisation and Structure of the Justice Sector
The legal sector now has a Supreme People’s Court (SPC) at the apex 
of the system, three regional Appeals Courts, 17 Provincial Courts and 
103 District Courts, which have now been merged into 39 Area Courts 
with at least two courts per province. As part of judicial restructuring, 
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these are now under the Supreme Court and not the Ministry of Justice. 
This was done to rationalise courts in line with the availability of the 
requisite number of judges as stipulated under the law. As is common 
in many countries, the Supreme Court mainly deals with matters of a 
constitutional nature and important appeal cases. There are also military 
courts which form a separate part of the legal system but these will not 
be considered in the analysis below. A single chamber hears both civil 
and criminal cases.
The President of the SPC and the Supreme Public Prosecutor are 
appointed by the National Assembly on the recommendation of the 
President. Judges are appointed by the NA Standing Committee on the 
recommendation of the President of the SPC, although all names are 
approved by the Party. There are currently more than 500 judges 
working in the court system with plans to expand this to over 1,500 by 
2020. The Prosecution service comprises 850 Public Prosecutors, 215 
of whom are women, working across 140 Public Prosecutor Offices at 
district, provincial and central levels, and supported by an additional 
530 staff. Within the court system there is provision for a variety of 
chambers to be set up to focus on trade, family and juvenile matters 
and further plans to establish a family registration office, notary office, 
and legal advice offices. The Justice Ministry is setting up a Notary office 
but there is at present no family registration office to implement the 
1992 law on family registration, which is legally a Justice Ministry function. 
Lao justice is slowly evolving from an initial set of socialist princi-
ples and directives to a recognisable system based on rule of law. 
There are currently over 500 judges, with plans to expand this to 
over 1,500 by 2020. Lawyers complain of inadequate recognition 
while officials say lawyers do not assert themselves enough. Much 
is expected from the proposed Law on Lawyers, which would 
clearly lay down the rights and duties of lawyers. The system of 
village mediation represents an effective and economical means 
of resolving local disputes that could be further developed. 
There are 109 officially recognised lawyers in Laos although an 
estimated 135 lawyers are working at present. There are ten legal 
centres offering a wide variety of legal advice and 12 private law firms, 
including four international forms licensed to provide legal advice. 
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The Lao Bar Association (LBA) has 88 members, including nine women, 
and operates from nine offices in Vientiane and seven regional offices. 
The Association has a number of important functions such as protect-
ing lawful rights and the interests of individuals and legal entities, act-
ing as a regulatory body for licensed lawyers, providing legal training, 
legal dissemination and legal aid services. The LBA has established a 
telephone hotline for people seeking advice on legal issues. It has ben-
efited from donor support under a UNDP-led initiative with support 
from AusAid and the EU. This has primarily focused on building the 
capacity of the LBA through initiatives designed to increase knowledge 
and awareness and improve access to justice for those ordinarily unable 
to seek advice. Most association members still prefer to provide such 
advice in their offices rather than appearing in court. While lawyers 
complain of inadequate recognition by officials, officials say that lawyers 
do not assert themselves. There is a lack of analytical thinking and 
presentation skills, while the role of lawyers is not well understood. 
Much is expected from the proposed Law on Lawyers which would 
clearly lay down the rights and duties of lawyers. Until now defence 
lawyers have been working under Decree 64 on the Lao Bar Association 
and the Ministry of Justice has recognised the limitations of this, having 
publicly stated these procedures are outdated and unsuitable for 
moving towards international integration. 
Village Mediation
Under the Constitution the village head (nai baan) is responsible for 
law and order at local level including the implementation of laws and 
enforcement of decisions of the State. Civil disputes are largely dealt 
with by a system of village mediation based on round table meetings 
in the office of the village head, who may or may not be present and 
does not act as a judge: agreements are rather arrived at through 
consensus. Once a decision is reached the village head is responsible 
for recording the decision and agreement. Penalties can include written 
warnings and fines and periodic reporting to the village head to 
monitor compliance. Any person may call for a mediation meeting and 
if the matter involves a more serious issue the police may be requested 
to attend. The village head will usually issue a summons for the respective 
parties to attend the meeting. It should be noted that the system of 
village mediation represents a very effective and economical means of 
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resolving local disputes without having to escalate the issue to a 
higher level with all the attendant administration and costs involved. 
Indeed, the concept of local level mediation and dispute settlement is 
now being actively considered as an alternative to the court system in 
many western countries where processing legal cases often results in 
significant delays in the justice system and escalating costs which are 
often disproportionate to the case being heard. If a matter cannot be 
resolved through village mediation it may be referred to the police and 
courts for resolution. At the same time, there may be cases where 
socio-cultural factors impinge on the proceedings in such a way that it 
may be difficult to ensure a fair outcome, although in such 
circumstances it is possible for one the parties to refer the case to the 
courts. However, it should be noted that a recent Ministry of Justice 
initiative for increasing the efficiency of village mediation through the 
launching of a case-free village campaign, may on occasion result in 
certain cases not being referred upwards in order to comply with targets 
and expectations.
In spite of the progress made towards establishing a modern legal system 
with the basic structures and personnel in place and an ambitious Legal 
Sector Master Plan for further improvements, close examination of the 
system suggests there remain many challenges that are yet to be addressed. 
Operation of the Justice System 
It is estimated that around 1,000 formal cases that reach the court 
system each year, 60-70% of which are civil cases, with the remainder 
mostly concerning crimes of the person. Most civil cases involve land 
disputes and land has become the single most litigated subject in the 
country. Whilst village mediation works well to filter out many minor 
disputes that might otherwise clutter the system, it is not known how 
many cases exist that never come to court in the first place. Although 
economic crimes exist it is generally recognised by stakeholders that 
the system does not have the capacity or will to detect such cases, many 
of which may involve well connected individuals and groups able to 
insulate themselves from the law in various ways. 
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Despite the village mediation system filtering out many minor cases, 
the courts remain overloaded. Around 70% of all cases are civil and 
concern land disputes and land issues, family and property disputes and 
divorce and other family matters. Disputes concerning large investments 
rarely come to the court system for a judicial decision but are dealt with 
by the Government or may go to arbitration. The Supreme Court is 
mostly a final court of appeal and rarely deals with constitutional cases. 
The law also provides an opportunity for citizens to appeal to the 
National Assembly, which can and has intervened.   
The courts remain overloaded, with most cases involving land 
disputes. In criminal cases, the police lack capacity and are not 
sufficiently independent to guarantee fair access to justice. In 
theory, a defendant can only be held for 24 hours and has the right 
to contact a lawyer. In practice, the police do not observe due 
process but supplement their income by negotiating rights and 
release in return for favours and payments. The Justice Ministry 
has publicly recognised the limitations of current procedures and, 
under a new ruling, defence lawyers will be able to meet clients 
before police investigations are completed. 
Whilst citizens in theory enjoy the protection of the law with respect 
to crimes against the person and property, the police lack the capacity 
and resources to provide requisite levels of protection, are not 
sufficiently independent to guarantee that citizens will gain fair access 
to justice, and lack the expertise to conduct effective follow up and 
investigation on behalf of the complainant or victim. 
Investigation, Prosecution and Defence
Once a case is brought to the notice of the police it is their duty as the 
main investigating agency to generate sufficient evidence for them to 
bring about a charge and for the prosecution to proceed subsequently 
with the case. In practice, the low levels of professionalism and 
expertise in the police has a serious detrimental impact on the 
functioning of the legal system. It is reported that they often fail to find 
sufficient evidence for the case to proceed or that they indulge in 
wilful or negligent destruction of evidence which would otherwise lead 
to a suspect being charged.
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After a case is brought by the police, it is the duty of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office to assess the evidence and determine whether there 
are sufficient grounds for taking the case to court. This is mostly an 
independent decision by the office of the prosecutor, except in cases 
of a security or political nature in which the Party will be necessarily 
consulted. As there is no law on evidence it is not clear what is 
admissible in court, so it is generally left to the police to collect evidence. 
Without the involvement of defence lawyers there is no counter 
evidence. 
Although there is a notion of the presumption of innocence in the law, 
especially in cases of a criminal nature, in practice this is often not 
applied and defendants may be held in custody for many months while 
prosecutors assemble the case against them, during which time they 
will often not have access to any legal counsel. In theory, under the 
law, a defendant can only be held for 24 hours during which time his/
her family has to be notified and the defendant has the right to contact 
a lawyer. In practice the police do not have a clear understanding or 
interest in upholding the rights of defendants and observing due 
process. This opens up an opportunity for the police to supplement 
their income by negotiating rights and release in return for favours and 
payments. 
One of the major shortcomings of justice system procedure to date has 
been the inability of most defendants in criminal cases to access a 
defence lawyer. The State will only provide a defendant with a lawyer 
in serious cases being heard at the Supreme Court. Lack of access to 
defence lawyers is due partly to weak procedure on rights and process, 
partly to the inability of suspects to engage and pay for a lawyer, and 
partly to the small number of practising criminal lawyers available. The 
Ministry of Justice has recognised the limitations of current procedures, 
publicly stating they are outdated and unsuitable for moving towards 
international integration. 
Under a new law, defence lawyers will now be able to meet clients 
suspected of a criminal offence before police investigations are 
completed. This law is aligned to the Law on Criminal Procedure and 
aims to comply with the International Convention on Civil and Criminal 
Rights. Interestingly, during consultations on the drafting of this law, 
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most officials expressed strong reservations on suspects having the right 
of access to a defence lawyer before an investigation had been 
completed. However, both the justice ministry and the National 
Assembly Standing Committee on Law are in support of this new law, 
which is a serious and welcome initiative to uphold the principle of 
being innocent until proven guilty and has been a missing element in 
the operation of the justice sector to date.  
Court Hearings and Judgements 
Since most defendants have no legal representation in court, nor any 
familiarity with court procedures, it is extremely difficult for them to present 
a credible defence case. The lack of legal counsel also means there is no 
prior agreement with the Public Prosecutor as to what evidence will be used 
in court, thus making it considerably easier for the prosecution to ambush 
the defendant. 
Under Lao law it is not clear on what principle verdicts are actually reached. 
There are ordinarily two accepted practices for reaching a verdict in most 
justice systems, where the burden of proof could either be based on “the 
balance of probability” or as is the case in many criminal cases, “beyond rea-
sonable doubt”. The latter implies a stronger commitment to the  presumption 
of innocence and is a further safeguard against convicting an innocent party. 
In the current system a judgement is deliberated and agreed upon by 
a bench of three judges. This formerly comprised a judge and two Jury 
members. In practice it proved difficult to co-opt two sufficiently 
knowledgeable and willing citizens to serve as impartial jury members. 
A verdict is reached on the basis of a majority decision. Since the vast 
majority of judges are inexperienced and young, many with just two 
or three years of experience, they mostly accept the evidence brought 
before them and the quality of judgements is often weak. At present 
there is no access to judgements and hence it is difficult to examine 
precedent and question.
Under Lao criminal procedure there are guidelines on the quantum of 
sentence for different categories of crime and similarly for civil cases 
and levels of penalty. As in any justice system, cases may not fully match 
the categories mentioned and hence there is a need for interpretation 
of sentencing guidelines. In many legal systems such guidelines comprise 
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substantial volumes of text and have to be fully understood by all legal 
professionals. In the absence of such detailed guidelines there is scope 
for substantial injustice and/or weak application of the law.  
In practice, the outcome of a case may be decided less by technical 
analysis than by individual connections, offers of consideration, family 
ties and other interventions. Reaching a decision can be even more 
tricky where it involves competing interventions, each desirous of a 
different outcome and where a case may thus have to be evaluated on 
the basis of competing influence rather than the weight of evidence. 
Whilst there is an underlying acceptance in many cultures, including 
Lao, that traditional loyalties can be used to influence outcomes, the 
depth of such practice within a formal setting will in the long run affect 
the perceived legitimacy and primacy of the law in the eyes of citizens. 
As in many legal systems around the world, judges have a greater 
degree of independence in reaching a verdict and deciding the quantum 
of punishment in cases that are essentially private in nature and that 
do not impinge on the State. In those cases that do impinge on State, 
security and/ or constitutional matters, judgements will be submitted 
to higher authorities and proceedings may conducted in a strictly 
confidential manner and in the absence of counsel, depending on the 
perceived gravity of the case. 
Whilst the legal system in Laos has a substantial and growing body of 
law, there are many weaknesses and loopholes in the operation of the 
present system which undermine the degree of legal certainty and the 
establishment of a fully functioning rule of law. Part of the problem lies 
in poorly defined and applied procedure and part in low levels of capacity 
and resources. Increased professionalism is required in all branches of 
the system including investigation, prosecution, defence, court 
procedure, judgement and sentencing. 
In addition, laws tends to be interpreted by a Standing Committee of 
the National Assembly, comprising the president, vice president and 
presidents of the various NA Committees, rather than by an expert 
panel of judges in a higher court. This will obviously result in a more 
conservative interpretation with little scope for legal creativity. 
However, a more important issue relates to the application and 
enforcement of the law, since the underlying structure provides sufficient 
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scope for the system to be applied to suit key interests.  
In Lao law it is not clear on what principle verdicts are reached. 
Judgements are often made by inexperienced judges. Guidelines 
on sentencing exist but the outcome of a case may be decided 
less by technical analysis than by individual connections or 
other interventions: cases may be evaluated on the basis of 
competing influence rather than weight of evidence. Increased 
professionalism is required in all branches of the system. 
There have been a variety of initiatives designed to strengthen the 
organisation and operation of the legal sector, including support to the 
Lao Bar Association, and the International Law Project, which was de-
signed to establish systems and procedures to assist in alignment with 
international treaties and conventions and support for legal 
drafting. These initiatives have contributed to a more conducive 
environment for the establishment of an effective rule of law system 
with respect for human rights. However, while important steps have 
been taken to improve legal frameworks, these have not always been 
fully implemented or translated into a tangible advancement in terms 
of rule of law standards. This is because of continuing weak 
institutional structures and systems and low levels of capacity amongst 
staff at all levels of the system The experiences of these initiatives dem-
onstrates that positive results can more easily be attained if efforts are 
concentrated in a limited number of specific areas, identified                   to-
gether with the Government to increase ownership and commitment. 
Enforcement
As long as there are serious perceived weaknesses in the system, there 
will be a strong tendency by all parties to be influenced by endogenous 
factors such as personal and political relations, patron-client obligations, 
and gifts and payments, as well as by exogenous factors such as 
political policies and directives, administrative targets and cultural and 
societal influences. 
Stuart-Fox (2011) argues that law in Laos is determined at three levels: 
firstly by reference to Party policy (in Lao nayobay, which has taken on 
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the additional meaning of “manipulating the law” in cases where a 
‘policy ruling’ is made in favour of an individual); secondly by reference 
to the written text as passed by the National Assembly; and finally in 
response to those who are in a position to influence a legal outcome. 
Stuart-Fox points out that the last is widespread and consequently legal 
authorities may find themselves evaluating a case not on the basis of 
the law as it stands, but on which of two conflicting influences and 
interventions represents the more critical and powerful interest, in a 
context where failure to make the right decision has cost some justice 
officials their jobs (Stuart-Fox, 2011)
All this serves to undermine the very concept of rule of law and creates 
a climate where it is generally seen as pragmatic and legitimate to 
by-pass legal processes and procedures and resolve matters in other 
less formal and more familiar ways. Whilst this may be a sensible 
strategy in many minor cases that serve to clutter legal systems, in more 
important cases involving aggrieved parties or serious malpractices, this 
strategy simply breeds a frontier-like mentality where transactions 
function outside the rule of law. This may create an attractive 
environment for individuals and enterprises with a strong interest in 
short term gain but does not provide a satisfactory environment for 
long-term development and wider regional and global integration      
Whilst there are serious weaknesses in the operation of legal procedures 
as noted above, a more widespread problem is that poor enforcement 
may result in a substantial number of potential cases never coming to 
court in the first place. Firstly, and mostly in the case of petty offences, 
it is often easier for members of the law enforcement agency to ignore 
the offence especially if the offender is known personally or known to 
be well connected. In other cases it may be seen as more expedient to 
impose an on-the-spot penalty which can be accepted informally. 
Finally, there may be internal or external pressure brought to bear on 
law enforcement agencies not to pursue a case for a variety of reasons. 
Another problem relates to the fact that the law is little known by most 
citizens, and worryingly not particularly well known by those responsible 
for applying and enforcing it. This largely derives from the fact that 
there are inadequate channels for making new laws known to people, 
although the more educated classes are becoming gradually more 
familiar with the law and may refer to the law to defend themselves or 
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others. A large proportion of the rural population is illiterate and will 
not therefore use the law, instead resorting to more familiar methods 
of dispute settlement or using the influence of others to assist their 
case. Many laws have been drafted by foreign experts, and given the 
lack of legal and language training resources in the Ministry of Justice, 
some have yet to be translated. Although laws are supposed to be 
available in the official government gazette, this is often not the case 
as officials lack the resources and skills to translate and publish laws, 
or may be reluctant to release information into the public domain 
without referring the matter upwards.   
The Public Prosecutor‘s Office and the Government Inspection Agency 
both function to monitor implementation of laws and may initiate 
action on taking any public agency to court for transgression of the 
law. Both organisations are understaffed, lack expertise and as an 
integral part of the government system, lack sufficient independence 
to be in a position to pursue a public agency. As a result there have 
been no formal cases brought against any government agency to date. 
Action has been taken against individualswithin agencies that have 
failed to comply with the law or transgressed beyond a legal mandate, 
but such cases are dealt with in a more customary manner, described 
by some stakeholders as “dealing with issues within the family”, where 
transgressors have been subsequently “loop lined” into less important 
and less influential positions or may have found themselves out of 
position and favour altogether.     
Key Issues and Potential Entry Points 
The main challenges in enabling the system to move towards a more 
fully developed rule of law include the need to build and strengthen 
the body of independent professional lawyers, and to develop 
mechanisms that enable the justice system to function in a more 
independent and professional manner. This will require a clearer 
separation of powers between the agencies of the justice system plus 
substantial improvements in the nature and operation of legal 
processes and procedures and in the capacity of those within the 
agencies to implement such processes. 
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It is seen as legitimate to bypass legal procedures and resolve 
matters in less formal ways. A more widespread problem is that 
poor enforcement may result in a substantial number of cases 
never coming to court in the first place. Many rural people are 
illiterate and will not use the law, instead resorting to more 
familiar methods of settlement or using the influence of others. 
At state level, no formal cases have been brought against any 
government agency. 
There is also a need for a substantial increase - among people at all 
levels of society - in awareness of the law, the rights of citizens under 
the law and the application of the law. Stakeholders point out that with 
a strong, more independent and effective legal system, many of the 
underlying problems or weaknesses associated with the underlying 
economic, political and social structures could be addressed, thus elevating 
support for strengthening the rule of law as a key strategic platform 
that is at the same time consistent with current Party and government 
policy. 
However, it is recognised that this is a substantial enterprise and is 
unlikely to be something that one donor alone can address, since such 
support requires a sector-wide approach to address the various 
complementary and reinforcing interventions along the chain of actors 
and institutions. In the meantime, a more feasible approach may be to 
focus on the enforcement of a much smaller number of laws and 
decrees of strategic significance in terms of wider development, which 
may include responsible management of natural resources, FDI 
investments and the utilisation of public money (allocation and 
spending) in the context of the 2006 Budget Law. 
Conclusion: Recent Changes, Drivers and Future Trends 
Overall it can be seen that whilst many of the rudiments of a function-
ing legal system are now in place, there are a wide range of problems 
that continue to affect the sector and undermine the establishment of 
a well functioning rule of law system. These range from fundamental 
issues in terms of the level and degree of independence of the various 
justice agencies including the police, public prosecution, lawyers and 
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judges, to a wider range of shortcomings in terms of the application 
and operation of the system of justice.  
Recent Changes 
There has been a recent move to rationalise the former 103 District Courts 
into 39 Area Courts ensuring at least two courts per province as part of a 
judicial restructuring under the Supreme Court rather than the Ministry of 
Justice. This is significant in that it attempts to align the courts to the 
resources available to run these effectively.
The size and competency of the judiciary has steadily increased over the last 
few years, with over 500 judges now working in the court system. There are 
plans to expand this figure to over 1,500 by 2020. The Prosecution Service 
now employs 850 Public Prosecutors, 215 of whom are women, working 
across 140 Public Prosecutor Offices. Within the court system specific 
chambers have been established for family and juvenile cases and the justice 
ministry is setting up a Notary Office. There are now ten legal centres 
offering a wide variety of legal advice and 12 private law firms licensed to 
provide legal advice, including four international companies. Membership 
of the Lao Bar Association has grown to 88, providing a range of citizen 
advisory services including a recently established telephone hotline. 
There has been substantial progress in the drafting and approval of a 
total of 88 laws to date, including several important laws on the legal 
sector itself. Over 400 international laws and treaties have been ratified. 
Another important development has been the strengthening of the 
village mediation system which provides a far more accessible, familiar 
and meaningful means of addressing legal issues and disputes for most 
citizens, than does entering into the environment of courts and judicial 
processes. 
Under a new law, defence lawyers will now be able to meet clients 
suspected of a criminal offence before police investigations are 
completed. Both the justice ministry and the National Assembly 
Standing Committee on Law are in support of this new law which is a 
serious and welcome initiative. 
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A comprehensive Legal Sector Master Plan was formulated in 2009 to 
help establish the rule of law as a solid foundation of the justice system 
by 2020. The Plan places considerable emphasis on the training of all 
personnel including judges, prosecutors and the police, and upgrading 
the educational qualifications of these personnel.
Drivers of Change  
A number of important recent changes are directly attributable to an 
increased recognition by the Party leadership of the significance of the 
rule of law in underpinning the structure and systems of governance 
as well as the mediation of social and economic relations in society as 
whole. There is an understanding that established rule of law principles 
are a prerequisite for engaging with the external world in a structured 
and productive manner in terms of attracting investment, negotiating 
avenues for export and in engaging with donor partners and other 
international agencies. 
Statements at the 9th Party Congress clearly demonstrate the Party’s 
commitment to moving towards a Rule of Law State and the 
Government has been showing a keen interest in exchanging views 
and ideas with countries such as Vietnam and China on how the legal 
system can operate with sufficient independence to be in a position to 
bring a case against a public body.
Another important influence on the change process can be attributed to 
the plethora of international treaties and conventions that have been 
ratified in recent years. There is a growing realization that whilst the 
ratification of some treaties may be more symbolic in nature, others require 
the Government to open itself to peer inspection and to participate in peer 
reviews. These reviews can result in the formulation of recommendations 
for action that cannot be ignored without significant loss of face or potential 
future exclusion. Whilst economic treaties exert may exert more influence 
at present, social and environmental treaties will become increasingly 
important motivators for improving enforcement. 
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The main challenges in enabling the system to move towards 
rule of law include the need to strengthen the body of lawyers, 
and to develop mechanisms that enable the justice system to 
function in a more independent and professional manner. This 
will require a clearer separation of powers between justice 
system agencies plus substantial improvements in legal             
processes. 
The Legal Sector Master Plan also represents a driver of change in the 
justice sector. It sets out an ambitious reform agenda that the justice 
ministry has committed to and has already had some impact in terms 
bringing about change in the sector and most significantly the plan 
addresses the issues of weak investigation and poor enforcement, which 
represent major problems and challenges in the sector.     
Finally, a small but not insignificant factor explaining change relates to the 
presence of donor partner support in the area of improving access to 
justice and international law as well as the array of donor support for the 
drafting of new laws and amendments across the system as a whole. 
Taken together these activities have led to a degree of engagement and 
influence that has contributed to the change process. 
Future Trends 
The slow but discernible trend towards legal sector reform is a 
fundamental prerequisite of good governance. In spite of an increase 
in resources in terms of structures and staffing, there are fundamental 
shortcomings and weaknesses in the operation of justice from the 
level of investigation through to prosecution, court procedure, 
judgements, sentencing and enforcement. In spite of these 
weaknesses, there are signs that the Party and Government are 
committed to putting into place incremental reforms that will result in 
a more effective legal system capable of delivering justice across all 
segments of society, including within the government system itself. 
Given the political sensitivity of such changes, it is likely that the process 
will take many years although it is evident that certain subjects, such 
as commercial law, may gain more traction in terms of the development 
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and codification of legal frameworks and the potential operation of 
fast-track legal processes. 
At the same time, although there has been substantial assistance in the 
drafting of new laws in a wide variety of sectors, focused support from 
donors has been limited in nature and largely confined to a few 
selected areas of the legal system that may have more instant appeal, 
such as access to justice and international law. It is clear that the lack 
of well functioning legal sector is a major obstacle to addressing a 
number of underlying structural problems in the contemporary political 
economy of Laos and hence this sector represents a critically important 
aspect of governance reform. Without an effective system of enforcement 
and inadequate legal processes it will be difficult to realise the goal of 
good governance.        
The reforms required to address all the problems of the sector represent 
a substantial task, and one that it is unlikely a single donor alone can 
address, since support requires a sector-wide approach to address the 
various complementary and reinforcing interventions along the chain 
of actors and institutions. 
In the meantime, a more feasible approach may be to focus on the 
enforcement of a much smaller number of laws and decrees of strategic 
significance in terms of wider development. These may include the 
responsible management of natural resources, FDI investments and the 
utilisation of public money (allocation and spending) in the context of 
the 2006 Budget Law.
Chapter 3: Decentralisation 
This chapter will consider the current status of decentralisation in Laos. 
It will begin with an explanation of the recent evolution of decentralisation, 
showing that there have been different forms of decentralisation at 
different points in time. It will go on to examine the present character 
and status of decentralisation in terms of political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralisation, as well as voice, accountability and 
transparency. 
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Historical Context 
Government in Laos is based on a centralised system of administration 
implemented uniformly throughout the country with level of 
responsibility divided between central ministries and provincial and 
district administration. Within this context, the country has experienced 
a number of phases of decentralisation over the last few decades. The 
early post-revolutionary years were characterised by substantial 
decentralisation as lack of revenues at the centre required provinces to 
be fiscally self-sufficient. This decentralisation was accompanied by a 
high degree of economic and financial autonomy. With the introduction 
of the ‘New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1986, provinces were given 
greater control over     revenues and budgets and were permitted to 
conclude trade agreements with foreign states with which they shared 
a border, while provincial administrations were no longer supervised 
by central ministries. Even the State Bank was decentralised, with branch 
managers appointed by local authorities. Whilst most of the revenues 
were retained by provinces to fund services, including health and 
education, a percentage of revenue was supposed to be passed upwards 
to central government. 
This early experience of decentralisation failed to bring about intended 
benefits. Provincial administrations were ill-equipped to take on new 
responsibilities. Revenues were diverted by powerful local officials for 
their personal consumption and little was remitted to central 
government. Even where provincial officials tried to function in 
accordance with their new responsibilities, they lacked capacity and 
delivery systems. Revenues were used for the benefit of Party members 
and as a consequence teachers and health workers were often left 
unpaid. Services collapsed and many government staff turned to other 
employment. As there was no centralised system for revenue-sharing 
(to take into consideration the needs of the poorer provinces), services 
were inequitably provided across provinces. By mid-1989 the central 
government had lost all control over what was going on in the 
provinces. There was no effective monitoring of national priorities and 
targets, nor was there any effective oversight of provincial revenue and 
expenditure by the Ministry of Finance. As a result, greater powers of 
patronage accrued to provincial officials, particularly to provincial 
governors.    
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The Party decided on a course of radical re-centralisation in 1991, with 
the enactment of a new Constitution which abolished the people’s 
councils and administrative committees at provincial, district and village 
levels, and reinforced central control and authority across the respective 
arms of local administration. Provincial Party secretaries were appointed 
as Governors holding ministerial rank and with a few exceptions were 
directly accountable to the Central Committee. This reaction seriously 
set back local governance and democratic participation at the local 
level. The abolition of the people’s councils and administrative 
committees at province, district and village levels effectively eliminated 
popular participation in local government and reinforced Party power 
at the centre. Since 2001, there has been a further drive to recentralise 
revenues to address revenue shortages, which caused periodic cash 
rationing and difficulties in ensuring a more equitable distribution of 
grant funding to revenue-deficit provinces.
Decentralisation as De-concentration
Political decentralisation is characterised by local systems of political 
representation in which citizens participate in government through 
elected representatives at the local level. In Laos, the main elements of 
the local political system are defined in Articles 3 and 5 of the Constitution. 
Article 3 emphasises the Party as the leading nucleus and Article 5 
effectively means that all state organs (including at local level) are 
organised in the same way as the ruling party, i.e. as hierarchical 
organisations in which information (about social issues and concerns, 
for example) flows up the hierarchy and decisions flow down. Whilst 
there has been a form of representative government through local 
councils in the past, the current system at provincial and district level 
is based exclusively on administrative units functioning in the absence 
of any system of elected representation. The Constitution does, 
however, provide for a single National Assembly with elected 
representatives from multi-member constituencies at provincial 
level - the only form of political representation in the current system of 
government. Whilst the representative role of the NA is analysed in 
more detail in the section on Participation below, Assembly members 
do provide a mechanism for citizens at the local level to raise concerns 
on a national platform.  
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Administrative decentralisation seeks to redistribute authority, 
responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among 
different levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for 
planning, financing and management of certain public functions from 
the central government and its agencies to field units of government 
agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous 
public authorities or corporations, or area wide, regional or functional 
authorities. There are three major forms of administrative 
decentralisation: de-concentration, delegation and devolution.    
In Laos, decentralisation as a policy of the state finds expression only 
as a de-concentration of state authority, where sub-national units have 
the responsibility for implementing centrally determined policies. This 
is well articulated in the law on local administration promulgated in 
October 2003. Article 5 of the law stipulates that ‘the organisation and 
functions of the local administration are implemented in accordance 
with the principle of centralised democracy and de-concentration, which 
divides responsibility among management levels. The village level reports 
to the district level, the district level reports to the provincial level, and 
the provincial level reports to the government under the guidance and 
responsibility of the Party Committee. The Constitution gives no clear 
guidance on provincial and district responsibilities except to specify that 
the leaders at each level must ensure implementation of the Constitution 
and the law and must carry out decisions taken by a higher level.
Although democratic centralism was brought in through the Constitution, 
centralisation has been slow and incomplete. In spite of the Party’s 
inclination to centralise decision making, provinces have enjoyed a 
surprising degree of autonomy in shaping social policy. This independence 
is partly due to limited resources and poor communications with 
Vientiane. Central government has also encouraged direct contact along 
the borders with China, Thailand and Vietnam and trading agreements 
with neighbouring jurisdictions. Provincial governors still exert considerable 
influence over line ministries in their jurisdictions. Although minsters 
wield considerable power as high ranking members of government, 
they hold equal rank with provincial governors, and their authority 
outside the capital depends on their relative position in the Party 
hierarchy. Only a close analysis of the relative positions of Party members 
provides clues to the effectiveness of national policies at provincial, and 
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hence local, levels. Since governors and ministers enjoy equivalent rank, 
organisational lines of responsibility in government are not well 
articulated. Consequently, national policies and regulations are 
selectively implemented and enforced at local level. Although somewhat 
constrained by the Constitutional reforms of 1991 and 2003, provincial 
administrations continue to exert a high degree of power at regional 
level and hence reforms to central-local relations have been a part of 
wider deliberations within government on market transition.
In Laos, decentralisation as a state policy finds expression only 
as a de-concentration of authority, where sub-national units 
have the responsibility for implementing centrally-determined 
policies. Provinces do enjoy autonomy in social policy, due to 
poor communications with Vientiane, trading agreements with 
neighbours and the influence of governors. However, districts 
have to deliver a range of public services with little or no          
autonomy which constrains the effectiveness of service delivery. 
The public service is guided by the regulations contained in the PM 
Decree  171 of November 1993. Initial attempts at addressing 
central-local roles and responsibilities were not particularly successful. 
For example, PM Decree 01/ 2000, which focused on central-local 
relations, has done little to clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
sub-national units of government. The entire six-page advisory note 
simply reiterates government policies beginning in the early 1990s to 
recentralise and then de-concentrate central authority. As a result, the 
interpretation and implementation of PM 01 has been undertaken in 
a minimalist way and many administrative and fiscal impediments remain 
as a major challenge to local development and inter-government 
relations.
To strengthen the public service and address various weaknesses, in 
October 2003 the Prime Minister issued Decree 82/03 on public service 
regulations with supporting instructions. The instructions set out the 
responsibilities of public servants at central, provincial and district levels. 
Central administration has macro level responsibility for the public 
service throughout the country and is expected to develop strategic 
and public administration development plans based on the directives, 
plans and policies of the Party. Ministries and provinces are then 
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supposed to formulate their plans to implement central policies and 
strategies and as such, undertake functions on behalf of the centre and 
provide periodic reports. Responsibility for management of the civil 
service lies with the MOHA. 
At present the instructions supporting PM Decree 82/03 provide the 
strongest evidence of a centralised system of administration. Districts 
do not have management responsibility for the public service. They 
execute functions on behalf of provinces and report on all matters to 
provinces. This represents a major challenge for districts, which have 
to deliver a range of public services with little or no managerial 
autonomy. This constrains performance and effectiveness of service 
delivery. Whilst the decree instructions provide a list of responsibilities 
for all levels of administration, there is insufficient clarity on how these 
responsibilities are shared between the various tiers of administration, 
especially in relation to matters of policy making, implementation and 
oversight. Furthermore, although headcount management is at the 
centre, the instructions are silent on the responsibility for managing the 
financial resources required to maintain the civil service establishment. 
The Law on Local Administration of October 2003 does little to strengthen 
the PM Decree 82/03 in terms of the division of responsibilities for policy 
making, oversight and implementation. The requirement for dual 
reporting lines (ministry and province) as described in Article 10 of the 
law, adds to the ambiguity in terms of roles/responsibilities and does 
little to address the historical tensions in centre-province relations. 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation should allow local administrations to raise and/or 
manage revenues that are transferred from central government, as well 
as giving the authority to make decisions on expenditure. The fiscal 
framework is a key factor in determining the overall character and form 
of local administration. 
As Laos has a unitary system of governance based on multiple 
subordinate levels of the same government, sub-national units of 
administration have no constitutional powers over revenue and 
expenditure. The extent and nature of decision-making powers over 
mini CD 45
finance is determined by the centre and has varied over time. As noted 
above, early experiences with decentralisation which included a strong 
measure of fiscal autonomy at provincial level proved unsustainable and 
there has been a concerted attempt to re-centralise fiscal management 
over the last decade as expressed in the State Budget Law of 2006. 
With development partner assistance, the Government has established 
new (centralised) procedures for planning, budgeting and accounting. 
The Public Financial Management Strengthening Programme (PFMSP), 
launched in 2006, was designed to complement and support the 
implementation of the new State Budget Law. This was designed to 
address weaknesses in the financial management systems at the central 
level. A major thrust of the programme was to assist in the centralisation 
of financial management functions. A multi-donor trust fund was 
established to facilitate implementation of the PFMSP. The priority 
areas covered by the programme are treasury centralisation, budget 
execution, accounting, financial reporting; and revenue policy and 
administration.  
Although the 2006 Budget Law proposed three types of taxes (central, 
shared and provincial), the precise definition and formula has not yet 
been approved by cabinet and the old system, which divides taxes on 
the basis of tax payers rather than types of taxes, continues to prevail. 
This system is messy and complicated, operating in the absence of a 
uniform tax identification numbering system, and thus requires a lot 
effort to modernise and streamline.
In spite of these efforts at centralisation of revenue functions, provinces 
still retain a lot of autonomy in terms of budget allocation and 
expenditure management. There is also a degree of discretion over the 
setting of fees and tariffs, such as for water supply. This can lead to 
tensions between provinces and the centre as in the recent case where 
tariff discussions between a provincial administration and a Malaysian 
company in relation to a potential water concession caused some alarm 
at central government level. 
Public financial management reforms will continue to be a critical aspect 
of improving the central–local fiscal framework, including for budget 
planning and execution, which are key factors underpinning equitable 
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service delivery and enhanced poverty reduction. The Public Expenditure 
Tracking Survey (PETS) of 2008 and the Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) assessment of 2010 provide valuable insights into 
some of the challenges faced by government in managing the transition 
to fiscal recentralisation coupled to administrative de-concentration. 
Both studies highlight a wide variety of weaknesses which compromise 
the governmental ability to engage in devolved funding arrangements. 
The main weaknesses that need to be addressed to improve the 
effectiveness of financial resources utilised at the local level may be 
summarised as follows: 
•	 A	formula	for	the	equitable	apportionment	of	revenues	
to sub-national, government based on population, area 
and relative poverty. needs to be developed and made 
operational.
•	 Little	 information	 is	 available	 locally	 about	 the	 likely	
financial resources to be expected for service delivery. 
•	 Unpredictability	 of	 service	 delivery.	 To	 fix	 this,	 the	
budget should be formulated in the context of a clear 
medium expenditure framework
•	 Spending	units	such	as	schools	and	health	centres	have	
no role in budget preparation 
•	 Capacity	 in	budget	execution	and	 reporting	 is	 low	at	
provincial and district levels 
Voice, Accountability and Transparency
The provision of primary services is the exclusive responsibility of 
sub-national administration and here provinces have authority over 
expenditure in areas such as primary education and health. Provincial 
expenditure for education and health represent more than two-thirds 
of total spending. This makes effectiveness of sub-national spending 
of critical concern. 
Although Laos is cited as one of the ten top movers in human development 
(UNDP 2010), one-fifth of all villages still do not have a school, only 
8% of villages have their own health centre, and the doctor/ population 
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ratio is one of the lowest in Southeast Asia. For Laos to exit LDC status 
by 2020 there will need to be significant additional investment in 
human development along with more effective management of service 
delivery at local level. The level of responsiveness of service providers 
to citizens is low. Poorer communities and ethnic groups are often 
excluded in the design and oversight of policies and programmes, 
although the Government has adopted a conscious approach to more 
equitable service delivery (see section on Equitable Service Delivery). 
However, in spite of attempts to engage citizens in participatory 
planning, the space for citizen mobilisation and expression of voice is 
deeply constrained. Efforts to improve the accountability of government 
and service providers and to amplify the voice of citizens can play a 
significant role in addressing the problems with public services. 
The transition from a decentralised system of government back to a 
centralised and de-concentrated system has been slow and has not 
been accompanied by sound rules and regulations. The lack of clarity 
on roles and responsibilities between different tiers of administration 
levels compromises the ability of both citizens to hold government to 
account, and for policy makers to hold service providers to account. 
Although there are mechanisms in place for community participation 
in the social sectors, the effectiveness of this participation is constrained 
by the inability of the system to be able to respond to citizens’ views 
on policies, resource allocation and investment priorities. At the same 
time it is recognised that changes in the relationships between policy 
makers, service providers and citizens/clients over the last two decades 
has complicated this issue. 
Despite attempts to engage citizens in participatory planning, 
space for mobilisation and expression of voice is constrained. 
Effective, equitable and affordable services can only come once 
the building blocks of voice and accountability are in place and 
when there is transparency in the way scarce public financial 
resources are utilised. With the Government’s drive to strengthen 
local administration, there is an opportunity to adopt mechanisms 
for holding service providers and policy makers to account, 
enabling citizen voice and creating an environment of transparency.   
As the importance of provincial and district governments in service 
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provision increases, so does the importance of transparency at the 
sub-national level. Greater transparency helps to provide much greater 
clarity on the functioning of government. It also enables weaknesses 
in sub-national public financial management to be exposed and allows 
for the tracking of financial flows from the source to points of delivery. 
Accountability to the public is increased and civic engagement and 
public debate is enhanced. Finally, transparency makes it easier to 
compare performance across and within provinces and fosters 
sub-national competition. Weaknesses in voice and transparency, 
however, lead to poor responsiveness. 
The PETS (2008) and the PEFA (2010) have identified a range of 
shortcomings in the current system that compromise accountability and 
transparency. PETS has highlighted the following difficulties in being 
able to hold policymakers and service providers to account, and in 
promoting greater transparency in resource allocation, utilisation and 
quality of services: 
•	 It	is	difficult	to	obtain	a	clear	and	comprehensive	picture	
of the functional allocations of central and sub-national 
government expenditure for service delivery at either 
budget presentation or execution stage. This is because 
40% of the expenditure which is under the control of 
the 17 provinces is shown by province rather than by 
function. Nine out of ten schools and health centres rely 
on off-budget resources from donors, NGOs, parents/
patients and communities to cover their operating costs. 
•	 There	is	no	transparent	basis	for	the	allocation	of	central	
government funding to provinces to ensure at least a 
minimum level of public services can be financed in all 
districts. Many of the revenue streams remain outside 
the budgetary system. This exclusion is contrary to 
requirements in the new budget law. In order to be able 
to make choices between new investments and 
operations, current and capital expenditure should be 
brought into an integrated framework. Annual financial 
statements of revenue and expenditure do not show 
mini CD 49
expenditure financed from fees and charges
•	 As	the	budget	and	donor	programs	are	heavily	skewed	
towards investment expenditure, there are scant 
resources to meet the running costs of service provision. 
Although the Budget Law centralises revenues and 
expenditures, the formulae for the equitable apportionment 
of revenues to sub-national government based on 
population, area and relative poverty have not been 
fully operational. 
•	 The	 central	 budget	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 government	
policy is weakened by the facts that a) provinces enjoy 
a substantial measure of independence in the financial 
allocation of expenditure, and b) staffing allocations are 
determined by a process unrelated to the budget. 
•	 To	be	able	to	hold	policy	makers	accountable	for	health	
and education outcomes, there is a need for information 
about, or scrutiny of the results achieved in service de-
livery;
•	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	hold	 teachers	 and	health	workers	 ac-
countable and responsive in a context where they have 
to hold multiple jobs because their salaries are low and 
not paid on time. Although parents and patients ac-
tively participate in frontline services, accountability is 
blunted by asymmetries of information and conflicts of 
interest. 
As a result of these shortcomings, not only do citizens have great 
difficulty in being able to hold government to account, they also have 
difficulty in knowing who to engage in order for their ‘voice’ to be 
heard. Effective, efficient, equitable and affordable service delivery can 
only come once the building blocks of voice and accountability are in 
place and when there is transparency in the way scarce public financial 
resources are allocated and utilised. Given the extent of the problems 
outlined above, establishing mechanisms for voice and accountability, 
and for promoting transparency in the provision of public services, can 
be extremely difficult.  
mini CD 50
However, in spite of these challenges there have been a small number 
of initiatives that will provide a useful foundation for the incremental 
strengthening of accountability in government. These initiatives include 
the implementation of a pilot Citizen Report Card under the GPAR 
programme, and a shift towards greater community level monitoring 
of infrastructure and services through targeted development projects 
such as DDF and PRF. 
Key Issues and Potential Entry Points 
In a de-concentrated administrative and fiscal system, and where there 
are inadequate fiscal resources to provide basic levels of service to all, 
a key priority is to effectively implement the Budget Law. Although 
much progress has been made, implementation has not been at the 
pace planned. A further injection of coordinated donor-funded 
resources will be required to help the Government deliver its PFMSP 
plan between 2012 and 2015. Implementation needs to be properly 
sequenced and requires continued political support and significant 
implementation capacity and systems development. It also implies that 
the revenue-sharing framework that aligns policies with the budget 
must be finalised. In a de-concentrated setting, the expected results 
that are likely to have a significant positive impact at the local level from 
implementation of the Budget Law are: 
•	 Greater	 accountability	 and	 strengthened	 controls	 in	
public financial management practices at provincial and 
district levels
•	 Much	better	alignment	of	the	budget	with	policies
•	 Government	will	have	the	ability	to	uniformly	execute	
policies throughout the country 
•	 Ability	to	ensure	that	budgeted	funds	get	spent	on	items	
for which the budget was allocated 
•	 Better	 reporting	 and	monitoring	 at	 national	 and	
sub-national levels of government
Alongside technical implementation of the Budget Law, there is a need 
to develop systems and procedures to strengthen accountability and 
voice in relation to local expenditure and service delivery. This could 
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include mechanisms that would enable civil society and community 
groups to work with the public by showing how budget numbers relate 
to issues that affect people’s daily lives – from public health and 
education to wealth distribution. It is important for people to be assured 
that public funds are used to meet the basic needs of society, 
especially the needs of the poor. 
The Government’s drive to strengthen local administrations so they can 
deliver better public services provides a window of opportunity. Local 
service delivery frameworks would enable context-specific mechanisms 
to be established for holding service providers and policy makers to 
account, enabling citizen voice and creating an environment of trans-
parency.  
Public service regulations provide for performance management of staff 
and the Government is keen to extend such systems to local administration. 
However, this is a major challenge as there is insufficient information 
to track the performance and effectiveness of services and no indicators 
for assessing the quality, timeliness, efficacy and costs of services. There 
is a similar gap in assessing the quality of inter-government relations. 
This is of particular importance given the history and the tensions 
between centre-province and the need for fully implementing a 
de-concentrated system of government. 
There is a requirement to formulate indicators that would help track 
progress on changes in local administration at the local level and 
between the four levels of government within a de-concentrated 
setting. The indicators should be designed to track accountability, 
transparency, voice, capability and responsiveness. Indicators must be 
meaningful and few. The criteria for inclusion should be based on 
whether the indicators are going to track changes (positive/ negative) 
to public services that matter most to people, service providers and 
policy makers. 
One of the challenges for the new GPAR programme and for the 
governance sector as a whole is drawing from and building on the 
different initiatives that relate to local administration and avoiding 
duplication and overlap. This is especially the case as the main thrust 
of the programme is about improved service delivery, effective protection 
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of poor and vulnerable people’s rights, and greater participation in 
transparent decision making. This requires close working relations with 
other key MDG sectors such as health and education, which will have 
new delivery structures, modalities and arrangements that will affect 
the nature of local service delivery. For example, the organisation and 
management of primary health care at all levels is defined in the health 
sector strategy and addresses issues of relationships within and across 
sectors. A similar approach has been adopted by the education sector, 
which is now proposing to introduce school-level block grants. Both 
sectors have extensive involvement in community engagement in service 
delivery. 
The new GPAR programme can provide a platform for lesson learning. 
It would need to create appropriate institutional, organisational and 
individual incentives and mechanisms for sharing good practices and 
learning. This would also encourage programs to draw on what is 
already there, avoid duplication and overlap, and improve implementation 
by drawing on lessons learned. For example the Education Sector 
Development Framework, 2009–2015 (ESDF) makes reference to 
progressive service assignments to lower levels and the introduction of 
school block grants through the District Education Bureau. It also refers 
to the Village Education Development Committee, which has responsibility 
for supporting education service delivery and development at the 
community level. The ESDF proposes changes to the inter-government 
relations. Many of the service delivery issues being addressed in the 
ESDF are common to other services and some are being addressed by 
GPAR.
Conclusion: Recent Changes, Drivers of Change and Future Trends 
In spite of government pronouncements on the importance of accountable 
and effective local administration, there have been few institutional 
changes to the system of local administration over the past few years, 
other than a gradual recentralisation of the financial function 
accompanied by implementation of the new centralised budgeting and 
accounting system developed with donor partner support. In April 2003 
the Government promulgated a new policy on governance reform which 
talked of empowering the lower or local levels of government 
organisation. However, in the absence of any clear framework 
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delineating the roles and responsibilities, functions and finances of 
de-concentrated administration there has been little change in the form 
or substance of local administration on the ground.     
Recent Changes 
There has been little significant change to the structure and/or form of 
de-concentrated administration in the last few years in spite of the 
opportunity provided by Decree 01/PM to redefine the mandates, 
responsibilities and functions of different tiers of administration, or to 
provide more operational autonomy to districts. 
One of the more important developments in this arena in recent years 
has been the piloting of discretionary block grants to district administration, 
accompanied by capacity and systems development for improved budgeting, 
planning and expenditure management of local administration under 
the GPAR District Development Fund (DDF) component. This initiative 
has provided strong evidence of the efficacy of greater fiscal and 
managerial autonomy at local level, resulting in significant value addition 
in terms of service delivery (see GPAR Outcome Evaluation 2005) when 
combined with participatory planning and implementation. 
The establishment of the new Ministry of Home affairs (MOHA) in July 
2011 represents a significant step towards strengthening governance, 
civil service management and local public administration, all of which 
fall under the responsibility of MOHA. The new ministry is now in the 
process of formulating a policy proposal for greater administrative 
de-concentration and has already held several rounds of discussions at 
technical and strategic level with ministries and provinces, including 
high-level dialogue chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. Senior 
functionaries in MOHA have pointed out that DDF constitutes an 
essential model that the ministry hopes to develop, although it is reco 
gnised that all features of the DDF model may not be introduced 
simultaneously. 
The most significant recent development, however, is contained in a 
policy statement of the 2011 Party Congress, which highlighted the 
need to strengthen local administration as a means of ensuring improved 
service delivery to local citizens and the establishment of local councils 
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after 2015. At the same time, MOHA is now in the process of formulating 
proposals for greater district autonomy in planning, budgeting 
expenditure management and staffing, and will in due course be working 
on proposals for the establishment of elected councils at provincial 
level. It is anticipated by MOHA that DDF pilot experience will provide 
the basis of the proposed way forward, which may include the provision 
of discretionary block grant funds in some form. 
The new National GPAR Programme (2012-15) provides an opportunity 
for addressing organisational and capacity challenges at national and 
sub-national levels. A major focus will be on clarifying and improving 
relationships and fiscal arrangements between different levels of the 
administration. Key components will be to introduce new policy and 
legal frameworks for strengthening local administration, plus the 
organisation and management capacity of local administration. It will 
mainstream the formula-based block grants for planning and budgeting 
at district level through the budget. In addition, the programme will 
contribute towards improving the delivery of MDG-related services and 
enhancing access to service for the poor. The programme will be 
implemented through a results-based monitoring and management 
arrangement. High level oversight responsibilities are shared between 
the Ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, Planning and Investment, 
Justice and with selected provinces. 
Drivers of Change
A major restrainer of change in this area of governance is the negative 
experience of previous attempts at decentralisation prior to 1991. This 
resulted in weak administrative control over the development process 
at provincial level plus a fiscal crisis at the centre, manifested in 
periodic cash shortages with the Government not able to meet 
recurrent expenditure outlays in some months and also unable to 
develop any system for inter-governmental fiscal transfers to help 
equalize financial and physical disparities across provinces. 
The establishment of the new Ministry of Home Affairs is a step 
towards strengthening governance, civil service management 
and local public administration. The most significant recent 
development is a 2011 Party Congress statement on the need 
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to strengthen local administration as a means of ensuring                  
improved service delivery to local citizens and the establishment 
of local councils after 2015.
This experience led to recentralisation of government, as reflected in 
the 1991 Constitution and reaffirmed in the 2003 Constitutional Amendment. 
In spite of an attempt to clarify the mandates and functions of local 
administration in Decree PM 01/2000, there has been little will to 
consider any form of administrative restructuring. At the same time, 
donor-supported Ministry of Finance initiatives designed to strengthen 
fiscal management in alignment with the 2006 Budget Law have 
resulted in the centralisation of revenue management and the 
introduction of a new uniform National Accounting System to be 
adopted across all branches of central and provincial administration. In 
this context there has been little appetite on the part of government 
to consider assigning new powers over revenues and functions to local 
administrations.     
A growing interest in the need for improving performance of local 
administration to deliver services in an effective manner has led the 
Government to reconsider the relevance of granting more power and 
authority to district administration. This has been complemented by the 
positive experience of recent pilot activities associated with the provision 
of discretionary block grant funding under the multi-donor funded DDF 
component of GPAR. This initiative has provided limited but strategic 
funding for fiscal devolution and decentralised planning and expenditure 
management at district level. The experience has provided a template 
for future reforms and is likely to influence the drafting of a new decree 
that will replace PM 01/2000 and help shape subsequent policies and 
strategies aimed at strengthening local administration.  
Future Trends 
A new policy direction is emerging which reflects current government 
interest in increasing the performance and effectiveness of local 
administration and is reflected in the new breakthrough strategy of the 
2011 9th Party Congress. This demonstrates increased recognition of 
the importance of greater managerial autonomy at local level as a 
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prerequisite for more effective service delivery. 
This is significant in that it marks a new trend towards decentralisation 
which is likely to be influenced by the experiences of initiatives such as 
DDF in areas such as planning and expenditure management, as well 
as complementary changes leading to greater autonomy over 
administrative and staffing functions at district level. Here, there is a 
possibility that local administrations will be assigned greater power over 
the recruitment, appointment, promotion and transfer of staff. It is also 
likely that local administrations will have greater power and authority 
over expenditure, including planning and implementation of schemes at 
local level. It is possible that that local administration may also be granted 
some level of discretionary block grant funding along the lines of the 
DDF programme, although this will depend on the Government’s overall 
budgetary position and may only materialise in the medium term. 
There is also a strong possibility that a greater representative element 
may be introduced to provincial governance through the establishment 
of local councils at provincial level. These councils are likely to be granted 
authority to oversee the functions of provincial administration and to 
scrutinise provincial budgets and expenditures. Such an initiative would 
provide an important additional element of political representation and, 
being closer to the electorate, would provide a new avenue for 
strengthening voice and accountability. 
There is a slight risk that a push towards decentralisation in the absence 
of capacity at local level could undermine local development activities 
and service delivery. This is unlikely, however, given the reasonably 
limited mandates that will be granted in the first instance. At the same 
time the DDF has shown that districts are readily able to assume more 
responsibility and to deliver higher quality services with limited supervision 
and support. There is also a risk that in the enthusiasm of the moment, 
the process could proceed too fast and lead to failure. This would 
ultimately result in a second pendulum swing back to centralisation. At 
the same time there is a slight risk that donors will not be able to adjust 
existing programmes, projects or funding commitments in an adequate 
manner and will thus not be in a position to support the process.  
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Chapter 4: Equitable Service Delivery 
This section examines the issue of equitable service delivery in Laos in 
terms of a broad development approach with the intention of ensuring 
that service delivery is focused on areas and populations most in need. This 
approach underpins a number of programme and project interventions 
designed to address poverty reduction or strengthen the capacity of 
local administration to plan and manage services in a more equitable 
manner. 
The section begins by examining the nature and extent of poverty and 
inequality in Laos, as the starting point of any intervention to improve 
equity in public service delivery. This entails a summary review of the 
macro picture on poverty and growth, as well as an assessment of both 
the distribution of income and non-income poverty and the nature and 
severity of emerging disparities. It will then examine the main 
government response to the delivery of equitable services including 
those of the PRF and DDF. Finally, and in the context of the issues and 
constraints already identified, the section will consider potential entry 
points for strengthening equitable service delivery. The main drivers of 
change affecting the nature and shape of activity in this area are 
considered separately in the section on underlying structural factors 
driving contemporary development. 
Macro Poverty Context
Major changes in the structure of the Lao economy over the last decade 
have contributed to an impressive average annual GDP growth rate of 
7% and an increase in per capita GDP to US$900 in 2008 (World Bank 
2009). This has resulted in an impressive global ranking of 43 out of 
179 countries in terms of growth. This growth has been primarily 
driven by the expansion of the primary and tertiary sectors, especially 
mining (gold and copper) hydropower, infrastructure as well as the 
services sector. Although agriculture continues to employ about three 
quarters of the workforce, agricultural output as a proportion of GDP 
has declined from 50% five years ago to 27.7% in 2010/11, despite 
overall agricultural sector growth of 2.8%. The overall macro-economic 
picture is sound with the country generating $2.2 billion in export 
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revenues in 2010, rising at more than 11% per year and accounting 
for one-third of GDP.     
Economic growth and development has led to a decline in the 
number of people below the poverty line but at the same time 
inequality is rising. The share of national consumption expenditure 
for the poorest quintile is just 8%, against 44% for the highest 
quintile, and a sizeable proportion live on the margins of poverty, 
with no social safety nets. 
Steady growth and development of the overall economy has led to a 
decline in the number of people below the poverty line. Measured in 
terms of food and essential non food requirements, the ratio of poor 
people declined from 34% in 2002/03 to 28% by 2007/08 (MPI, DoS 
2010). Although the population grew by more than one million between 
1992/93 and 2007/08, the absolute number of the poor declined to just 
over 1.5 million. Alongside improvements in income poverty there has 
been a significant improvement in service delivery, with half of the 
population gaining access to water and sanitation services. Nearly a 
million or about 57% of urban inhabitants have access to improved safe 
water systems. There are four central, four regional, 12 provincial and 
127 district hospitals, 835 health centres and almost 2,000 pharmacies 
throughout the country. Immunisation programs have expanded and 
reached 72% of the population. Over two-thirds of the population and 
almost all district towns have access to electricity. The Government 
secured 30,000 tonnes of national rice reserve and contributed of 3,000 
tonnes under the ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve Agreement. 
In spite of these improvements Laos remains one of the poorest countries 
in the region with 44% of the population living below the international 
poverty line of $1.25 per day and as many as 77% of the population 
living on less than $2 per day. A sizeable proportion live on the margins 
of poverty and are thus highly vulnerable to changes in economic, 
social and environmental circumstances such as loss of access to land, 
deaths in the family and natural disasters. This is exacerbated by the 
absence of social safety nets and lack of anti-poverty measures. Given 
the extractive nature of economic growth it is not surprising to find 
that a disproportionate level of benefit has flowed to higher income 
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groups, as evidenced by the fact that consumption shares have only 
increased for the highest quintile over the last 15 years. At the same 
time there has been a substantial rise in inequality, especially in 
locations that have seen reductions in poverty, such as urban areas and 
areas along the Thai border. The share of national consumption 
expenditure for the poorest quintile is just 8%, whereas it is 44% for 
the highest quintile (MPI/ DoS 2010). Ensuring equitable poverty reduction 
remains a challenge, given that the Gini Coefficient rose from 32.6 in 
2002 to 35.4 in 2007 (LECS IV)
Fiscal Context of Pro Poor Services 
The 2007 Public Expenditure Review (PER) identified a lack of pro-poor 
focus in many budget expenditure areas intended to relate to national 
priority sectors and programmes across the 47 poorest districts. The 
PER 2007 and 2012 both noted, notwithstanding many data deficiencies, 
that expenditure in education and roads appeared to be reasonably 
efficient and equitable whereas expenditure in agriculture and health 
appeared neither efficient nor equitable. An examination of the sector 
breakup of recurrent budget allocations for the period 2007/08-2009/10 
shows that social sector expenditure as a percentage of total recurrent 
expenditure remains low and fluctuating in education and health. 
The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) indicated in March 2009 
that the social sector shares of total recurrent expenditures was to be 
increased to 30% in line with 30% for the economic sector and 40% 
for infrastructure, mainly roads. Another feature identified by the PER 
was that the share of recurrent expenditure on administration was 
unusually high, as compared to in other countries. A second important 
observation was that any shift in total spending towards the social and 
productive sectors would need to be reflected in a similar shift in recurrent 
budget allocations. The PER noted that while spending on the social 
and productive sectors had grown over the previous three years by 
33%, spending on administration grew by 45%. 
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Non-Income Poverty 
There has been a steady improvement in a number of critical human 
development indicators in line with the overall reduction in poverty over 
the last two decades. Education spending was just under 12% of total 
public expenditure in 2008 as compared to 0.5% on defence and 
security, with nearly 50% of this amount being targeted at primary 
education. Net primary school enrolment has increased from 58% to 
94%, close to the targeted MDG for 2015. The Under-5 Mortality Rate 
and Infant Mortality Rate have both been gradually decreasing over the 
last ten years and are close to MDG4. Non-income poverty, however, 
remains a serious issue and the country faces multiple challenges in 
meeting a number of “off-track” MDGs. The overall rate of chronic 
malnutrition (stunting) amongst the under-5 population stands at 37%, 
an alarmingly high rate given the levels of GDP growth. The country 
still has much to do to meet a number of key MDG targets, including 
those related to nutrition, mother and child health and gender equality. 
The continued lack of access to key MDG services has meant that Lao 
ranks 133 out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2007). 
Growing Disparities
Income and non income poverty are characterised by a wide range of 
geographic, social, ethnic and gender disparities. Rural poverty is almost 
twice the rate of urban poverty. There are also substantial regional 
variations in poverty rates. The north of the country continues to lag 
behind other regions with a poverty head county of 33% in 2007/8 
compared to 23% and 30% respectively in the southern and central 
regions. The incidence of poverty is greatest in the remote and sparsely 
populated areas of the east and southeast along the Vietnamese border. 
The lowland Mekong basin areas have intermediate levels of poverty 
whilst the lowest rates are found in and around Vientiane and other 
urban centres. Villages that are distant from markets and which lack 
basic infrastructure record average poverty rates of 43%; a fall of just 
5 percentage points since 2002/3. Whilst there is general agreement 
that the percentage of population below the poverty line is highest in 
the remote eastern areas, the extent poverty in terms of absolute 
number of poor is significantly higher in the Mekong river valley region 
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and Savannakhet, where the largest number of the poor reside. 
There is a lack of pro-poor focus in many areas of budget               
expenditure with social sector expenditure remaining low.             
Although a number of critical human development indicators show 
steady improvement, rural poverty is almost twice the rate of 
urban poverty and is most pronounced for children. 
Consumption poverty varies across the 49 officially-recognised ethnic 
groups and is far more pronounced amongst children, with 45% of 
under 5s and 35% of children aged 5-18 living in poverty. Most children 
experiencing consumption poverty are from households that have no 
road access, are severely affected by unexploded ordnance and/or are 
Mon-Khmer speaking. Urban-rural disparities are most pronounced for 
children, with 82% of rural children suffering from severe deprivation 
as compared to 40% in urban areas (UNICEF 2011). Whilst overall 
improvements in IMR have reduced the national average to 70 per 
1,000 live births, IMR exceeds 100 in five provinces: Luang Namtha, 
Khammouane, Saravan, Sekong and Attapeu.  
Poverty levels amongst the three major non Lao-Tai groups rise to as 
much as 54% in some groups as compared to 25% among the Lao-Tai 
(considered the majority group). The high rate of malnutrition is most 
pronounced in a number of eastern and northern areas, where as many 
as 44% of the under-5 population suffer from chronic malnutrition. 
In spite of steady improvements in education over the last decade, 
recent evidence in school census data shows a marked drop in the 
completion rate for five years of primary schooling, with an increase in 
the drop-out rate after Primary Grade 1. This problem will have a 
serious negative effect on the achievement of MDG2, which requires 
that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling and 
that 95% of those completing Grade 1 will reach the last grade of 
primary education. Recent MoE analysis shows the enrolment and 
completion rate for girls in the 56 most educationally disadvantaged 
districts is lower than the national average. This has a direct impact on 
MDG3 indicators promoting gender equality and the empowerment of 
women, and contributes to the mere 6% growth in the share of 
women in non-agriculture wage employment between 1995-2005. 
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A rapid assessment of the issue by the Ministry of Education (Sept 2011) 
attributes much of the problem to a number of underlying structural 
issues in the wider economy and society, including persistent poverty 
and growing inequality, Many emerging economic opportunities are 
connected to primary sector wealth extraction and production, leading 
to relocation and alienation of communities from traditional sources of 
livelihood. These underlying socio-economic trends generate both push 
and pull forces on poor families and lead to the withdrawal of children 
from education and their re-engagement in low-income activities. 
Other problems are sectoral and concern poor teacher skills, high 
student to teacher ratios, incomplete schools and lack of facilities. 
In spite of improvements in education, recent evidence shows a 
marked drop in the primary school completion rate, especially 
for girls and ethnic minorities. Persistent poverty and growing 
inequality lead to withdrawal of children from education and 
their engagement in low-income activities. Other problems are 
poor teacher skills, high student-teacher ratios, incomplete 
schools and lack of facilities. 
Unexploded ordnance remains a serious and persistent problem affecting 
25% of the total land area or around 2,500 villages (one-third of total 
villages). This has a long-term impact on socio-economic development 
and functions as a multiplier to attaining other MDGs. MDG 9 was 
therefore added to the original eight MDGs. The incidence of poverty 
in the 40 districts where more than 50% of all villages are affected by 
unexploded ordnance is 47%, compared to 27% in districts where 
fewer than 10% of villages are contaminated. Similar rates of disparity 
in human development performance are seen where the literacy rate 
remains below 75%: it is as low as 40% amongst rural Sino-Tibetan 
ethnic groups as compared to the 100% literacy in urban areas. 
Gender inequalities exist at all levels of society and in all regions although 
they are more pronounced among ethnic communities. In general, 
women and girls are the most disadvantaged people in the poorest 
parts of the country, where there is no road access. Whilst there has 
been steady progress in school enrolment rates for girls from Lao-Tai 
groups this has not been shared by either boys or girls from other 
ethnic groups. Lao-Tai boys complete an average of 6.2 years of schooling 
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as compared to an average of one year for Hmong-Mien girls. Similar 
disparities exist in terms of access to health care, with 27% of women 
from Lao-Tai speaking households using institutional birth facilities as 
compared to just 6% of women from Hmong speaking households. 
Strategy for Equitable Service Delivery 
The Government is committed to poverty reduction and pro-poor service 
delivery and its broad strategy is articulated in the 2004 National Growth 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy and in the NSEDP. The 7th NSEDP 
(2011-2015) recognises the incidence of poverty and disparities and 
the importance of delivering MDG services to priority areas. This includes 
an emphasis on the delivery of services at local level based upon 
participatory methods. The National Program for Rural Development 
and Poverty Eradication, which is a key input to the NSEDP, has 
identified the following five priority goals for increased attention in 
rural areas: 
•	 Small-scale	 infrastructure	 and	 service	 delivery	 and	
livelihood development
•	 Decreasing	the	service	and	income	gap	between	rural	
and urban areas
•	 Ensuring	more	integrated	economic	and	social	development,	
taking into account the importance of natural resource 
management and environmental conservation
•	 Encouraging	 the	 participation	 and	 initiative	 of	 local	
communities based on the participatory development 
approach
•	 Improved	international	and	regional	cooperation.	
The Leading Committee for Rural Development and Poverty Eradication 
is an institutional mechanism to strengthen government capacity to 
implement more equitable service delivery and to oversee and guide 
the implementation of specific initiatives on rural development and 
poverty reduction in priority areas. It is also responsible for implementing 
development as defined in Decree 285/ PM, which includes promoting 
the security and political development of local communities. In its poverty 
and development role the Committee acts as a facilitator helping to 
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coordinate and harmonise initiatives across 64 priority focal areas 
(previously 47 districts). In practice, this has meant being able to take 
stock of different poverty-related initiatives and to reflect these in a 
single planning document. In practice it has been difficult to harmonise 
different initiatives that are implemented through line ministries and 
hence, together with the MPI, the Committee has developed a draft 
manual to guide the process. Work is ongoing to simplify this so it is 
more widely applicable. However, many of the pro-poor initiatives 
implemented by different ministries continue to reflect varying 
approaches in terms of the nature of the type of service being delivered 
and the method of delivery. 
A key aspect of the Government’s strategy has been targeting services 
towards those communities most in need and to address the range of 
disparities discussed above. A detailed study on the spatial patterns of 
poverty has demonstrated a strong link with geographical factors such 
as agro-climatic conditions and access to rural markets, and provides a 
useful basis for more precise targeting. It should be noted however, 
that some of these correlations are breaking down as new forms of 
development associated with concessions and commercialisation of 
agriculture generate wealth and disparities in new areas. 
In response to the need for improved targeting, in 2007/08 the Government 
identified 47 poorest districts where the incidence of poverty was 44% 
or more and another 35 second-priority districts with poverty incidence 
of over 36%. Non priority districts have been defined as those with a 
poverty incidence of less than 20%. Almost all the 47 poorest and many 
of the 35 second-poorest districts are rural, remote upland areas, 
inhabited by ethnic groups and hence display many of the factors 
reflecting inequality noted above. Following Decree 285/PM the 
Government has modified the method of targeting from a definition 
based on 47 poorest districts to 64 focal areas. 
Decree 285/PM of 2009 on Poverty and Development Criteria has 
broadened the definition of development to include criteria based on 
institutional factors such as political awareness and maintenance of law 
and order, as well access to socio-economic infrastructure and services. 
Under these criteria, poverty is defined on the basis of income or income 
equivalent to meet minimum standard calorific intake of food and 
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basic needs (clothing and shelter) as well as access to other basic 
services such health, education, water supply and roads. Development 
is defined in both institutional and socio-economic terms in relation to 
effective village mediation (case-free village); access to a package of 
minimum health care services (model healthy village) as well as other 
physical and socio-economic parameters.
The 7th NSEDP recognises the incidence of poverty and disparities 
and the importance of delivering MDG services to priority areas. 
Whilst the strategy of targeting services to areas most in need is 
sound, in practice there is no necessary correlation between 
working in a poor district and covering poorest villages, since 
implementing agencies tend to focus on the villages that are 
easierto reach. 
Whilst the concept of targeting services to areas most in need is a sound 
strategy, there remain significant variations in poverty within poor 
districts and across villages and kumban. In practice it has been found 
there is no necessary correlation between working in a poor district and 
the coverage of poorest villages since implementing agencies will 
mostly tend to focus on the villages that are easier to reach. At the 
same time there are inadequate arrangements for targeting routine 
sector expenditure, leading to a situation where one-sixth of public 
education spending goes to the poorest quintile of the population. Just 
one-fifth of total public health expenditure goes to district health 
facilities and village health centres which primarily serve the poor. 
The Leading Committee for Rural Development and Poverty Eradication 
directs donor-partner initiatives targeted at poverty reduction in the 
poorest districts as well as government initiatives, with a budget of 
around 350 billion kip, representing service delivery in the remaining 
26 poorest districts. This is equivalent to US$4 million per annum or 
around $154,000 per district per annum from a variety of different 
government programmes operational in these districts (some of which 
will be implemented in the 21 districts). Around 10% of the total 
government funded investment has been used for assisting relocation 
in 21 districts and transition away from shifting to permanent cultivation 
in 18 districts. This is designed to encourage smallholders to make more 
efficient use of land resources through the occupation of new locations 
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with access to land for permanent cultivation, although there is evidence 
that the benefits to smallholders are not always apparent and that in 
some cases there can be negative economic and social consequences. 
The consolidation of villages into larger socio-economic clusters has 
resulted in the vacation of 103 former villages now merged into larger 
units, representing a 1% reduction in the number of villages per annum. 
The current Rural Development and Poverty Reduction Plan 20111-15 
anticipates a total investment of Kip 350 billion ($4 million) per annum 
to ten border areas based on contributions from the Government and 
the Government of Vietnam, plus an anticipated investment of 2,355 
billion kip for the remaining 54 focal areas from the Government and 
development partners. The plan includes 967 projects in areas such as 
village consolidation and relocation (900 billion kip); agricultural 
production (600 billion kip); infrastructure development (972 billion 
kip); social sector services (271 billion kip); strengthening local governance 
(49 billion kip) including Party security, inventory of statistics and 
dissemination of decrees; and international cooperation (6.5 billion kip) 
study visits.    
A number of initiatives have been conceptualised by the Government 
and donor partners to address the various dimensions of equitable 
service delivery involving community-driven approaches targeted at the 
poorest communities. These include the Government’s main initiative 
under the VDF, providing a devolved fund for livelihood activities and 
small infrastructure in 54 districts under the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, with a rotating fund component, as well as the PRF of the 
Leading Committee for Rural Development and Poverty Eradication in 
the Prime Minister’s Office, designed to bring about a measurable 
reduction in poverty and reduced levels of disparity in 30 priority districts 
(including 21 of the 47 poorest districts) in Phase 1 and in 274 kumban 
in Phase 2.  
The District Development Fund (DDF) represents another initiative to 
promote equitable service delivery through the provision of block grants 
for infrastructure and services to poorer communities. It works in 35 
target districts in Phase 1, scaling up to 66 districts under a proposed 
new phase. Equity approaches have also been emphasised in sector 
projects such as the Lao Extension for Agriculture Project (LEAP). All 
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initiatives promote greater inclusion in terms of gender and ethnicity. 
The VDF was launched in 2003/04 through the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment as a devolved budget allocation with a revolving fund 
component, primarily to promote livelihood activities for cultivation and 
animal husbandry, handicrafts, processing, and trade. The VDF and the 
Nayobai Bank were designed to provide opportunities for households 
in poor villages to increase livelihood opportunities through improved 
household production whilst also promoting participation and ownership 
in livelihood activities and improved linkages with local level administration. 
The Government initiated the VDF approach in 47 first priority districts 
and has established 528 village funds to date, covering 35,000 families 
from 54 districts with a revolving fund of 42.5 billion kip, of which 6.8 
billion kip is in community savings. The modality involves participation 
in the form of consultation  
In order to assist the process of planning for poverty reduction, the MPI 
initiated a participatory planning initiative to complement the NSEDP, 
with particular focus on the poor districts and kumban. This has been 
supported by UNDP, with funds to allow the MPI, line ministries and 
other agencies to work with poor districts, local district administrations 
and communities to develop short- to medium-term kumban model 
plans which can then be replicated by local staff in other kumban. This 
process has then informed the revision of the Participatory Planning 
Manual, undertaken by a committee chaired by the MPI and the Leading 
Committee. The main aim has been to ensure that manual can be used 
as a guideline on participatory planning after further simplification and 
field testing by GIZ. Whilst this is welcome, there is an issue arising from 
the fact that different initiatives have formulated varying planning 
processes. Although there is broad convergence, some of the details 
of the processes and procedures differ and this may be confusing for 
any district which is involved in more than one government or donor 
initiative.    
Poverty Reduction Fund (PRF)
The Poverty Reduction Fund is one of the key modalities designed to 
achieve measurable improvements in equitable service delivery and 
poverty reduction. The PRF was established in 2002 as an operationally 
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autonomous entity to fund small-scale infrastructure and services 
identified through strong participatory processes in the poorest districts 
of the country. The PRF works under the Leading Committee for Rural 
Development and Poverty Eradication and has a board of directors 
drawn from various line-ministries and chaired by the Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
Phase 1 of the PRF (2003-2011) covered 30 districts in eight provinces 
with a total budget of US$42 million, comprising $35 million from 
World Bank International Development Association credit and grants 
and $7 million from SDC. These funds have been supplemented by 
community contributions in the form of labour and materials estimated 
to be worth $6.5 million. Both the geographical coverage and managerial 
process of PRF have emphasised the equity dimension of service delivery 
by targeting districts with a high incidence of poverty, the incorporation 
of participatory methods into all aspects of the planning and management 
cycle, and the delivery of small-scale infrastructure to enable public 
access to basic services that will impact on the income and human 
development dimensions of poverty. 
As an autonomous agency working outside but alongside government, 
equipped with sufficient financial, managerial and technical resources, 
PRF has been able to implement infrastructure and services in rapid and 
extensive manner across all 30 districts, 23 of which fall under the 
previous definition of 47 poorest districts. Phase 1 of the PRF has 
covered 2,185 communities with 3,396 sub-projects, including the 
construction or upgrading of 3,042 km of rural roads and 91 bridges, 
1,237 water supply points, 592 schools, 62 health dispensaries and 155 
irrigation schemes. Overall, implementation has been assessed as 
satisfactory and PRF investments have enhanced access of poor rural 
villages to basic socio-economic infrastructure linked to better access 
to markets, health and education services and clean drinking water. 
Respective evaluations of the PRF have reported a wide range of positive 
impacts in terms of more equitable service delivery. A quantitative 
impact evaluation found that the PRF has improved health and education 
outcomes, and access to roads. In northern districts, water and sanitation 
projects provided through the PRF have decreased the incidence of 
diarrhoea in beneficiary villages. In southern districts, where literacy 
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rates were comparatively low, education infrastructure and services 
delivered through the PRF have improved literacy rates in beneficiary 
villages, although - perhaps not surprisingly - this impact is less in 
communities where education levels are higher and services have been 
introduced more recently. 
As a model for equitable service delivery, the PRF represents a mission-mode 
approach to addressing poverty reduction through a specific purpose 
vehicle designed to bring about change in the incidence of poverty and 
in the nature of disparity in more vulnerable districts. The geographical 
and technical focus of fund activities are such that it may have more 
limited impact on reducing the absolute number of poor, the largest 
number of whom reside in lowland districts and communities that do 
not necessarily have a high rate of poverty. The PRF focuses on every 
village in a district rather than the poorest. In Phase 1 PRF poverty 
targeting was essentially based on district level data, which favoured 
poor districts but not necessarily poor villages or households. 
PRF Phase 2 (2011–2014) will continue to support the Government’s 
poverty reduction agenda by financing investments in small-scale 
infrastructure in poor communities that will improve access to basic 
services and markets in remote and inaccessible areas, and will 
continue to emphasise participatory approaches as a means of 
strengthening citizens’ engagement and voice in equitable service 
delivery. The current phase has a budget of US$65.7 million, comprising 
$25 million from the World Bank, $10 million from the Government, 
$13.2 million from SDC and $17.5 from AusAid. 
Phase 2 includes a number of significant changes, with a clearer overall 
objective and a new form of targeting using the poverty criteria defined 
in Decree 285/PM, overlaid with data on spatial distribution of poverty 
and triangulated with other projects to identify 274 poorest kumban 
in ten provinces, plus ten kumban in an eleventh province. Each kumban 
will receive four cycles, instead of the eight cycles in PRF1, of funding 
of $30,000-$50,000, or a total investment of $120,000-$200,000 over 
the project period, depending on population size.
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A number of initiatives are addressing equitable service delivery 
via community-driven approaches targeted at the poorest. These 
include the VDF, providing a devolved fund for livelihood activi-
ties and small infrastructure; the PRF, designed to measurably 
reduce poverty and disparity, and the DDF. Overall, stakeholders 
have expressed strong satisfaction with the respective infrastruc-
ture and services provided through these initiatives and benefi-
ciaries are reporting improvements in livelihoods.
Under PRF 2 the equity aspect of delivery is significantly more 
pronounced since investments are now targeted at kumban rather than 
districts. The kumban have to prioritise schemes and locations based 
on poverty ranking so that at least 60% of the total budget and all 
micro-projects are located in the poorest villages. PRF 2 has also 
introduced a new approach to monitoring achievement, focusing on 
the extent of measurable improvement in poverty reduction in beneficiary 
communities based on the collection of quantifiable impact data.    
A recent evaluation of capacity building under the PRF (September 
2011) points out that there is a high level of understanding and awareness 
of PRF approach, methods and procedures amongst staff at both 
kumban and district level. Government staff recognise the value of a 
targeted, participatory approach to addressing local needs in a priority 
manner. All stakeholders from government and the community highlight 
participation as one of the most important aspects of the PRF approach, 
although government stakeholders tend to see this as relevant to PRF 
work alone and point out the continuing importance of a top-down 
approach as a means of transferring knowledge and skills to the 
community.
All stakeholders report that PRF processes and schemes are well 
managed, coordinated and sustainable, although local leaders point 
out that sustainability is conditional on future funding for aspects of 
maintenance. The PRF has also introduced feedback and grievance 
complaints systems. The majority of calls to date have been concerned 
with obtaining basic information on the project and of the few calls 
that have reported complaints, most concern the work of contractors. 
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District Development Fund (DDF)
The District Development Fund (DDF) initiative covering a total of 35 
districts across five provinces is based on the provision of discretionary 
block grants to district administration for funding small-scale infrastructure 
and services that are planned and implemented in participation with 
poor communities. Since thye DDF entails working through local 
administration to deliver pro-poor services (including operational grants 
for service outreach in health and education), there is a significant 
emphasis on building the capacity of government in planning and 
budgeting, engineering design, contracting, monitoring and quality 
assurance, and expenditure management. The DDF constitutes a 
model of governance reforms in which capacity development and direct 
service delivery occur simultaneously.
DDF capital investments have covered over 352,000 beneficiaries 
through 286 local infrastructure projects, with bulk of these in water 
supply and health (31%), roads and related public works (30%) and 
education (23%). 
The 2010 Mid-term Evaluation notes that the DDF helped to make 
service delivery more equitable, accountable and effective through a 
targeted approach that has helped to minimize bias towards funding 
of schemes at district level and in more accessible communities. The 
scale of investment has been distributed between district and village 
level on a 30:70 basis to promote greater  equity across the district. In 
addition the project has helped to develop the capacities of over 3,000 
government staff, 20% of whom are women, working at district and 
sub-district level. It has also developed the capacity of 18,000 community 
members including 6,500 women and 1,600 village heads, including 
320 women heads.   
Under the DDF financial allocation formula, provinces with a greater 
number of poor households receive more money, whilst the services 
provided under DDF funding are focused as far as possible on off-track 
MDGs. However, the DDF recognises that it is not possible to ensure 
all funds benefit the poorest since, for example, around 30% of all 
households in a poor village are not poor and yet will benefit from DDF 
services. 
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At the same time an examination of the pattern of funding by type of 
village in Saravan province shows a highly variable picture in terms of 
the number of poor villages covered by the DDF, which varies from as 
many as 67% in some districts to less than 30% in others. Closer 
analysis reveals the DDF has been largely successful in targeting poorer 
villages in those districts with a smaller number of poor villages but 
much less successful when the number of poor villages rises and the 
percentage coverage declines. This is partly, if not wholly, the result of 
budget constraints and the incremental nature of funding roll-out, 
which has prevented a larger number of villages being covered in the 
project time frame. In other cases, the non inclusion of poor villages is 
the result of the presence of other funds from donors, international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) or government.
The DDF includes participatory planning and implementation processes 
and procedures, although the project realised early on that with all 
aspects of implementation managed by and through the district 
administration, certain procedures needed to be streamlined in order 
to be more practical and sustainable. This has meant replacing an 
annual participatory plan process with a rolling plan which is then 
updated annually and hence will entail less participation in any 
particular intermediate year.  
Although the DDF has produced an extensive menu of participatory 
planning tools and techniques, it is ultimately the responsibility of the 
district to ensure the integrity of such processes at field level. Whilst 
this may result in a reduced level of participation, it does however serve 
to develop the overall capacity of district and kumban staff to 
implement a devolved and equity-focused process of service delivery. 
DDF thus approaches the equity dimension of service delivery from an 
institutional perspective, in which district administrations understand 
how to measure disparities and address equity as part of routine service 
delivery, and where participation involves building partnerships between 
the community and the administration, thereby helping people to 
participate in their own development. 
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Gender and Ethnicity
All stakeholders in the PRF and DDF emphasise the need for women 
and men to participate separately, since women - especially those from 
ethnic groups - are more confident and articulate amongst themselves 
and tend to prioritise different needs from men. Although women have 
been extensively involved in all aspects of community planning and in 
implementation of schemes at community level, very few have taken 
on more public roles related to these initiatives at kumban or district 
level. Both the PRF and DDF have delivered capacity development 
activities to women. Capacity development activities under the DDF 
have covered 17,000 people in total, just over one-third of whom are 
women.       
The PRF and DDF emphasise the need for women and men to 
participate separately and promote capacity development            
activities among women. The pro-poor service delivery initiatives 
of both funds also focus on ensuring equal rights among ethnic 
groups. Women and ethnic group stakeholders report that their 
specific needs are taken into account and that all villagers are 
treated equally, irrespective of gender or ethnicity.   
The pro-poor service delivery initiatives of both the PRF and DDF have 
a strong focus on ethnicity and ensuring equal rights among ethnic 
groups. These communities are an integral part of the various initiatives 
by virtue of the fact that they comprise the majority of the population 
in the remote, rural mountainous areas covered under each fund. Whilst 
the PRF has developed an ethnic group policy framework to ensure 
adherence to the World Bank’s safeguard policies, the DDF has embraced 
UN charter principles for women and ethnic groups. Women and 
ethnic group stakeholders report that their specific needs are taken into 
account and that all villagers are treated equally irrespective of their 
gender or ethnicity.   
In almost all cases the respective programmes and projects focusing on 
equitable service delivery have led to development of road networks, 
water supplies, schools, and health facilities, and improved access to 
agricultural extension services and inputs. Beneficiaries, project staff 
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and government officials agree that these initiatives have improved 
access to basic infrastructure in the participating districts. Overall, 
stakeholders have expressed strong satisfaction with the respective 
infrastructure and services provided through these initiatives. Beneficiaries 
report improvements in livelihoods after local infrastructure sub-projects 
have been implemented, and a strong interest in receiving further 
infrastructure and services. Evaluations show that water supply systems 
relieve women from a significant burden of time and work, permit the 
cultivation of cash crops, and lower the incidence of diarrhoea; roads 
and bridges provide remote villages with better access to markets and 
public services; and the construction of schools embodies the hopes of 
parents that children will do better than they have themselves.
Key Issues and Potential Entry Points 
Equality v Equity
One of the main constraints to equitable service delivery in the past, 
retained in the interests of maintaining unity, harmony and security, 
has been a tendency to emphasise the importance of delivering equal 
amounts of service to all rather than focusing resources on those most 
in need. This has changed in recent years with the introduction of 
targeted poverty reduction and service delivery programmes delivered 
by government and donors. However, these programmes do not impact 
on the capital or recurrent budgets of routine service delivery delivered 
through line ministries, which often remain focused on the basis of 
provincial priorities. There is a need to work with line ministries at pro-
vincial and district level to develop mechanisms that will provide a 
greater equity focus in services. There is also a need to democratise the 
process of delivery by placing more emphasis on listening and analysing, 
rather than guiding and directing the change process. 
Disparity Analysis 
In order to address underlying equity issues in service provision it is 
necessary to move beyond participatory approaches in micro-planning 
towards a system that can provide an objective assessment of 
inter-community and inter-district disparities in services. This requires 
developing the tools and techniques to assess the level of variation in 
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service delivery or access to services in comparison with a standard 
delivery norm or current average, adjusted for population size and 
geographical area. Differential levels of access to and delivery of 
services will necessarily vary according to the population and catchment 
area, hence the need to adjust for both in order to identify real levels 
of disparity. Such an analysis will reveal communities and groups that 
have a higher than average level of provision and those that are below 
average, and will thus help local administration to target delivery on a 
more equitable basis. Another constraint is the lack of data to monitor 
the status and progress of key indicators associated with more equitable 
service delivery. At the same time stakeholders in local administration 
point out that they lack the capacity, funds and human resources to 
deliver services in a differentiated manner that would provide greatest 
benefit to the poorest.
Understanding Inclusive Social Structures  
There is strong evidence to indicate that the traditional socio-political 
structures of many ethnic groups, who make up 40% of the population 
in Laos, are inherently inclusive and non hierarchical and thus distinct 
from patrimonial socio-political structures found amongst the lowland 
population. Research has shown that the social organisation of many 
upland villages has traditionally been based on very egalitarian structures 
and processes. Traditional upland communities are often very vocal 
within their group, although they display reticence and deference in 
the face of outsiders. Given the significant focus of equitable service 
delivery on upland ethnic communities, there is a requirement to better 
understand indigenous structures and processes and to adapt 
programme planning and decision making tools and techniques 
accordingly. This requires a deeper understanding of traditional social 
structure and the politics of local decision making, rather than striving 
to impose external and unfamiliar working practices intended to increase 
inclusion in a context where inclusion is already well developed. 
Paternalistic structures throughout the country hinder participation, 
having a direct impact on equitable service delivery. This approach 
includes strengthening the planning process to be inclusive, transparent 
and accountable in order to be more relevant to the needs of poor 
communities. 
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There is a need to work with ministries at local levels to provide 
greater equity in services and to democratise the delivery process 
by emphasis on listening and analysing. Since services are rarely 
tailored to the needs of diverse communities, many programmes 
are undermining traditional socio-economic and cultural organi-
sation by delivering standard infrastructure and services in a 
uniform manner. 
Diversity as Distinct from Disparity 
Many stakeholders have highlighted the issue that in pursuit of reducing 
disparities in access to MDG-related services, programmes and projects 
are either intentionally or unintentionally eliminating diversity and 
undermining traditional socio-economic and cultural organisation and 
livelihoods. The delivery of standard infrastructure and services 
packages in a uniform manner often reduces the potential beneficial 
impact since services are rarely tailored to the specific needs of diverse 
communities. At the same time, many communities have been 
relocated so as to improve access to services that end up being of 
marginal benefit. This often results in negative economic and social 
consequences. Many services could be better adapted to the specific 
needs and aspirations of diverse communities but this requires a 
different service delivery model, allowing communities to make 
conscious and meaningful choices. For example, adapting educational 
curricula to the linguistic and learning needs of diverse communities 
would greatly enhance the take up of services by those communities. 
Similarly, local health systems are often complex and eclectic and need 
to be incorporated into local delivery models. Stakeholders point out 
the irony that while government and development partners recognise 
biodiversity, they often wittingly or unwittingly undermine human 
diversity. This is a significant issue in the multi-ethnic context of 
poverty and disparity in Laos.
Safety Nets and Credit
Many stakeholders in the sector highlight the need for an innovative 
and creative approach to the concept of a portfolio of equitable 
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services. This would include a variety of social safety nets and would 
have the advantage of being more precisely focused on the most 
vulnerable communities. If designed correctly it could be self-targeting 
in nature: only those most in need would wish to access the service and 
this would automatically reduce potential leakage. It would be particularly 
relevant to households suffering from chronic malnutrition, those 
exposed to sudden shocks of food security or ill health, and those 
combating sudden loss of productive assets. Relocation cases, where 
inward investments have taken over the main source of livelihoods for 
households or communities, will also often require safety nets to 
mitigate negative consequences.
Discretionary Funding to Enhance Equity
Local administrations lack the funds (capital and recurrent) to address 
local manifestation of disparity. This issue is integrally linked to the 
discussion on decentralisation and the issues raised elsewhere on 
strengthening decentralisation and the possible move towards the 
introduction of discretionary block-grant funding and school block 
grants. These would provide a vital aspect of strengthening equitable 
service delivery and thus represent an excellent entry point for influencing 
this issue more widely. Stakeholders also highlight the need to include 
mechanisms for recurrent funding. This has a proven ability to increase 
the efficacy of social sector programmes such as health and education, 
which in remote areas primarily depend on recurrent funding for service 
delivery and outreach. This will be a component of the new DDF package 
and will require close tracking to ensure optimal effectiveness.    
Service Delivery Partnerships 
Although civil society organisations are generally still in the early 
stages of development following the 2009 Non-Profit Associations 
Decree that opened legal space for their formal recognition, there is 
reasonable potential for developing new partnerships with emerging 
NPAs and CSOs to broaden the constituency of actors engaged in 
service delivery. This would also strengthen the diversity of development 
models and increase the opportunity for knowledge sharing and cross 
learning. Party-affiliated mass organisations, such as Lao Women’s 
Union and the Lao Youth Union, have strong mobilization and 
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grass-roots outreach roles and are engaged in many project related 
activities, but have limited funding and technical expertise.   
Multiple Approaches 
Multiple approaches to local development persist, although the Government 
has recently strengthened harmonisation efforts. For example, the PRF 
is participating in a task force co-chaired by the Leading Committee for 
Rural Development and Poverty Eradication and the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment, seeking to harmonise local development planning 
approaches. The MPI has indicated that preliminary outputs will be 
shared with partners in 2011. In the meantime, different projects 
continue to implement their own approaches. Several projects focus 
on participatory planning and local government capacity-building in 
rural areas, including the District Development Fund, the Lao Northern 
Upland Development Project, LEAP and the Khammouane Development 
Project (PO87716). Many stakeholders in the donor community feel 
there is inadequate coordination, learning and harmonisation across 
these projects, whilst government stakeholders complain of multiple 
protocols, different management systems and a variety of technical 
procedures which confuse local administration and create inefficiencies 
in government.  
Conclusion: Recent Changes, Drivers of Change and Future Trends
Recent Changes 
There has been a gradual change in attitude, perception and action on 
the part of the Government towards the notion of equitable service 
delivery, which is inextricably linked to prevailing patterns of poverty 
and growing levels of disparity and inequality. This change can be most 
clearly seen in terms of a reorientation of government development 
priorities from security, law and order, in which the main objective of 
service delivery was implementing laws and rules, to the current context 
of delivering MDG-related infrastructure and services to areas where 
poverty is highest and service disparities greatest. This is a significant 
shift in approach, derived in part from the consistent emphasis placed 
on service delivery and MDG targets by MPI, with influence from UN 
agencies.   
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The service delivery emphasis of the previous phase of the GPAR 
programme has also helped to reinforce the overall acceptability of the 
concept of equitable service delivery, which is now embedded into the 
MOHA programme on governance reform. This aspect of GPAR has 
helped to shape aspects of broader service delivery improvements 
through One Door Service Centres, as well as providing a rationale in 
and outside government for other aspects of civil service improvement 
in areas such as PIMS, Job Descriptions and Code of Conduct etc. The 
service delivery language that has infused the dialogue on civil service 
reform has, in itself, helped to reinforce the concept and widen its 
acceptability. Interestingly, other initiatives including a provincial 
government initiative to establish a user satisfaction tracking system 
for business registration in Luang Prabang, also cite the importance of 
service delivery as key element in local administration. 
Another key aspect of change relates to the work of the National Leading 
Committee on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication, under the 
Prime Minister’s Office, as a high-level institutional body to strengthen 
the focus on equitable service delivery. The Leading Committee is also 
involved in the delivery of equitable services through the PRF and 
related initiatives. The Leading Committee has also developed a 
manual to help provide greater consistency in participatory planning.  
In support of more equitable service delivery there have been a number 
of changes related to improved targeting and focusing of services to 
reach those most in need. Whilst targeting was initially based on the 
47 poorest districts, this has subsequent been modified to encompass 
64 focal areas. The criteria for the definition of poverty and development 
have also been modified in Decree 285/ PM based on income or 
equivalent criteria as well non-income criteria. At the same time the 
PRF will now be targeting 274 of the poorest kumban in recognition 
that districts are still too aggregated to be able to ensure that services 
reach the poorest. 
Drivers of Change
Much of the recent declared rationale for strengthening local 
administration has been associated with the need to improve service 
delivery as a core governance objective. This emphasis on strengthening 
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service delivery largely emanates from an improved socio-economic and 
sector planning process, which has shown that aggregate growth and 
poverty reduction has been accompanied by widening inequalities and 
disparities that have distinct social, ethnic and geographical characteristics. 
Inequalities and disparities manifest themselves in human development 
outcomes which can be measured against MDG goals. 
Another driver of change has come from the elevation of service 
related goals and targets in the national planning and policy formulation 
process, which has placed equitable service delivery at the centre of the 
6th and 7th National Socio-Economic Development Plans over the last 
five years. This has led to a much greater focus on delivery targeted 
services focusing on the poorest areas and communities as part of the 
wider development strategy, and has given shape to a number of 
specific programme and project interventions.   
At the same time the Party and Government recognise the potential 
dangers of ignoring inequalities and disparities across regions, ethnic 
groups and social strata. The Party has explicitly referenced the need 
to address this problem to ensure unity and avoid social unrest. This is 
all the more apparent in a context where there has been recent 
widespread protest in Myanmar and across the Middle East. 
Future Trends
The reality of growth and inequality, which is prevalent in many 
developing and transitional countries, means that there will continue to 
be a strong government emphasis on increasing equitable service 
delivery in a variety of ways. This is reinforced by the fact that the 
Government is committed to meeting MDG targets and graduating from 
LDC status by 2020. 
The 7th National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011-2015) 
recognises both the incidence of poverty and growing disparities, and 
the importance of delivering more services in a more equitable manner. 
The NSEDP also recognises the importance improving service delivery at 
local level through participatory approaches and processes. This is further 
reinforced by the National Programme for Rural Development and 
Poverty Eradication, which is a key input to the NSEDP and has identified 
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a series of national priority goals that further reinforce the principles and 
approaches of equitable services. 
This trend is likely to be reinforced by the donor community, which is 
firmly committed to focusing development assistance on the poorest and 
most service deficient communities. The trend is only likely to increase in 
the context of current austerity measures in a number of donor partner 
countries, where governments will come under pressure to focus aid on 
direct, measurable and tangible outputs that have direct benefit for poorest. 
Whilst this is a noble objective in itself, it could undermine the need to 
support systemic reforms that may, in the long run, make a greater 
contribution to poverty reduction and social well being. 
The implication of continuing emphasis on equitable service delivery is 
that not only will there be a continuing need for funding in the short run, 
but there is an equally important need for technical assistance to help 
develop and refine new methods for targeting services and ensuring that 
funding is aligned to service deficiencies and disparities. There are few 
well developed tools and procedures to guide this at present. At the same 
time there will be a need to experiment with different forms of funding, 
including support for recurrent services as well as capital, which is an 
area that requires greater attention if service outreach is to be improved.
Chapter 5: Participation 
Introduction
This section examines various aspects of participation in terms of formal 
representative structures and arrangements for enabling citizens to 
participate in public policy and decision making. This occurs through 
elected representation as well as through Party mass organisations, 
enabling people to participate in various national development activities 
and formal member associations such as the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. 
This is followed by an analysis of civil society in a variety of forms, ranging 
from Non Profit Associations and other civil society organisations groups 
to more instrumental forms of participation designed to increase citizen 
engagement in the planning and delivery of services at community and 
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project level. This form of bottom-up participation is significant in that it 
helps to establish legitimate and more active citizen engagement in decision 
making. Such engagement is reported to lead to increased efficiency and 
effectiveness of funding and implementation activity, thus providing a 
solid foundation for new civil society initiatives to open up and populate 
new spaces for participation. Finally, the section will consider the role of 
the media and other forms of communication that provide a new platform 
for future engagement and activism.  
Policy Framework for Participation 
A broad policy and legal framework for participation has been evolving 
over recent years, with greater recognition that participation of citizens 
in specific aspects of government can contribute to the achievement 
of development goals and aspirations. Both the NGPES and the NSEDP 
recognise the critical importance of access to information as a means 
to enhance participation and socio-economic development. Hence, the 
overall environment for greater levels of participation in both formal 
structures of decision making, as well as in the planning and 
implementation of local development, would appear to be much more 
conducive than they were a few years ago. Decree 115 of 2009 on 
Association marks an important step in the formal recognition of NPAs 
as partners in development. The 7th NSEDP explicitly mentions the role 
of civil society in development, referring to Decree 115/PM of 2009, 
which encourages professional groups to form associations to 
contribute to the development process within the context of the Lao 
law and Constitution. The 7th NSEDP also calls for an expansion of 
people’s participation and for each government organisation to conduct 
participatory monitoring and evaluation at all levels. 
The National Assembly has a progressive view on civil society as a 
potential resource for assisting in its role of monitoring and overseeing 
government agencies. National Assembly members welcome increased 
dialogue between civil society and government. Line Ministries argue 
that CSOs such as parent- teacher associations can be helpful in 
improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of service delivery, whilst 
the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, views producer associations 
as important mechanisms for improving agricultural productivity and 
marketing. 
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Overall, there has been an important shift in official government views 
and attitudes towards the CSO sector, which is now seen as a potential 
partner in development and one that in the long term can assume the 
role of INGOs. The Government has recognised the value and utility of 
CSOs as agents in the wider development process with potential 
capacity and commitment to improve citizen participation in planning, 
implementing and monitoring service delivery and development. 
However, if this is to be a meaningful objective the Government and 
its development partners will need to help create the conditions for 
broader participation in policy-making and decision-making at all levels 
and by all groups in society. At the same time, stakeholders in civil 
society point out that the political environment has changed in recent 
years in favour of a more pluralistic approach to concepts and ideas, 
which include the value of participation in society either through 
informal or formal mechanisms. 
National Assembly
Although the size of the National Assembly membership has grown in 
recent years, this reflects the general growth in population rather than 
any fundamental increase in the depth of participation. (For basic details 
on NA role and function see section on Government). 
As already mentioned, at the last election members were elected from 
a pre-selected list of 190 Party approved candidates, of whom 47 were 
women. Since the number of candidates is only marginally more than 
the seat total of 132, the election process involves deleting a small 
number of candidates from the list rather than actively selecting 
candidates, non of whom will have been involved in an individual 
election campaign. The electoral committee tends to decide on the 
composition of candidates and there is a Party view that the list should 
include technical experts and business people, as well as those in gov-
ernment. Candidates have to conduct campaigns together as a group 
rather than individually and hence there is no discussion of                spe-
cific policy priorities other than those of the Party. Candidate 
information is given on a template which lists only basic details such as 
name, profession and date of birth. 
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The 7th NA Legislature is comprised of members from four linguistic 
groups. The largest representation is that of the Lao-Tai with 99 seats 
(26 held by females), followed by the Mon-Khmer speakers with 21 
seats (5 female). The Hmong- Mien have 7 members (2 female) and the 
Sino-Tibetan speaking group 5 (0 female). Compared to the previous 
legislature, the current membership is more educated and younger with 
an average age of 53 years. The youngest is 37, while the oldest is 69 
and two-thirds of all members have university degrees.          
Separation of powers and interests between the executive and the 
legislature is limited, as the latter is predominantly made up of members 
of the executive and those approved by the Party. Candidates working 
for the Government mostly obtain leave from office for the duration 
of the legislature in order to work at constituency level.
Whilst many features of the National Assembly constrain its ability to 
perform as a representative body, as seen in Chapter 1 on Government, 
a number of recent and significant changes are enabling the Assembly 
to evolve into a more effective agent of participatory governance. The 
NA’s senior leadership has acted as a significant driver of change. 
Significantly, the current Prime Minister was NA President at a time 
when the NA was increasing its role and is thus likely to be supportive 
of a more effective Assembly. An important change in the 7th Legislature 
has been the number of new candidates entering the Assembly, many 
of whom were not necessarily the favoured candidate on the approved 
list. This means that the 7th Legislature not only has members who are 
not in other branches of the government but also a few representatives 
who are not Party members. 
Interestingly, a number of stakeholders within and outside government, 
including NA members themselves argue that the Assembly has begun 
to assume a check and balance role through closer scrutiny of budgets 
and expenditure, questioning of policy and making its observations 
public. NA members also point out that they have begun to play a more 
active role in amending and reviewing legislation, particularly focusing 
on the Public Prosecutor, People’s Court, Notary, Public Investment and 
NA Laws. The NA added three new chapters and 36 new articles to the 
NA Law, demonstrating its ability to modify legislative processes. Since 
the 6th Legislature, the NA has also been actively discussing the concept 
of local councils. 
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There has been an important shift in official government views 
and attitudes towards the CSO sector, which is now seen as a 
potential partner in development, and one that in the long term 
can assume the role currently performed by many international 
NGOs. A number of stakeholders argue that the National             
Assembly has begun to assume a check and balance role through 
closer scrutiny of budgets and expenditure, questioning policy 
and making its observations public. Public understanding of the 
National Assembly’s role is limited, with citizens viewing it as an 
ombudsman or mediator rather than an active representative 
body. 
Although the formal NA committee system was established in 2005, 
almost none of the committees, with the exception of the law committee, 
were operational over succeeding years. This aspect has now changed 
and committees hold pre and post session meetings, review relevant 
legislation and on occasion may challenge the Government. There is 
increasing capacity to comprising two one-week inter-sessions which 
entail questioning Ministers, Vice Ministers or Director Generals on 
different aspects of policy and management. This has involved 
presentations by Ministers to NA members with almost 2/3rds of all 
members present. Although these were discussions were often 
consensual in nature there have led to much constructive criticism. 
Other initiatives have included establishing a telephone hotline 
facilitated a closer interaction between citizens to the government. 
Hundreds of calls were recorded, shared with and discussed by 
National Assembly members. There is a NA Newspaper which was 
originally produced on a quarterly basis but is now printed as the 
weekly Phouthen Paxason Newspaper (People’s Representative). This 
documents important events and activities of NA members with the 
aim of communicating Assembly’s achievements to the public. The 
Newspaper also publishes articles on science, technology and 
socio-economic and cultural issues. Issues on land, corruption, unfair 
social treatment and many other topics have been posed to relevant 
government agencies to seek clarification are often published in the 
Newspaper. The NA also airs the Phouthen Pasaxon programme on 
radio every Saturday morning from 7.30 to 8.00 AM on the AM and 
FM 107.3 Mkz frequency through Lao National Radio. 
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Other improvements have taken place with donor partner funding 
(UNDP) which have assisted in establishing inter-session activities for 
NA members. Increasing to comprising two one-week sessions which 
are entail questioning Ministers, Vice Ministers or Director Generals on 
different aspects of policy and management. This has involved presenta-
tions by Ministers to NA members with almost two-thirds of all members 
present. Although these discussions were often consensual in nature there 
have led to much constructive criticism. Other initiatives have included 
establishing a telephone hotline facilitated a closer interaction between 
citizens to the government. Hundreds of calls were recorded, shared with 
and discussed by National Assembly members. There is an  NA newspaper 
which was originally produced on a quarterly basis but is now printed as 
the weekly Phouthen Paxason newspaper (People’s Representative). This 
documents important events and activities of NA members with the aim 
of communicating Assembly achievements to the public. The newspaper 
also publishes articles on science, technology and socio-economic and 
cultural issues. Issues on land, corruption, unfair social treatment and many 
other topics have been posed to relevant government agencies to see 
clarification are often published in the newspaper. The NA also airs the 
Phouthen Paxason programme on radio ever Saturday morning from 7:30 
to 8:00 AM on Lao National Radio.
Other important changes include an increase in the permanent 
membership of the NA so that now there are three permanent members 
in each province. At the same time, the budget for the NA offices now 
comes direct from the Assembly itself, thereby enhancing its financial 
independence. However, resources remain limited and there are only 4-10 
office staff supporting NA members in any province, none of whom have 
had any formal training.  
The overall understanding of the public with regard to the National 
Assembly is still somewhat limited and most citizens are not familiar with 
the details of its role and functions. Where citizens do have a clearer notion 
of its role, they will mostly point out that it is the place to file a complaint 
against government. This demonstrates that citizens largely view the NA 
as an ombudsman or mediator rather than an active representative body. 
This also reflects the limited overall engagement of citizens with the formal 
arms of government and their low expectations in terms of representation 
and participation. The role of government is still seen primarily as one of 
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maintaining law and order and providing a safe environment for citizens 
to live and work. Nevertheless, things are beginning to change and many 
stakeholders point out that the National Assembly has become a more 
vocal entity, with members prepared to speak out and at times to question 
or even reject government submissions. This is well illustrated by the recent 
NA pronouncements on provincial budget anomalies highlighted by the 
SAO. 
Mass organisations 
The four mass organisations in Laos, all of which have Party approval, 
are the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC); the Lao Federation 
of Trade Unions; the Lao Women’s Union; and the Revolutionary Youth 
Union. These are supplemented by peasant associations which also 
enjoy official backing. The main function of the LFNC, formerly the Lao 
Patriotic Front, is to promote national unity and providing a means for 
other organisations, religious associations and individuals to participate 
in meeting Party goals as members of the LFNC. In this sense it provides 
a mechanism for those, including ethnic groups, who are not Party 
members to be affiliated to the Party. 
The Federation of Trade Unions provides the only legal voice of workers 
and has a rather unusual dual role of representing the organised 
workforce in terms of maintaining reasonable minimum wages and 
working conditions, whilst ensuring these do not result in making the 
sector uncompetitive in terms of attracting foreign direct investment. 
Although these dual objectives could be seen as weakening the concept 
of a trade union, it could also be argued that maintaining an acceptable 
balance between the cost of wages and the level of profitability will 
benefit the larger body of workers in the long run as the sector expands 
and new jobs are created. The Lao Federation of Trade Unions has 
gradually begun to play a more active role in protecting the rights and 
interests of the workforce amid burgeoning economic growth, as 
demonstrated by new moves to increase the minimum wage and 
interventions to resolve a dispute with a sugar company refusing to pay 
workers in Savannakhet.      
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The Lao Women’s Union has been one of the most active mass 
organisations in the country, with the main objective of promoting the 
role of women in the economy and government. Its primary focus has 
been to run training and human resource development activities for 
women across the country, as well as representing women’s interests 
to the Party and Government. In this way it is able to function as a 
useful pressure group to help offset traditional male dominance in the 
economy and government. 
The Lao Revolutionary Youth Union is active in schools, where it serves 
as a recruiting ground for the Party. Though it does organise youth 
activities, it serves principally as a means of political indoctrination of 
young Lao. The Youth Union was established in 1955 as the Youth 
Combatant Association and has around 311,000 active members aged 
15-30. The Youth Union operates across the country with the mandate 
of educating youth on policy guidance, party resolutions and state law, 
the government’s socio-economic development plan and congress 
resolutions, and in further training young people to become good 
citizens. The Youth Union publishes its own magazine, newspaper, 
television and radio programmes targeting young people. Membership 
tends to be urban-centric and is seen as an avenue for potential 
advancement for younger people with more limited opportunities.  
Professional Associations
In addition to the formal mass organisations there are a number of 
professional associations. The more established associations such as 
those for handicraft producers and travel agents are very closely 
connected to the State and tend to be conservative in nature, while 
newer associations (millers, traders, fair trade etc.) tend to be more 
effective in representing member’s interests. The Lao Bar Association, 
which works under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, stands 
out as one of the most effective and semi-independent associations, 
although it has benefited from substantial donor support. The Association 
has a number of important functions such as protecting lawful rights 
and the interests of individuals and legal entities, acting as a regulatory 
body for licensed lawyers, providing legal training, legal dissemination 
and legal aid services. An established telephone hotline facilitates people 
seeking advice and assistance on legal issues. The LBA provides insights 
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to law students about the legal profession by working closely with the 
Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the National University of Laos 
and Souphanouvong University. 
There are also other more informal groups and associations at local level 
such as those for water users, and commodity producer groups, which are 
registered at district level. These associations operate like self-help groups 
to address common issues faced by all members. There are also charitable 
foundations, which are often linked to former  political leaders and other 
charismatic or wealthy individuals or religious associations. 
Some associations, especially those in the business community, can be 
quite effective in representing member interests, using close links with 
government in an instrumental manner. The Lao National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (LNCCI) is registered as a social organisation 
under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The LNCCI was 
established in 1996 under Decree 316/PM and its membership includes 
25 business associations covering sectors such as handicrafts, furniture, 
agriculture, timber, hotel and restaurants, mining and manufacturing. 
Members benefit from access to markets, information, training, trade 
fairs and exhibitions, and many form associations to gain access to 
training and donor support. The LNCCI reports good progress in 
pushing the policy envelope in a number of key areas such as introducing 
a visa on arrival facility for tourists and businessmen, assisting in the 
formulation of new mining laws, advising on new and more transparent 
criteria for concession bidding, introducing banking and insurance 
reforms with regard to leasing, and lobbying to control illegal import 
of meat and vegetables from China. In December 2011 the LNCCI 
organised the first “Made in Laos” expo in Vientiane Capital.  
Non-Profit Associations
More formal civil society organisations, constituted as Non-Profit 
Associations (NPA) with a largely socio-economic orientation, represent 
a relatively new and emerging phenomenon. There were an estimated 
200 NPAs operating and registered in 2008, of which 32 were working 
in the development sector. More recent estimates place the number of 
development NPAs at 80, alongside 70 INGOs. Most Lao NPAs have no 
more than a handful of staff and around 4-5 years operational 
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experience, demonstrating that the sector is still nascent, with limited 
experience and restricted capacity. Prior to Decree 115/09 these 
associations registered through a variety of modalities. 
There have been a number of initiatives designed to enhance capacity, 
including informal networking supported by DED, Concern and GAA 
to support peer learning, coordination and solidarity among a limited 
number of NPAs. Recently a consortium of aid agencies initiated a joint 
programme supporting an emerging civil society for inclusive development, 
targeting poverty alleviation and good governance. The programme 
was designed to contribute to creating a more vibrant civil society and 
to provide a more coordinated and relevant approach to improving the 
capacities of CSOs across different subjects. Although managerial and 
administrative capacities are generally weak, some organisations have 
been able to undertake a reasonable level of outreach training at 
community level, covering 1,000-2,000 trainees in various locations.   
The main actors in the sector define their mandate largely in terms of 
community development, which provides a useful and strategic entry 
point for broadening participation as a whole. Stakeholders point out 
that the sector largely comprises young, professional and committed 
people who have the potential to foster, build and mentor a more 
vibrant constituency of actors in the voluntary sector able to engage in 
development in partnership with government and donors alike. They 
also point out that NPAs in Laos have deliberately taken on an “embedded” 
character to be in a position to work alongside government. This is a 
conscious strategy that has been adopted to establish legitimacy, 
thereby enabling them to operate more freely and flexibly in future. 
Whilst the degree of embeddedness does mean that local NPAs are 
much less focused on advocacy than development, it does not mean 
that soft and embedded advocacy cannot take place. On the whole this 
is a rational and pragmatic approach to gaining a foothold in a new 
and expanding development arena in the country. 
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The international NGOs and emerging NPAs represent important 
resources that can be used for promoting development. In a      
resource-scarce context with multiple development challenges, 
widening the development partnership is not only pragmatic but 
a necessary strategy in the context of the evolving political 
economy of Laos.
Decree 115/PM of 09 represents an important positive step in helping 
NPAs gain formal legal recognition. A perennial problem in the past 
was the lack of formal recognition, meaning that CSOs had no legitimate 
mandate to engage in development work and making it difficult to 
enter dialogue with government. While the decree is seen by stakeholders 
as a welcome initiative, providing the potential for a more productive 
partnership with government and the community, no NPAs were 
involved in drafting the decree and the registration process itself is seen 
as complex, intrusive and constrained. Although around 80 organisations 
expressed interest in registration, only ten were granted registration in 
the first two years, although now 16 organisations have either permanent 
or temporary registration. The granting of official registration licenses 
has been restricted to those with close links to government or those 
working in the business sector. The Lao Biodiversity Association has a 
former high ranking official of the National Social Sciences Institute; 
the Lao Culture Preservation and Promotion Association has an ex 
Minister of Information and Culture. Other registered associations 
include the Lao Disabled People’s Association, the Lao Promotion and 
Assistance to Disadvantage People’s Association, and the Lao Coffee 
Producer’s Association. 
The process of registration requires scrutiny of the NPA’s objective, 
name and board members and the granting of registration can be 
conditional on making changes to any of these aspects. Given the 
complexity and level of intrusion in the process, some organisations 
have adopted the strategy of waiting to determine the advantages 
arising from registration before proceeding further. Other CSOs have 
linked up with formal mass organisations and thus may not require 
registration. 
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Overall however, stakeholders feel that the CSO environment is gradually 
improving and there is an opening up of space for different actors to 
work in partnership with government and the community. Actors in 
the sector point out that new opportunities can be realized through 
the formation of strategic alliances with those in government who have 
similar views on certain issues and topics, and that this has been 
facilitated by the fact that there is more open discourse on such matters 
in the Government. This opening up of discourse on aspects of 
development provides a useful platform for CSOs to form strategic 
alliances around a body of related interests in government in order to 
be better placed to work together towards a common development 
objective. In the same way, CSOs recognise that they could form 
stronger alliances with National Assembly members and help them to 
undertake a more effective watchdog role through scrutiny of policy 
and wider discourse on development.    
Stakeholders argue that Laos has the potential to formulate an alternative 
development pattern. It has already made the transition from a socialist 
economy to a market-oriented economy and now stands at a crossroads 
in terms of socio-economic transition. Those active in the CSO sector 
are eager to influence the direction of change towards a sustainable 
model of development within the broader context of Lao polity and 
society.          
Whilst the general environment for NPAs is seen by most actors within 
the sector to be moving in a positive direction, INGO stakeholders point 
out that, rather ironically, their operating environment appears to be 
getting more constrained. New minimum investments are required to 
qualify for the establishment of a representative office, new and more 
stringent visa rules have been established for staff, who will no longer 
enjoy exemption from income tax, and operational permits have been 
reduced from two years to one year.
Overall, the INGO and emerging NPA sector represents an important 
resource that can be used for promoting development in a resource-scarce 
context. There are multiple development challenges in the need to 
extend services to the poorest and most remote communities, in an 
ethnically diverse landscape with multiple disparities and variances across 
communities. The complexity of this task, coupled to limitations in 
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financial, human and technical resources, means that widening the 
development partnership is not only pragmatic but a necessary 
strategy in the context of the evolving political economy of Laos.    
Citizen Participation in Planning and Service Delivery 
One of the main manifestations of participation to date derives from 
citizen engagement in participatory planning and implementation of 
services through a wide range of development projects that emphasise 
participatory approaches. In addition, there are varying degrees of 
participation in the formal system of annual planning and budgeting, 
as reflected in the draft Participatory Planning Manual of the Ministry 
of Planning and Investment and the Leading Committee on Rural 
Development. 
Participatory processes to date, whilst being confined to planning 
and implementation of services, have helped to offset gender 
bias in local decision making, although women still participate 
less actively and in smaller numbers than men. 
The Participatory Planning Manual sets out a process of bottom-up 
planning, which begins at the family level, drawing on inputs from 
community members, and is collated and prioritized into a village and 
kumban level plan which is then submitted to the district. The degree 
of participation at village level varies from more extensive engagement 
with households, involving simple tools and techniques, to less intensive 
participation based on discussions at the regular monthly village meeting. 
Once the village has agreed its priorities, these will be submitted to the 
kumban through the elected village head. The kumban itself was 
originally conceived as a unit of government primarily designed to 
promote political and ethnic unity through control and development 
involvement, managed by appointed functionaries working alongside 
district staff and sometimes with provincial line departments. 
Although the mechanisms for greater participation in kumban planning 
have been formally defined in the manual and include group discussions 
and feedback based around specific sets of interest (i.e. farmers groups, 
women’s group, mixed groups etc.), in practice this rarely happens and 
the process is altogether more guided and directed than contested and 
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debated. The manual is being simplified at present to make it more 
practical and widely applicable. At the same time, there is trend towards 
strengthening participation at the kumban level, and this is being 
reinforced in as many as 274 of the poorest kumban through 
facilitated processes under PRF 2. Organisations such as the Gender 
and Development Group have also attempted to strengthen participation 
in local planning and development, facilitating forums or workshops 
to bring together different interest groups in a structured manner 
under the chair of a senior district government functionary. 
Participatory planning processes have opened up the space for more 
active engagement of different sections of society at community level. 
Experience has shown that whilst people are prepared to speak out in 
the presence of the village head, they are much more reluctant to do 
so in the presence of outsiders, including government functionaries. 
This means that in the absence of external facilitation it has been 
difficult to capture community views and concerns. This has a serious 
implication for any attempt to promote participation, which requires 
intensive levels of support, especially at the initial stages, if it is to result 
in meaningful engagement. 
At the same time this newly opened space for participation has clearly 
demarcated boundaries where the focus of engagement is more 
technical in nature, primarily concerning the type and location of service 
to be provided. However, this space clearly provides an opportunity for 
promoting more active citizenship in terms of increased voice and 
accountability of government. Participatory processes to date, whilst 
being confined to planning and implementation of services, have helped 
to offset gender bias in local decision making, although women still 
participate less actively and in smaller numbers than men. Stakeholders 
also point out that these have helped people gain a better understanding 
of the local context and appropriate forms of intervention and 
linkages with government. All this provides the essential base from 
which citizens can graduate to more extensive engagement and active 
citizenship.   
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Media
A key dimension in widening participation relates to the availability of 
information and the means to make this accessible to a wide diversity 
of citizens. In order for citizens to participate in and engage with 
society as a whole, they need information that is more than simply 
propaganda and/or the dissemination of laws. They need information 
that will allow them to consider options and make informed choices 
about their own development strategies and actions. Laos faces a 
number of challenges in this regard. Firstly, the Government still retains 
a strong sense of the need to promote unity and security, given the 
recent history of war and socio-political fragmentation, and 
consequently tends to approach the issue of information in a cautious 
and controlled manner. Secondly, the socio-physical characteristics of 
the country, with extensive ethno-linguistic diversity, means that there 
is no single, simple information channel or medium that can disseminate 
to all citizens equally. Thirdly, the prevailing high levels of illiteracy and 
poverty limit the degree of engagement people have with the wider 
regional or national context. Finally, there are strong cultural barriers 
to using information in a challenging or confrontational manner and, 
while this is a common feature in many Asian consensual cultures, this 
is more pronounced in Laos than in many neighbouring cultures including 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar and Thailand. 
The media has grown rapidly and plays a key role in disseminating 
official news to all layers of the society. The dissemination of print 
media products from the capital now reaches more readers in many 
provinces and remote districts. There are five national daily newspapers: 
Paxaxon (People); Pathet Lao; Khaokila (Sports Daily News); and the 
English-language Vientiane Times and KPL News. There are several 
weekly newspapers published in Vientiane and distributed nationwide 
such as Renovateur, (French language) and Van Athit. KPL News is 
available on the web in Lao, French and English. Since the 1990s a small 
number of regional Lao-language newspapers have been established 
along with six magazines and a private Lao newspaper (Vientiane Mai). 
Apart from these, there are many other in-house newspapers and 
journals published by the Party Central Committee and various state 
bodies, public organisations and official institutions. On the whole the 
print media remains conservative and cautious and practices an 
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extensive degree of self censorship. Some newspapers, particularly the 
Vientiane Mai and Vientiane Times, along with foreign newspapers and 
magazines provide increasing space for reflecting citizens’ opinions on 
various topics such as land and corruption issues. 
A new media law has been enacted enhancing the role of the mass 
media and an increasing number of participatory communication 
initiatives (e.g. community radio pilot projects) have contributed to 
improving the environment for progress. A number of aspects of the 
media have opened up over the last few years as a result of increasing 
commercial penetration of media space by private media companies, 
and new channels of communication that are beyond the reach of 
government to control. These include mobile phones, internet and 
social media, DVDs and other forms of communication. 
Through Thai television, among the most popular forms of 
media in Laos, the urban population has become increasingly 
aware of issues of debate and protest in Thailand and Myanmar. 
In contrast Lao media is viewed as dull and predictable, though 
the Government has recognised the need to upgrade it through 
substantially increased investment.
There are 29 national television stations, of which three are central-based 
Lao TV channels broadcasting daily news and entertainment 
programmes country-wide. Lao Star TV can be accessed in 25 countries 
around the world and Lao National TV screens ethnic language 
programmes. Two Chinese cable television companies provide satellite 
access to numerous foreign TV channels. There are over 30 radio 
stations including national radio, province and district radio and some 
community radio stations. Private companies broadcast radio 
programmes at specific times for commercial and entertainment 
purposes. Satellite TV dishes are now reaching many remote mountainous 
areas, allowing people to access not only government media but various 
sources of information.  
Among the most popular forms of media is Thai TV, received through 
satellite and cable. Its professionalism and financial resources allow it 
to produce and televise a wide range of drama, entertainment and 
news programmes, which are accessible to most of the Lao population 
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in varying degrees. Whilst popular interest is mainly confined to 
entertainment, the urban population has become increasingly aware 
of issues of debate and protest which have manifested themselves in 
neighbouring Thailand and are beginning to unfold in Myanmar. The 
level of awareness on such issues is surprisingly high in urban centres. 
Lao State broadcast media, comprising National Lao Television, 
Security TV and State Radio, suffer from a lack of resources and 
professionalism, relying on poorly trained journalists and heavily 
censored content. The result is less entertaining programmes focusing 
on news, government propaganda and light entertainment in formats 
that most viewers consider dull and predictable. 
Almost all stakeholders in urban centres claim that they hardly watch 
Lao TV, although there is some openness towards listening to Lao radio, 
which features commercial inputs that have infused a more modern 
format. These stakeholders are quick to point out that official Lao 
media lacks debate and interest. Part of the problem relates to the lack 
of training for journalists and media professionals. The National 
University of Laos has initiated a new mass media degree and the 
Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism runs in-house training 
twice per annum, sometimes with assistance from experts from Euro-
pean and Asian countries. 
With current economic growth and the inability to close off the inflow 
of global media, the Government has recognised the need to upgrade 
the quality of radio and television broadcasts and of newspapers and 
magazines, through a substantially increased investment in the media 
sector. Besides this direct investment, the mass media is also being 
encouraged under Decree No. 36 of 1993 to obtain income from 
other sources to improve its quality.
Internet and Mobile Technology   
Internet and mobile phone use are growing rapidly, expanding beyond 
urban centres and the middle classes to an increasing number of the 
rural population. Use is mostly confined to personal and social messaging, 
social media exchange and entertainment. There has been substantial 
growth in mobile phone ownership, from 55,000 in 2002 to around 
one million users now. Mobile networks are quickly expanding coverage 
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in remote rural areas and 60% of the rural population has access to a 
mobile phone. With a lack of government restrictions, internet usage 
has also grown substantially, but at a slower pace. Informal estimates 
put internet users at around 100,000, most of whom are government 
officials, intellectuals and students, media and business people. It should 
be noted, however, that the Government has introduced more stringent 
regulations over the mobile phone market, requiring users to register 
all their contact details prior to obtaining a connection. 
There is good potential for developing new approaches to participation 
through new communication channels that can be tailored for different 
forms of social media that will address a wide range of political, 
socio-economic and cultural issues of concern and interest to the 
broader population. Such an initiative would build on the expanding 
network and provide information outreach to over one million people 
directly, and no doubt to many more indirectly. With over 15 million 
Lao speakers in Thailand, the opportunities for wider communication 
and debate are significant. There is an emerging interest amongst some 
sections of civil society and donor partners in developing a broader 
coalition and potential interventions around these issues. This represents 
a different approach to civil society, where rather than focusing on 
specific advocacy or development organisations, the focus is on 
mechanisms that are less threatening in the sense that they have no 
organisational status yet are more powerful in terms of forming and 
shaping ideas through the use of new networks and forms of social 
interaction.   
Key Issues and Potential Entry Points 
National Assembly is Critical for Representation  
The National Assembly is one of the key agents in ensuring participation 
in government through a formal representative structure that has 
constitutional status, legal recognition and formal legitimacy. It provides 
an important check and balance role in relation to the other branches 
of government. The Assembly is thus a vital part of the representative 
structure of the wider government system and provides space for the 
participation of citizens in governance. 
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There are a number of issues that need to be addressed if the NA is to 
evolve into a more effective representative body in the longer run. 
Firstly, the timing and duration of sessions severely constricts its ability 
to function, Secondly, concerns have been raised about the process 
and quality of debate given the high workload, with 91 laws to be 
approved within a period of 100 days as set out in the 7th Legislature 
Assembly Agenda. 
In spite of many shortcomings in the electoral process, nature and form 
of representation, role and functions and capacity and resources, 
encouraging developments have served to strengthen the 
representative role of the Assembly in recent years, although these have 
been incremental in nature. As some stakeholders have argued, the 
Lao National Assembly is more progressive than the Supreme People’s 
Assembly in China in terms of its role and the way in which its members 
have interpreted that role in recent years.  Strengthening the National 
Assembly is a crucial aspect of the wider task of helping to establish a 
distinct and unique governance system based on structures that exist 
and have legitimacy.
There is no formal representation below the National Assembly at 
provincial, or district level. However, there has been a slow but growing 
interest in deepening scrutiny at provincial and district through more 
effective auditing and controlling of provinces and hence governors. 
Although the 2006 Budget Law centralised revenues, this has not yet 
been fully implemented - hence the desire of central government to 
strengthen audit at provincial level. This is consistent with the view of 
Party leadership that there is a need to adjust the balance of power in 
favour of the centre by strengthening the role of national bodies to 
oversee and scrutinise activities at provincial level. At the same time 
there is recognition of a complimentary need to develop arrangements 
that will increase operational autonomy at lower levels and strengthen 
representation. This represents a broadly favourable environment for 
the possible emergence of provincial councils, alluded to at the 9th 
Party Congress. Given that such councils may well materialise in the 
next few years, there is good scope for deepening forms of formal 
participation in government with closer outreach and links to districts 
than the present National Assembly constituency operation.  
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Participation as an objective not a process 
Participatory planning and appraisal techniques used by a variety of 
projects in many contexts will help to strengthen community engagement, 
often to good effect. However the use of externally designed tools and 
techniques to stimulate greater involvement in local decision making is 
often time consuming, costly and not particularly replicable in the 
absence of facilitation. Here there is a need to experiment with a 
variety of mechanisms that will allow for good enough levels of 
participation to offset any obvious biases in decision making. In 
communities without significant socio-economic differentiation, one 
of the main issues to address will be gender bias and this can be achieved 
through a relatively simple but conscious approach to ensure female 
participation in local decision-making and prioritisation processes. Here 
the main consideration is to ensure that participation is seen as an 
objective and not a process, and may in fact take many diverse forms 
rather than compliance with a particular set of methods. 
Enhancing the Role of Civil Society 
A key factor in enhancing the role of civil society is the degree of 
willingness on the part of government to develop new ways of working 
with different types of actor. Whilst government has developed a sense 
of confidence in working with the private sector, it remains cautious 
of private voluntary agencies. There are increasingly more educated 
and progressive cadres in the Party who recognise the need for 
developing new ways of working, but it is not clear if this translates 
into an acceptance of more active citizenship in processes of decision 
making. There are signs, however, that the Party and Government 
recognise the need for a broader partnership with civil society actors 
for implementing development programmes. The National Assembly 
has a progressive view on CSOs as a potential resource for helping it 
perform its role in monitoring and holding state agencies to account, 
and NA members welcome increased dialogue between civil society 
and government. There is also recognition that different actors may 
have different skills in reaching out to remote communities to increase 
access to services. In this context there is an important emerging space 
for formal civil society organisations to become more active in development 
and service delivery. At the same time there is greater acceptance of 
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citizen participation as a means to improve planning, enhance service 
delivery and strengthen accountability of the government. 
However, a number of political constraints still persist. There remains 
a strong culture of top-down direction and management of citizens. 
This culture persists is widely practised across all government 
institutions. The text of the 9th Party Congress, referring to the nature 
of engagement of citizens, talks of “creating a space where people can 
study holistically and receive information on Party and government 
policies and action plans; this will create public awareness and unite 
people to implement the policies and plans of the Party and State.” 
Stakeholders in the CSO sector recognise these limitations and advocate 
a pragmatic approach to this problem based around focusing CSO 
efforts and activities on local development, service delivery and capacity 
building at community level rather than advocacy on rights and 
entitlements. Such an approach is generally uncontroversial from the 
government perspective. Most CSOs therefore see themselves as a 
partner to government, bringing in new knowledge and innovative 
models. Stakeholders in the CSO sector are also keen to evolve new 
ways of working that will enable them to operate along similar lines to 
the existing formal mass organisations and associations. It is clear, for 
example, that formal associations such as the LNCCI, with stronger links 
to government, have been able to address some policy issues and pro-
mote change, albeit along narrow interests. 
New partnerships and approaches will gradually empower civil society 
organisations to participate in implementation and monitoring and to 
identify shortcomings and improvements in service delivery, thus laying 
the foundation for more meaningful engagement in the long run. There 
is however, a clear limitation on the absorptive capacity of CSOs to take 
on funded development activities, given their own limitations in terms 
of staff, resources and systems. The potential for substantial increase 
in the number and scope of civil society organisations is limited, although 
more could be done to enable these organisations to partner with 
government in a variety of service delivery and development activities. 
Although many Non Profit Association actors feel they can absorb more 
funds, to make this practical substantial capacity building would be 
needed in programme management and fund administration. 
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Given the possible emergence of provincial councils in the next 
few years, there is good scope for deepening forms of formal 
participation in government with close outreach and links to 
districts. There is now greater acceptance of citizen participation 
as a means to improve planning, enhance service delivery and 
strengthen accountability. However, the culture of top-down 
direction and management of citizens remains strong, and most 
in the CSO sector advocate a pragmatic approach to local          
development rather than focusing on advocacy and rights and 
entitlements which will only be opposed by officials. 
Since most NPAs are set up by well intentioned people who are also 
well connected, there is a useful window of opportunity emerging to 
assist CSOs to enter the development space and capitalise on the 
energies and commitment of those actors who government acceptance 
to open up new avenues for participation and new spaces in development. 
Once their role is better established it may be possible for them to 
develop more capacity to build citizen awareness on rights and 
entitlements, and to help monitor the degree to which these obligations 
are met by government. 
New Forms of Participatory Networks and Engagement
There is an increasing need in the contemporary development context of 
Laos to identify new and more innovative ways to broaden participation 
and engagement in public policy dialogue and influence. As seen above, 
there are already established mechanisms for certain defined groups, 
such as the private sector, NPAs and others, to begin dialogue with 
government. With donor-partner backing these groups have begun to 
participate in formal development partner meetings, sector working 
groups and round table meetings. 
There is however, increasing scope to explore new ways of engagement 
based on existing and rapidly expanding forms of virtual communication 
through the internet and internet-enabled mobile technology. This can 
be used to disseminate public information and economic market 
information, but also to open new spaces for dialogue and debate on 
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public policy. These forms of communication have already expanded 
access to information for millions of users around the world and have 
the potential to reach out to a substantial number of the population in 
Laos. It is known that mobile technology has empowered many poorer 
people (and often poor women) in countries such as India and 
Bangladesh to engage in market transactions and to access credit and 
services in new and effective ways. 
Whilst it is recognised that such forms of information and communica-
tion may only appeal to a limited number of predominantly urban 
middle-class people in the first instance, with intelligent editing, infor-
mation can be easily tailored and presented to appeal to specific seg-
ments of the population (young, middle aged and elderly) to great 
effect. At the same time, it is recognised that this enterprise will tend 
to be oriented to more articulate and advantaged sections of society 
with the capacity and interest to engage in advocacy and to debate on 
issues of public concern. These new forms of virtual media are 
unlikely to be a channel for ordinary citizens to represent themselves, 
but do offer enormous potential for younger sections of the future elite 
to find new ways of networking and articulating with the State. It is 
precisely from this group that the next generation of entrepreneurs, 
intellectuals, and administrators who will shape the future policy direc-
tion of Laos will emerge. In the long run, these spaces for participation 
will become more important as an influence on policy than many more 
formal civil society organisations, which depend on a small but vocal 
leadership that make claims to representation with no substantive sup-
port beyond a limited membership group. 
Conclusion: Recent Changes, Drivers of Change and Future Trends
The overall environment for greater levels of participation in formal 
structures of decision making and in the planning and implementation 
of local level development would appear to be much more conducive 
than it was a few years ago. 
Recent Changes 
There have been a number of recent changes in the character and 
functioning of the National Assembly, enabling it to evolve into a more 
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effective agent of participatory governance. In the 7th Legislature there 
are fewer members who are senior Party and government functionaries 
and a number of members were not necessarily the favoured candidate 
on the approved list. This means that the 7th Legislature not only has 
more members who are not in other branches of the government but 
also representatives who are not Party members. At the same time, the 
Assembly has begun to assume a check and balance role through 
closer scrutiny of budgets and expenditure, questioning of policy and 
making its observations public. The current Assembly membership is 
more educated and younger than in the past.          
There has been a positive shift in official views and attitudes towards 
civil society organisations as those in government recognise the need 
to open up the space in service delivery for a wider range of actors and 
resources. Decree 115/PM of 2009 on Association marks an important 
step in the formal recognition of NPAs as partners in development. In 
spite of a slow and intrusive registration process, NPA stakeholders feel 
that there is an opening up of space for different actors to work in 
partnership with government and the community, and that new 
opportunities can be realized through the formation of strategic 
alliances with those in government who have similar views on particular 
certain issues. This provides a useful platform for CSOs/NPAs and 
individuals in the Government to coalesce around a set of related 
interests. 
Many mass organisations and professional associations have begun to 
change their way of working. The Lao Federation of Trade Unions has 
begun to play a more substantial role in promoting workers rights and 
interests. The LNCCI reports that they have made good progress in 
pushing the policy envelope in a number of sectors including tourism, 
business, mining and leasing.
A new media law has enhanced the role of mass media and helped to 
increase the number of participatory communication initiatives. There 
has been a major expansion in print, radio and TV media in recent years 
in terms of access, choice and coverage, though content remains 
largely confined to the dissemination of official news or entertainment. 
Although popular interest in the media is almost wholly restricted to 
foreign (Thai) entertainment, increased access to foreign news is 
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opening up new ideas and events. There has been a substantial growth 
in internet and mobile technology with over 1 million mobile phone 
subscribers with access to a wide array of web-enabled social media.
Drivers of Change
The essential driving force behind the recent changes in approach to 
participation would appear to be based on a series of complementary 
factors. At the formal level, it is increasingly understood in government 
that the National Assembly should play a more pro-active oversight role 
over legislation and expenditure, since it can perform a check and 
balance role without threatening the foundations and fabric of the 
system. The senior leadership of the National Assembly has also acted 
as a significant driver in this process, including the current Prime 
Minister, who was the NA President and recognises the useful role the 
Assembly can play in the oversight of various aspects of government.  
At the civil society level, the main changes can be attributed to a 
growing awareness in Government, especially the executive machinery, 
that civil society organisations can play a useful role in the delivery of 
services and are more easily managed than INGO actors. At the same 
time, there has been consistent pressure from donor partners to open 
up space for civil society organisations to assume a more effective role 
in supporting local development processes. 
Future Trends
As already shown in the governance section, the representative role of 
the National Assembly is gradually taking shape with a new composition 
and character enabling it to assume a more pro-active policy oversight 
role. This is likely to continue over the next few legislatures. With focused 
funding and support on building more effective constituency representation 
and greater oversight capacity, the role could be substantially enhanced 
in future. 
There is a positive trend towards increased citizen participation governance 
through various formal, semi-formal, and informal institutions. There 
are around 80 Non Profit Associations active in the development sector 
and there is increasing acceptance from the Government of civil society 
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organisations as potentially useful partners in community development. 
Although NPAs and CSOs have adopted an essentially embedded role 
in support of existing development processes, rather than adopting a 
more rights based advocacy approach, this is probably a pragmatic and 
instrumental strategy in the present context. 
Chapter 6: Underlying Structures and External Influences 
Economic Governance 
The underlying structural character of the Lao economy is a significant 
factor in determining the nature of contemporary political economy 
and is thus a key driver of change. There has been considerable expansion 
in both foreign and domestic investment with over US$1 billion 
recorded in the first half of the 2010-11 fiscal year, a 66% increase on 
the previous year. $900 million of this was foreign investment, over 
half of which was accounted for by import of equipment. The value of 
foreign aid in the same period was $304 million, roughly equivalent to 
real capital foreign direct investment.
The country is rich in natural resources especially land, forest, minerals, 
water and hydropower potential. Preliminary results from a current 
study on land management (Heinimann 2011) under LMRP indicate 
that more than 5 million hectares of land has been allocated to concessions, 
equivalent to 21% of the total land area. Of this 4.2 million hectares 
relates to mining exploration areas, accounting for 10% of the total 
land area. By 2009-10 hydropower and mining alone were contributing 
over 35% of total GDP and 20% of total revenue in 2009-10 (World 
Bank Lao Development Report 2010). At the same time, the revenue 
generated from this economic model is substantial and has been the 
driving force behind the rapid rise in annual government revenue, which 
was estimated at of around $1 billion per year (2010) and projected to 
rise to $2 billion over the next five years, largely on the back of minerals 
and hydropower.
As a result, the country has already reached tenth position in a ranking 
of mineral dependent world economies. The political economy of raw 
material extraction is a complicated issue. While many mineral dependent 
countries see mining as an effective path to development there is a 
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serious danger that such dependency will lead to “addiction”. This can 
be a precarious development path, particularly in a context where the 
major source of national economic wealth relates to taxes and fees 
imposed on externally-controlled operations with investment regimes 
that allow profit repatriation. The LNCCI reports that the Government 
has issued 120 mining concessions to date but only a few are 
operational as many concessions have been acquired for speculative 
purposes by investors who are not able to meet the operational 
conditions laid out in the contract. There are also damaging 
environmental impacts from poorly-controlled mining in areas through 
practices such as gold dredging, which releases mercury and cyanide 
into freshwater. The Government has placed a moratorium on all further 
mining concessions while it considers arguments about the positive and 
negative impacts of mining on the economy. Given the vested interests 
in the sector, it remains unclear as to how the Government will proceed. 
After mining, the second largest type of land concessions relate to 
agriculture. These cover over 330,000 hectares, almost all 
concentrated on favourable arable land, which constitutes no more 
than 20% of the country’s total land area. The largest single type of 
agricultural concession is rubber, which currently accounts for 43% of 
all agricultural concessions (Heinimann et al 2011). FDI in rubber and 
similar commodities is adding a layer of complexity, with increasing 
penetration of rural space by large commercial actors increasing levels 
of vulnerability among the rural poor, who experience reduced access 
to land and other natural resources and lack the skills required to 
diversify into new forms of livelihood. A further problem is that 40% 
of the ethnic population in mid- and upland areas are bearing the brunt 
lost access to land and traditional livelihoods. 
Land Governance
The economic vulnerabilities are exacerbated by poor land governance. 
There are a variety of institutions involved in allocating and regulating 
land concessions as each level of administration (district, province, and 
national) can approve concessions up to a certain size in area. This 
decentralised approval system, coupled with weak governance 
processes and highly dynamic investments, further reinforces 
vulnerabilities. Given the weak overall management of land concessions 
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and investment there is no consistent data and information on the 
number, size and location of investments or investors in land and 
natural resource development in the country. As a result, neither 
policy makers nor development actors have an evidence base for the 
benefits and trade-offs of past and current land investments. This 
greatly hinders effective and transparent land governance and 
economic management. 
Over 85% of all agricultural investments are foreign, most of come 
from China, with the balance being Thai, Vietnamese, Korean and 
Indian inward investors (Heinimann et al 2011). Although there are 
secondary gains from informal charges and payments to facilitate entry 
and operations, the benefits of these gains are largely if not wholly 
channelled into conspicuous consumption rather than production, with 
minimal wider benefits. Moreover, Chinese investors have been 
pressuring the government to increase the quota for more competitive 
Chinese migrant labour, thereby further driving down wages. The World 
Food Programme (WFP) argues that this model of economic development 
is not only exacerbating inequality but also induces environmental shocks 
associated with deforestation, droughts and floods.
Dutch disease, which can undermine long-term economic                  
performance and result in a ‘resource curse’, is often worse in 
aid-dependent countries such as Laos. Mining exploration          
areas cover 4.2 million hectares or 10% of total land area. FDI 
in rubber and similar commodities leads to penetration of rural 
space by large commercial actors, increasing vulnerability among 
the poor, while investors push for increased foreign labour 
quotas, thereby driving down wages. WFP argues that this                 
exacerbates inequality and also induces environmental shocks.
Estimates show that land concessions to date have affected over 1,000 vil-
lages, 22% of which have been affected by as many as four concessions, 
and 26% of which have poverty rates above 50%. Whilst advocates argue 
that concessions make use of and add value to under-used land, critics point 
out that they have serious detrimental impacts on  livelihoods, food security 
and poverty, as well as on biodiversity The implication is that there is an urgent 
need to assess the current and future impacts in more detail and to introduce 
more diligent and transparent management of vital land resources.
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Hydropower offers significant opportunities in terms of contributing to 
growth, with a projected two new dams coming online every year for the 
next two years. The Nam Theun 2 project is seen as a model in terms of 
environmental and social mitigation. However, even here, income 
opportunities have been foregone as long-term price agreements with 
Thailand have pegged revenue from electricity sales, delivered through a 
dedicated line to Thailand, at 4.2 cents per unit, substantially below the 
Thai domestic price of 8 cents. At the same time, the projected growth in 
revenues accruing from large-scale hydropower projects over the next few 
years may not materialise if the consequences of continuing recession in 
Europe affect the Thai economy. The lack of credit among the European 
banks which dominate large project lending will also limit the scope for 
investment and expansion, demonstrating the vulnerability of dependence 
on a narrow economic base.    
Management of FDI 
The precarious nature of a growth model based on primary sector activities 
in mining and commodities will be substantially heightened by any rising 
operational costs or downward trends in world commodity prices, 
especially in a context where there has been limited economic diversification. 
Fluctuating commodity prices can mask long-term vulnerability and dependency, 
resulting in a situation where those with the greatest need to avoid 
dependency on a narrow sector are often the least able to do so. 
It is for these reasons that many economists have identified a close 
correlation between a fast-expanding natural resource based economy 
and the “Dutch disease” effect, where a rapid inflow of foreign direct 
investment coupled to a sharp rises in commodity prices will lead to real 
exchange rate appreciation, rising labour costs and structural mbalances that 
undermine the competitiveness of the sectors,  especially light exports, that 
are needed to help diversify the economy and reduce vulnerability. Manifestation 
of Dutch disease is often worse in cases where a country is also heavily aid 
dependent, a s in Laos. Dutch disease often undermines long-term 
economic performance in resource dependent economies, resulting in a 
‘resource curse’. Laos also suffers the disadvantage, in economic terms at 
least, that there is almost no value chain addition to mineral and ore 
extraction as most processing is done elsewhere. Many would argue that 
during a resource boom, economic and political interests coalesce to lock 
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economies into a specific developmental trajectory based on the emergence 
of a rentier class inextricably linked to the dominant  political structures and 
systems. 
This process is exacerbated by a number of factors including the speed and 
scale of such transformation. All forms of economic growth create 
opportunities for individual wealth creation but some forms have a greater 
distributive effect. One of the essential problems of growth through l 
arge-scale commercialization of the primary sector, including extractive 
processes and plantation production, is that circuits of capital generated from 
such growth are inherently narrow. When these are superimposed on 
externally-driven investment with necessary provisions for repatriation of 
profits, then wealth creation is confined to the small segment of co-investors 
and others who play instrumental roles in investment mediation. At the same 
time, there is competition for access to land between the different interests 
of the natural resource economy, including mining, hydropower, agricultural 
commodity production and the vast mass of subsistence smallholders. It is, 
not surprisingly, the latter category that are the losers in this as their access 
to land gets squeezed between the competing interests of large  primary 
sector actors. 
A problem with growth through primary sector commercialization 
is that wealth creation is confined to those with roles in investment 
mediation. It would be prudent to concentrate less on providing 
incentives and to focus instead on attracting progressive investment 
through better economic governance, transparency and legal 
certainty. A broad and stable internal political coalition can 
encourage pro-growth policies and supporting institutions if 
there is space for the debate and adoption of alternative           
strategies.
Another challenge arising from the underlying structure of the emerging 
economic model is the degree to which the revenue generated from 
the model can be optimized, given that these revenues will provide the 
major source of investment in infrastructure and human capital in future 
years. When the source of revenue growth is generated within an 
investor-friendly climate, characterised by varying degrees of flexibility, 
inducements and incentives, there is a risk of substantial potential rev-
enue loss in the scramble for inward investment. This can be further 
exacerbated when negotiations are conducted at various levels of 
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government offering varying degrees of incentive. It is reported by 
observers that many concessions have been granted to investors at low 
lease rates over long durations without any Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) obligations. 
A more strategic approach requires a coordinated and coherent effort 
to managing land concessions and generating the information required 
for negotiating benefits and trade-offs. It would be prudent for the 
Government to concentrate less on the provision of incentives, formal 
and informal, and to focus instead on ensuring that the foundations 
of economic governance, transparency and legal certainty are in place 
as a more powerful force for attracting progressive inward investment. 
In the absence of this, the economic space will tend to get populated, 
if not dominated, by companies of potentially dubious credibility. 
However, there are cases of productive and responsible investment in 
all sectors. Nam Theun 2 is a showcase project and a number of large 
Australian investments are undertaken in a fully transparent and 
responsible manner with CSR provisions to mitigate any negative 
consequences. What is required is a step change in the governance of 
concessions to be applied to all FDI within a much tighter rule of law. 
Overall, it can be seen that a major limitation of the current development 
model is highly dependent on a natural resources sector which has 
innate vulnerabilities. Much of this growth is directly linked to China’s 
scramble for food and mineral security. There has been little or no 
growth in the smallholder agriculture in which the vast bulk of the 
population are engaged, while competitiveness in the non-resource 
economy is sliding and there is little development in the domestic 
manufacturing sector. There is a need to slow down and refocus investment 
management. Wealth creation is largely related to a limited number of 
actors who intervene in circulation, rather than production of capital. 
Alongside the conspicuous consumption of imported goods that results, 
an increasing number of smallholders have reduced access to land, food 
security and livelihoods. This can only be adequately offset through 
effective redistributive processes. Although revenues from charges, fees 
and taxes are available for investment in infrastructure and services, 
unless these are optimally negotiated and well managed, the 
redistributive effects will be limited and wider wealth creation will be 
severely compromised. When many governance institutions are weak 
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and lack basic managerial capacities, there is no guarantee that these 
earnings will be well managed. 
Ultimately, the nature of the underlying economic model is inextricably 
linked to the political system within which it operates. Political coalitions 
lay the foundation for development of state and other institutions, and 
changes in coalitions drive changes in policy responses to resource 
booms. Even if it is not possible to entirely avoid the symptoms of Dutch 
disease, it may be possible to keep them in check despite the fragility 
of state institutions and systems. A broad and stable internal political 
coalition can encourage the adoption of pro-growth policies and 
supporting institutions, provided there is space for alternative strategies 
to be debated, considered and adopted in a manner that will not 
undermine the essential stability of the dominant political coalition. As 
new strategies are developed, economic policies will change and 
vulnerabilities and dependencies may decline. 
Political Structures and Processes
The political system in Laos is based on a concept of democratic centralism, 
characterised by a unified hierarchical structure in which open debate 
takes place within a closed (Party cells) environment at lower and 
intermediate levels of the Party (democratic aspect), whilst decision 
making, direction and leadership take place at the highest level of the 
hierarchy (Politburo and Standing Committee). Once a decision is made 
by majority vote, there is a strict requirement to adhere to and uphold 
the directives of the highest authority (centralist aspect). 
The system is further characterised by strict Party discipline and the 
subordination of the minority to the majority. Whilst the directing 
bodies of the Party are elected (Party cells and Standing Committee), 
members of the highest decision-making body (Politburo) tend to be 
preselected from among the elected based on a mix of competency, 
suitability and patrimony. Those that attend the five-yearly Party 
Congress are elected from the Party cells and have an opportunity to 
influence broad policy and strategy within a generally consensual 
environment.   
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As defined in the Constitution, the Party plays a leading role in all 
aspects of the State including the legislature, judiciary, and executive. 
In practice this means that senior functionaries in all branches of 
government are appointed by the Party and assigned roles by virtue of 
Party membership and loyalty. 
One of the outcomes of this form of democratic centralist structure and 
system is that the strong central direction of policy implementation at 
all levels of administration can eliminate the confusion and contradictions 
of more pluralistic contexts. This system has clear advantages in terms 
of establishing and consolidating political unity and stability, which is 
a fundamental requirement in any post-conflict state, where there is 
an urgent need to ensure security and law and order as the basis for 
any subsequent development. At the same time political unity and 
stability is a positive attribute in any fragile state where government 
structures and systems are not yet fully in place. 
Moreover, political unity provides an opportunity for developing 
medium- and long-term development perspective and strategies that 
are not subject to sudden changes and reversal. This stands in contrast 
to many more pluralist political systems, where policies are often used 
for the purposes of political party expediency and voter manipulation, 
rather than for any development rationale, There is ample evidence 
from other Asian countries that pluralistic political systems can breed 
populist policies designed to win votes, but which often undermine 
development strategies. For example, the widespread distribution of 
heavily subsidised goods and rations to win over votes often leads to 
enormous leakage and costs that outweigh any developmental gain. 
However, the potential strengths of a one-party system with a high 
degree of political uniformity can only be realised in a context where 
policy making is informed and shaped by a high degree of internal 
expertise, and where there is an efficient, effective and responsive 
bureaucracy able to deliver high quality service to citizens. 
Whilst the unified political party system in Laos has created a stable and 
secure environment for the rapid development of a market economy, 
which has had a strong positive impact on GDP growth, the system is 
struggling to deal with growing economic dependency, increasing 
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disparities and inequalities, and the requirement for effective law 
enforcement. These problems are partly a product of the political system 
itself, and hence part of the solution lies within the political realm, in 
terms of strengthening those aspects of governance that remain weak. 
There are signs that the Government has begun to realise the 
necessity of introducing incremental reforms that will address a wide 
range of existing problems and challenges. These are not only about 
increasing the efficiency and performance of the administration in 
delivering services but more crucially about strengthening transparency 
and accountability within the Party and Government at all levels. 
A number of factors would help to create a more enabling environment. 
These include providing more public access to information; opening up 
new spaces for debate and dialogue with government; more effective 
audit and scrutiny by the agencies charged with this task (including the 
National Assembly, Government and Party Inspection Authorities and 
State Audit Organisation); curtailing extra-legal behaviour within the 
system by reducing the extent and scope of discretion in decision 
making; and adopting a more effective and independent law 
enforcement process.
Strong central policy implementation at all levels can eliminate 
the confusion and contradictions of more pluralistic contexts. This 
system has clear advantages in establishing and consolidating 
political stability, a fundamental requirement in any post-conflict 
state. However, while the unified political system in Laos has 
created a stable environment for a market economy with strong 
GDP growth, the system is struggling to deal with growing                
economic dependency, increasing inequalities, and the                  
requirement for effective law enforcement.                  
There are signs that there is some momentum in government around 
a number of these issues. The 9th Party Congress resolution emphasised 
the need for a clear distinction of roles between the Party and State; 
the National Assembly has been granted the power to appoint the State 
Audit Organisation as a more independent body to audit government 
accounts; the NA is now more inclined to question and scrutinise 
government policies, laws and activities; there has been a concerted 
effort to rejuvenate aspects of the Party and Government, as evidenced 
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by the entry of younger cadres at senior level; two-thirds of NA 
members now have graduate or post-graduate degrees; there are a 
number of new, younger and well-educated vice ministers in 
government; there is more diversity of opinion and open dialogue and 
all levels of the Party; and actions have been taken to address cases of 
gross misconduct and corruption, although these have been handled 
internally within the Party and Government.  
Culture, Social Relations and Patrimony  
Laos has a long tradition of patron-client relations that have reproduced 
themselves over multiple periods of history to provide a framework of 
social hierarchy articulated within the socio-political structures that 
evolved over time.  A key feature of traditional social structure was the 
sakdina (feudal) system characterised by a complex web of reciprocal 
duties and obligations between those at different levels of the social 
hierarchy. The system was governed by a code of practice in which 
leaders were obliged to observe certain standards of behaviour towards 
others in return for duty and loyalty. While the system was structured 
around innate hierarchy and strong patron-client relations, in Laos such 
patronage behaviour was rarely accompanied by the substantial social 
distance found in many other Asian cultures. In Laos traditional 
sakdina relations provided sufficient space for different social strata to 
have various forms of contact beyond ritualised economic activity, and 
in this sense was not fundamentally exploitative. As these relations were 
mediated by and through a weak state structure, there were was a 
higher degree of interaction between different social strata. 
These factors help to explain the continuity of traditional social systems 
over time, where deeply embedded modes of behaviour are reproduced 
and reinforced through notions of mutual respect and cultural identity. 
Whilst the change of regime in 1975 resulted in an end to the 
politico-economic superstructure of the former regime, it has not 
resulted in any fundamental change to the underlying modes of social 
conduct in spite of various attempts, such as collectivisation and 
political education, to eradicate traditional notions of social hierarchy 
and behaviour. Although the change of political order post-1975 has 
offered new channels of upward social mobility, especially for Party 
functionaries, these have blended over time with more traditional 
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notions of social hierarchy, resulting in a hybrid culture which is both 
technocratic and patrimonial. The new hierarchy of the Party combines 
traditional patron-client  relations with more functionalist modes of 
behaviour associated with technocratic management. In this hybrid 
culture, traditional notions of duty and obligation have been 
reinvented around the granting of favours and privileges mediated 
through a modern form of patrimonialism, in which the old sakdina 
culture has been has been reproduced and reinvented through new 
circuits of patronage and wealth creation infused with an ideology of 
egalitarianism which helps to obfuscate the objectives and outcomes. 
In this context, it can be seen that Party and social hierarchy are 
inextricably linked, where one’s position in the Party reflects one’s posi-
tion in the social hierarchy. The political system has not replaced concepts 
that underpinned the old social order but has reinvented these so that 
upper echelons of the Party hierarchy continue to retain a strong his-
torical social base rooted in the persistence of sakdina culture. Here it 
is common to find members of the upper strata taking on the 
symbolic trappings of past hierarchy. This helps to consolidate and 
legitimise authority and thus reinforces the dominant political structure. 
A key feature of this socio-politico culture is that everything works on 
the basis of family and personal relations as opposed to formal 
procedures and due process and almost everything is negotiable. Whilst 
economic capital is important, its main significance is the way it converts 
into social and political capital. Upland villages, in contrast, have quite 
different socio-economic relations. These are largely egalitarian in nature 
and make decisions only when all parties are satisfied through a system 
of consensus which can require a long drawn out process.  
The Party combines traditional patron-client relations with more 
functionalist modes of behaviour, with notions of duty              
reinvented around the granting of favours. A key feature of the 
socio-politico culture is that everything works on the basis of 
family and personal relations as opposed to formal procedures, 
and almost everything is negotiable. 
Another feature of traditional Lao culture which continues to shape 
attitudes and behaviour is the tendency to avoid issues rather than 
confront them, unless the issues have an immediate and direct impact 
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on an individual. This is well illustrated by the Lao saying of kin khau 
to so khouam pheun (eat our rice and don’t discuss the issues of 
others). This attitude means that people are not naturally inclined to 
question and argue in a direct form and would rather ignore than 
confront issues. This passive laissez-faire attitude encourages the 
Government’s top-down and directive approach in dealing with 
communities. 
Physical Factors
Another driver of change is linked to the physical terrain of Laos, with 
42% of the population living in mid-and upland areas remote from 
markets and services. Language barriers and varying cultural practices 
and attitudes complicate communication. The physical characteristics 
of demography and poverty have a serious affect on the ability of 
government to deliver public services in areas that are difficult to access. 
As a consequence, the Government has developed a strategy of 
relocation to facilitate service delivery and encourage growth-centre 
development while reinforcing political security. This strategy has acted 
as a driver of change for many remote rural communities, with around 
100 villages experiencing some form of physical dislocation each year. 
Relocation of remote communities can have negative consequences. 
Detrimental impacts on community livelihood strategies are widely 
reported alongside other unforeseen consequences. The World Health 
Organisation has reported instances where a substantial rise in inward 
migration has resulted in outbreaks of serious communicable disease 
such as malaria and dengue, while WFP has reported higher malnutrition 
where communities have been dislocated from their traditional means 
of livelihood.
External Influences 
The Lao PDR has been gradually integrating with the world economy 
since the early 1990s. A steady process of economic liberalisation and 
reform has arisen from Laos joining the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations in July 1997, its associated commitments to the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area, and from the process of joining the World Trade Organisation. 
At the same time the country has been actively seeking direct foreign 
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investment to facilitate economic growth and has remained heavily 
dependent on multi-lateral and bilateral donor agencies for budgetary 
support. All of this has served to influence the overall direction of 
economic policy and the wider political economy, which have also been 
heavily influenced by the evolving economic policies of China, Vietnam 
and Thailand. 
In spite of the inevitable pressures for change arising from the wider 
political economy of the Asia region, the government is broadly 
supportive of reform but keen to ensure the process does not undermine 
the status quo of the political establishment. Laos is increasingly 
interested in regional experience in helping to inform and guide the 
development of economic, and to a lesser extent political, policies. 
Vietnam clearly has the ability to exert major influence in Laos, 
especially in the area of governance reforms. This is evident in much of 
the terminology used for governance and public administration reform, 
e.g. with Laos following its neighbour in establishing the Ministry of 
Home Affairs and a similar set of governance reforms. Important new 
reforms in Vietnam that will probably influence Laos include:
•	 Greater de-concentration of technical human resources man-
agement functions to line ministries and local government
•	 Civil	service	recruitment	and	promotion	policies	
•	 Pay	and	remuneration	reforms,	creating	a	salary	structure	that	
is sufficiently differentiated to motivate and reflect personal 
capacity and performance
•	 Greater	financial	autonomy	through	the	use	of	block	grants
•	 Civil	service	training	policy
Whilst China has traditionally had a more volatile relationship with Laos, 
it clearly exerts a strong influence in the economic realm, where Chinese 
investors are beginning to dominate whole sectors such as large-scale 
agricultural commodity production and mining. South Korea is also 
likely to be a major new player in the economy and will begin to exert 
more influence over the next few years. 
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The relationship with Thailand is complex due to long historical and 
cultural ties and the increasing influence of Thai culture on the younger 
generation. This has been substantially reinforced in the last ten years 
as Lao youth has gained more access to Thai media. 
Steady economic liberalisation and reform have arisen from 
integration with the world economy. Foreign investment is 
facilitating economic growth but Laos remains dependent on 
donor support and is increasingly interested in regional experience 
to guide development. Vietnam exerts major influence, espe-
cially in governance reforms while Chinese investors are begin-
ning to dominate whole sectors and South Korea is becoming a 
major player. With many more countries willing to establish 
cordial relations, Laos can play off such interests to generate 
useful dividends. 
Australia may be one of the more influential of the non Asian countries 
although its influence is still limited. A new generation of the Lao 
educated class has studied in Australia and has some social and cultural 
affinity with the country, but this almost never translates into anything 
more substantive. Australia does have significant FDI interests, with two 
leading Australian mining companies responsible for around US$2 billion 
of investment. Whilst officials from these companies claim the relationship 
with government has been cordial and transparent at the highest level, 
such relationships are confined to specific business-related issues.
Similarly ASEAN is an influential force, but more in the economic sphere 
and vis-à-vis economic and trade reforms. Southeast Asia is assuming 
increasing geo-political importance, with ASEAN growing in influence 
and Japan, South Korea, China, India, and increasingly the US, confirming 
an interest in the region. These trends can be helpful in that there are 
many more countries willing to establish cordial relations with Laos, 
which can play off such interests. If such relations are managed well 
they could generate useful dividends. There is now, for example, 
greater acceptance of US support for development, which includes the 
WTO project. This is involved in law making and so has political content. 
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Donor Partners
The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Japan have been 
expanding commitments to Laos in recent years and are the biggest 
donors. The banks have been pushing fiscal centralisation and have 
greater leverage to influence and encourage change in this area than 
any single bilateral partner. Australia is gearing up to be a larger 
player in the development arena and may become the biggest of all 
bilateral donors in a few years. Germany is expanding its programme 
in Laos based on the country’s continuing status as one of the poorest 
countries in Asia. Whilst China defines itself as a developing country 
and thus doesn’t give aid per se, it does provide commercial and soft 
loans and may become a significant player in the short and medium 
term. 
The political economy of aid in Southeast Asia is an interesting topic. 
Cambodia, for example, has shown a keen interest in donors as long 
as they can be controlled and provide funding without conditionalities. 
In Laos, donor aid is seen as a necessary medicine, but the quicker the 
Government can reach a point of greater self sufficiency in budgetary 
terms the better. At the same time, many western donors are faced 
with a position where the credibility of their systems and ideas would 
appear to be under question by many observers in Asia. 
Donor coordination is managed by UNDP, which has been placing 
substantial emphasis on using donor funds to address the MDG targets, 
which do not represent the exclusive agenda of the Government. Some 
commentators in the donor community and Government see the UN 
as too narrowly focused on MDG achievement and hence missing 
opportunities to address other underlying issues that may determine 
the course of MDG achievement. This strategy results in a situation in 
which donors primarily fund social development while the Government 
funds growth without the benefit of donor contribution and influence. 
Stakeholders point out the need to connect these two funding systems 
more closely into a virtuous circle rather than separate them as at 
present. Here, donors may miss the opportunity to work with the 
Government to address crucial policy connections and underlying 
constraints. Stakeholders report that some line ministries are 
essentially driven by donors and yet still lack the capacity or systems to 
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spend donor funds. Many complain of different reporting systems for 
different donors. Given the need to enable ministries to be more self 
reliant in future, donors such as the ADB are keen to take a new 
interest in building line ministry capacity. 
There is also a view amongst some stakeholders that the donor partner 
community as a whole is rather conservative and does little to explore 
the “grey” areas of policy and practice in government, in spite of being 
a major contributor to the national development budget and a partner 
in the implementation process. SDC and the EU are recognised as more 
credible than many other donor partners in this arena, although the EU 
is viewed as more bureaucratic and hence slower to respond.
Increasing Exposure to External Ideas 
A significant driver of change is the influence of increasing exposure 
to external trends, events and ideas both within Asia and from around 
the world. This driver is likely, in the short to medium run, to be 
mostly confined to the urban population but extends well beyond the 
traditional elites and upper class groups to a large number of the young 
population. These groups are already well integrated into aspects of 
global culture and look mainly to Asia for wider reference points on 
music, fashion and entertainment, with a strong interest in Thailand, 
South Korea, Japan and Singapore. There is also continuing long 
standing cultural interest in the USA and Europe and growing interest 
in Australia as destinations for study and scholarships. Much of this 
interest consolidates around a desire amongst many young people to 
learn English. All of this serves to opens up new ideas and opportunities. 
A key source of exposure to new trends and ideas is the growing 
population of students accessing different forms of tertiary education 
institutes, where there is a high degree of peer interaction and exchange. 
This opens a space for the development of new ideas and is a growing 
source of intellectual and semi-intellectual energy and curiosity in 
global media. This will begin to translate into a more coherent and 
articulate discourse on aspirations, opportunities and constraints.
